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Disclaimer
This report is the product of a multi-stakeholder inquiry convened by The Birmingham Energy Institute’s Centre for Strategic Elements 
& Critical Materials and the EPSRC Critical Elements & Materials (CrEAM) network, and funded jointly by the University of Birmingham, 
Birmingham Energy Institute, EPSRC CrREAM Network and EPSRC Impact Acceleration.
The Commissioners have agreed its conclusions and recommendations. Individual points within the text do not necessarily represent 
the views of individual Commissioners. Nothing in this report can be taken as representing the views of the Commissioners’ employers.
The Birmingham Energy Institute is the focal point for the University of Birmingham and its 
national and international partners, to create change in the way we deliver, consume and 
think about energy. Bringing together interdisciplinary research from across the University 
of Birmingham and working with government, industry and international partners, the BEI 
is developing and applying the technological innovation and original thinking required to 
create sustainable energy solutions.
Our global community is consuming more energy than ever. As we run out of time to 
contain climate change the BEI is upscaling their innovative technology solutions for 
applications across the globe and influencing and shaping policy on critical issues such 
as waste management, materials supply and decarbonisation of heat to shape the energy 
solutions of tomorrow.
The UK government is committed to bringing all greenhouse gas emissions to net-zero by 
2050. The Midlands region is renowned for its ability to drive technology revolution and its 
nationally leading manufacturing and engineering base. The Birmingham Energy Institute 
is working with business, industry and policy stakeholders across the region to realise the 
transition to net-zero.
The overarching aim of the CrEAM network is to safeguard UK industry against shortages 
of strategic/critical elements and materials by bringing together leading UK academics 
from a wide range of disciplines alongside key industrial users.  The network was 
established to develop strategies to mitigate supply risks of these materials and, where 
possible develop alternatives.
The CrEAM network is raising awareness of critical materials and supply chain issues, 
and identifying and connecting UK research and development activities on selected 
strategic/critical materials to strengthen possibilities for multi- and interdisciplinary 
research. This research is helping to protect UK commercial interests dependent on 
materials supply by connecting expertise throughout the supply chain to work on  
solutions to the problems identified.
The Birmingham Centre for Strategic Elements and Critical Materials (BCSECM) was 
established to unite the significant research activity at the University of Birmingham in 
the area of strategic elements and critical materials and provide a forum to promote 
interdisciplinary collaboration in this field.
The BCSECM was launched in March 2017 and it encompasses expertise from across 
the University of Birmingham and the Birmingham Energy Institute in Biosciences, 
Chemical Engineering, Chemistry, Earth & Environmental Sciences, Economics, Law, 
Materials Science, Physics and Social Science.  The experts within the centre all have 
the common aim of addressing the challenges posed by supply constraints for strategic 
elements and critical materials.
SECURING TECHNOLOGY-CRITICAL METALS FOR BRITAIN 3SECURING TECHNOLOGY-CRITICAL METALS FOR BRITAIN2
CHAIR’S LETTER
We embarked upon the journey to formulate this Policy Commission, in what now 
seems like a different world. The UK had not yet left the European Union and the 
Coronavirus pandemic was not yet upon us.
In the past year, we have witnessed some dramatic changes that have reshaped 
the UK’s relationship with the world and our trading partners, stress-tested 
our supply chains and logistics capabilities and changed our society in many 
profound ways. Some of these changes will be transitory, but others will have 
longer lasting effects.
Yet there are also long-standing challenges that have remained a constant - our 
ongoing mission to curb carbon emissions and attempts to combat climate 
change remain. Our ability to deliver on our international commitments will 
doubtless be enabled or constrained by our access to the technology-critical 
metals that underpin the clean energy transition.
This Policy Commission was initiated from the starting point that our trading 
relationships would be changing and the UK would need to consider its position 
and strategy in relation to technology-critical metals as a sovereign country. 
There have been many lessons over the past year that have shown us the 
consequences when supply and value chains are strained. It is important to 
recognise the consequences that supply constraints on technology-critical metals 
could have on our future prosperity. Whilst there are immediate challenges that 
we face, we can anticipate more in the future - it is essential to be prepared.
During the process of compiling this report, much has changed. We embarked 
upon this process prior to the UK reaching a deal with the European Union, 
before the pandemic and prior to the election of a new President in the United 
States. In some ways, it feels that we initiated the Policy Commission in another 
time. However, the challenges we set out to identify remain and the themes 
explored are still as resonant as ever, if anything, the changing situation has only 
served to highlight the timeliness of this report and the writing team have updated 
the text to reflect our new global context.
There are promising signs that we are headed in the right direction - whilst the 
UK has not yet published a publicly articulated strategy around technology-critical 
metals, we note through our networks that there is vigilance around this issue and 
plans afoot to formulate policy in this area. Furthermore, the academic partners 
that initiated this report have been successful in securing funding for the ‘UKRI 
Interdisciplinary Circular Economy Centre for Technology Metals’(Met4Tech) - this 
will undoubtedly build upon the successful collaborations around the CrEAM 
network that have been instrumental in delivering this report.
It is our sincere hope that this report will serve as a catalyst for raising the 
profile of this crucial area, indeed our leadership in this area has the potential to 
unleash solutions that will benefit not only the UK, but also the many other nations 
grappling with the same challenges that we face.
Sir John Beddington
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FOREWORD
The Birmingham Centre for Strategic Elements and Critical Materials (BCSECM) was 
launched on the 29th of March 2017. One of the main catalysts for the formation of the 
centre, was the realisation that the UK’s relationship with the rest of the rest of the world 
would be changing in ways which were then unforeseen and undefined. Mr Reinhardt 
Bütikofer MEP, Co-Chair of the European Green Party, spoke at this event, noting that 
the “European Union has been a very successful driver of raw materials policy”. Indeed, 
until Brexit, our critical materials policy had largely been defined as part of the EU. We 
realised that there would be an urgent need for the UK to establish an independent 
policy and technological leadership in this area. The BCSECM brought together a highly 
interdisciplinary team of experts in physical sciences, engineering, business and law 
which has proven enormously beneficial in addressing this multifaceted challenge.
Since the Centre’s inception, we have collaborated with many organisations across the 
UK with complementary capability. In partnership with Exeter University we established 
the EPRSC Critical Elements and Materials (CrEAM) Network, which for the first time 
brought together academic and industry expertise from previously siloed, but related, 
sectors such as mining, materials processing, manufacturing, and recycling. This Policy 
Commission is one of the fruits of that joint enterprise, providing a comprehensive end-to-
end assessment of our use and dependence on critical materials and unbound by sector-
specific considerations. The UKRI Circular Economy centre for Metals for Technology 
(Met4Tech), led by the University of Exeter and only recently announced, will further 
strengthen our partnerships and collaboration.
Ground-breaking projects developing solutions at scale have been a feature of our 
mission. The Faraday Institution ReLiB project, led from Birmingham and addressing the 
recycling and reuse of lithium-ion batteries, has helped us to forge strong partnerships 
with several leading UK universities. Our EU (SUSMAGPRO) and UKRI projects (RaRE 
and REAP) on recycling of rare earth magnets have brought together whole supply chains 
including recycling companies, alloy producers, magnet manufacturers through to end 
users. 
Moving forwards, our Policy Commission began its work on the 28th of October 2019, 
with an aim to report six months later. We could not have anticipated how Coronavirus 
would change the world, and the launch of the report was accordingly delayed after 
several attempts to organise an in-person launch event were prevented by the changing 
situation.
Around a similar time, the Birmingham Energy Institute & Energy Research Accelerator 
launched a related Policy Commission, chaired by Lord Teverson, entitled Energy from 
Waste and the Circular Economy: Net Zero & Resource Efficiency by 2050. Although 
the emphasis of that Policy Commission is on waste more broadly, and the potential to 
generate energy from waste, there are many synergies with our report.
One of the key recommendations is the creation of “Resource Recovery Clusters”, 
hubs for innovation around transforming waste into valuable resources for our economy. 
Indeed, the Birmingham Energy Institute is working to develop the Tyseley Energy Park, 
an ambitious energy and resource nexus close to the city of Birmingham. It is here that 
many of the technologies for the processing and recovery of technology-critical metals are 
being developed. Indeed, a key challenge addressed in this report, is the need to develop 
sophisticated technologies for recycling of technology-critical metals. This is exactly the 
approach that we hope to validate with our scale up of new innovative technologies at 
Tyseley.
We are very positive about the enormous opportunities for the UK to define a fresh 
strategy for technology-critical metals. These are generational opportunities that stand to 
benefit not only the UK, but also the world as we join forces as a planet to decarbonise. 
That said, we caution that so too are the potential threats to our industry, jobs and global 
standing if we hesitate or do not act in time. We hope this report and its recommendations 
will prove useful to government, industry, and universities as we embark on the journey to 
a zero-carbon future.
Professor Allan Walton and Dr Paul Anderson
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THE WORLD’S DEMAND FOR  
RAW MATERIALS IS EXPECTED  
TO DOUBLE BY 2060
TECHNOLOGY-CRITICAL METALS ARE 
THE BUILDING BLOCK MATERIALS FOR 
THE GREEN ECONOMY AND WITHOUT 
THEM THE UK GOVERNMENT’S 10 
POINT PLAN FOR A GREEN INDUSTRIAL 
REVOLUTION WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE TO 
REALISE.11
EXECUTIVE SUMMARY & KEY RECOMMENDATIONS
In the next 5-10 years the UK is going to see dramatic changes to many of its large industrial sectors, such as automotive, aerospace 
and energy generation, as we move from a fossil-fuel-driven society to an electrically driven one. Many of these industries will be 
dependent on technology-critical metals (TCMs), for example, cobalt and lithium for the batteries in electric vehicles and rare-earths 
used in the magnets for electric motors and wind turbines. 
These technology-critical metals have been identified by the EU, 
US and Japan as being a serious supply risk1,2,3. In a post-Brexit 
Europe, it is vital that the UK develops its own strategies to access 
these metals so that we can achieve the planned transition to 
a low-carbon society and meet our climate-change targets. 
Covid-19 has highlighted the vulnerabilities of many supply 
chains and, as we scramble to shore up existing industries 
and expand into new job-creating sectors, the UK needs 
to ask itself serious questions about how it will access 
essential raw materials like technology-critical metals. To 
put this in perspective, such metals are vital to 7 of the 
top-10 UK export markets, with a value of more than £150 
billion annually. The Faraday Institution predicted that the 
transition to manufacturing electric vehicles (EVs) could 
support 220,000 jobs by 2040. 
The ability to create and retain these jobs will depend on 
the UK’s access to critical materials for batteries4 and rare-
earth magnets for EV motors and platinum group metals for the 
hydrogen economy.
The world’s demand for raw materials is expected to double by 
2060, according to a report by the Organisation for Economic 
Cooperation and Development5. The requirement for metals is 
expected to grow even faster, with an expansion from 8 to 20 
gigatonnes over the same period. In volume terms, much of this 
will be readily available, and easily recycled, metals like iron and 
aluminium. However, high-technology industries that make, for 
example, batteries and motors for EVs, the generators for wind 
turbines and the jet engines for aircraft are dependent on many 
technology-critical metals. It is predicted that by 2050 the EU will 
require 60 times more lithium, 15 times more cobalt, and ten times 
the amount of rare earths compared to the current supply to the 
whole EU economy1. 
The new industrial strategy for the EU warned that 
Europe’s transition to climate neutrality could 
replace today’s reliance on fossil fuels with one 
on raw materials, many of which we source 
from abroad and for which global competition 
is becoming fierce.
DEVELOPING STRATEGIES
Many regions of the world, including the EU, have been developing strategies to access these technology-critical metals for their key 
industries6, while the UK has lagged behind. The challenges already faced around access to key technology metals are potentially 
complicated for the UK by the nation’s exit from the EU, and the uncertainty that this has created with regard to trading relationships 
around the globe. It is in this challenging context that the UK must now fashion its own independent policy for access to technology-
critical metals.
Technology-critical metals are often at risk of supply shortage for 
a number of reasons: rapidly expanding markets, geographical 
concentrations in certain parts of the globe, political factors (trade 
disputes, quotas and taxes), low recycling rates and a lack of 
alternative substitute materials. It should be noted that at present 
none of these elements are mined in significant amounts in the UK.
Accessing the raw materials, however, is just one piece of the 
jigsaw. Without the processing technologies necessary to convert 
these technology-critical metals into, for example, chemicals, 
cathodes, alloys or magnets, we remain reliant on other countries 
for the critical components needed by our industrial sectors, 
and in many cases a large bulk of the value and jobs are in 
these parts of the supply chain. Highly skilled jobs, which would 
otherwise provide high-quality employment, are at risk if we do not 
capture more of the value chain in the UK. Some regions of the 
world, especially China, have invested heavily in the processing 
capability to convert these materials into products and, by 
doing so, now control the downstream supply chain. This report 
describes some of these global supply chains and suggests 
opportunities for intervention. 
Recycling or re-using the materials and components at end-of-life 
or from production scrap could provide a significant indigenous 
supply of technology-critical metals; however, there are 
technological, economic and regulatory barriers 
in some cases, which has meant that many 
of these materials are lost in the 
system. For example, less 
than 3% of rare-earth 
materials are 
recycled today worldwide1. This report explores such barriers 
and suggests action that could be taken to promote a UK-based 
secondary supply chain to re-use, recover and reprocess these 
materials and products, learning lessons from success stories 
with platinum-group metals and aerospace alloys, where world-
leading recycling technologies have been developed in the UK.
It is important to note that the secondary supply of these 
materials should not operate in isolation from the primary 
raw-material sources. In many cases the same processing 
technologies exist for both and if set up correctly, both should 
be leveraged to support the downstream supply chain. This 
will provide opportunities for employment and the development 
of a sustainable system for technology-critical metals in order 
to reduce the environmental footprint of production. Several 
examples of this are given in the report.
There are also opportunities for primary supply in the UK and 
by making strategic alliances overseas. The UK has major 
international interests in mining, through London registered 
companies, mine finance, equipment supply, consultancy 
services, and research and education. 
The EU recently updated its critical materials list which has 
expanded to 30 material groups. This Policy Commission is more 
tightly focused on groups of technology-critical metals that are 
vital to the UK’s industrial future. In particular, we have looked at 
battery materials (cobalt, nickel and lithium), rare-earth materials 
(neodymium, dysprosium), aerospace materials (rhenium and 
tantalum) and platinum-group metals (platinum, palladium). The 
report is by no means a comprehensive list of all of the critical 
materials that are important to the UK economy, but it is a starting 
point for further discussion.
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CONTINUED
In the intervening period since this commission was initiated, there have been a 
number of promising developments, which shows a recognition of this crucial issue by 
Government and Industry. 
The Parliamentary Office for Science and Technology released its POSTNote on Access 
to Critical Materials in September 20197, to which a number of the Commissioners and 
Witnesses to this report contributed. The Critical Minerals Association was launched in 
January 2020 and the All Party Parliamentary Group on Critical Minerals was launched 
on February 2020 (mainly focussed on primary supplies)8. Additionally, a number 
of significant government investments in key sectors have recognised some of the 
problems the UK faces with technology metals, including the industrial strategy projects: 
Faraday Battery Challenge/Faraday Institution and Driving The Electric Revolution9. 
However, these are often sectoral investments, which cannot address the totality of the 
threat or the opportunity without engagement across multiple value chains. 
While these developments anticipate certain recommendations of the report, they also 
demonstrate that the need for concerted policy and strategy in this area is more pressing 
than ever. No report of this kind can ever offer more than a contemporary perspective, 
pointing the way forward on the best evidence available. As the world continues to 
change, we must adapt with it, and so this report will receive regular updates from the 
Birmingham Centre for Strategic Elements & Critical Materials and partners active in the 
EPSRC CrEAM network. 
RECOMMENDATIONS
The recommendations are built upon our findings, compiled from the evidence sought from a wide cross-section of expertise, 
from a broad range of UK stakeholders. These recommendations are informed by the challenges that end-users in crucial British 
industries have faced, as well as insight from across the supply chain for a number of key technology metals. Although the 
specific challenges around different materials vary, there is a common clarion call from all: UK urgently needs to develop policy 
responses to the critical materials challenge post-Brexit.
SEEK OPPORTUNITIES FOR THE UK TO 
DIVERSIFY ITS ACCESS TO PRIMARY 
RESOURCES OF CRITICAL MATERIALS
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1 The UK should create a single body responsible for developing strategic access to technology-critical   
 metals and effective inter-departmental collaboration at government level. This body should link the  
 primary and secondary markets for technology-critical metals, and develop and oversee, a full UK   
 technology-critical metal strategy. 
2 Seek opportunities to diversify its access to primary resources of technology-critical metals, through  
 resource diplomacy. This should form part of any new trade negotiations.
3 Actively attract & provide support for large-scale strategic private investments for supply   
 chain development of technology-critical metals both at home and abroad, and aim to    
 make the UK an international refining centre for specific technology-critical metals by   
 2025. 
4 Create individual task forces bridging primary and secondary materials for targeted   
 technology-critical metals. These should identify the investments that would be   
 required to set up primary processing, refining and recycling facilities for these   
 materials.
5 Introduce incentives to encourage recycling, refining and processing of 
  technology-critical metals in the UK, particularly for processes that deliver   
 a lower environmental footprint.
6 Consider measures to accelerate projects that seek to develop our    
 indigenous sources of technology-critical metals (lithium, tungsten),  
 including updating the regulatory environment.  
7 Prioritise technology-critical metals in UK Research and Innovation   
 strategies in areas such as the circular economy, developing 
 substitute materials and efficient processing techniques for 
 technology-critical metals.
8 Invest in the skills base in advanced materials processing and 
 refining  of  technology-critical metals. 
9 Urgently address the lack of data on material flows for  
 technology-critical metals into and out of the UK    
 economy. 
10 Review waste management law with a view to   
 promoting recovery of technology-critical metals   
 and ensure that  there are no unnecessary   
 regulatory barriers. 
11 Encourage information exchange through  
 the whole supply chain to ensure the  
 challenges for recyclers are well   
 understood by the product designers. 
12 Consider how appropriate governance   
 structures might ensure sustainability   
 and resilience in the supply chain for 
 technology-critical metals (see   
 detailed recommendations in the  
 Goverance section of the report).
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A material is defined as critical when it is deemed to be at risk of short supply, but is economically important either in general or in a 
specific region of the world (see figure 2). The EU and US have open-access lists of critical materials (see figure 1). In contrast, the 
UK does not currently have a strategy in this area. 
Whether a material is deemed “critical” or not, is a policy determination that must be made by a nation or trading bloc, based on its 
own determination around access to resources, evaluation of supply risks and the impact that a supply restriction so deemed in 
another area would cause to that region’s economy. A material that is deemed a ‘critical material’ in one locale, may not be deemed 
as such in another area. 
Whether a material is critical depends on many factors, such as the quantity required, the rate of consumption, the challenges 
associated with purifying it, low recycling rates, ease of substitution, geographical concentration and the ease of access to the 




























PHOSPHATE ROCK NATURAL RUBBER
TUNGSTEN
CRITICAL MATERIALS FOR THE EU
TECHNOLOGY METALS COVERED 
IN THIS REPORT
Technology-critical metals are essential to many of the technologies that underpin the modern world. Their 
unique properties impart function to components that cannot be met with other metals or materials. This 
makes technology-critical metals of key economic importance to the UK (see figure 1).
There are other materials that are of economic importance, but their relative abundance and/or the ease with which we 
can access them means they are not classed as critical. What makes a material critical is one or more factors that 
constrain their availability. This can be as a result, for example, of the material’s geographical distribution,  
geo-political factors, supply-chain bottlenecks and lack of processing capacity.
If supply constraints affect the UK’s ability to access 
critical materials, there will be negative effects on industrial 
sectors that are key to the UK’s prosperity, such as 
automotive, aerospace, defence, pharmaceuticals, clean 
energy, machinery & equipment, robotics, transport and 
manufacturing . Furthermore, given that critical materials are 
key to many clean technologies, their constrained availability 
would hamper the UK’s ability 
to project leadership on the 
international stage and deliver 
on its global commitments to the 
greening of UK society. 
 Figure 1 European Commission Study on the EU’s List of Critical Raw Materials (2020), Economic Importance and Supply Risk Results of 2020 
Criticality Assessment. Emphasis changed to focus on Technology-Critical Metals1.
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Definition of a Critical MaterialBOX OUT
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There are many reasons why these 
sub-groups of metals are considered 
critical, ranging from scarcity in the 
earth’s crust for platinum group 
metals, to political factors in the case 
of the rare earths. Some materials 
such as cobalt are largely produced 
as a by-product of mining other 
metals; as a result their supply is 
largely determined by the demand for 
these metals.
There are geographical concentrations 
of most of these materials around 
the globe, with China being the 
major source of many of them. This 
is because China has invested 
strategically in mineral resources, but 
also in the refining and manufacturing 
industries to convert these materials 
























































Study on the EU's list of  




























































The EU list of critical raw materials contains a wide range of elements (within 30 raw-material groups). This includes materials and 
elements used in farming, for structural materials and in processing gas. This report is specifically targeted at technology-critical 
metals, that underpin many of our key industries of the future. It is important to note that this report does not cover all of the 
materials on the EU list. This report focuses on four sub-groups of materials.
1 Rare-earth metals (neodymium, praseodymium, samarium, 
dysprosium and terbium)
2 Battery materials (nickel, cobalt, lithium, and graphite)
3 Platinum-group metals (palladium, rhodium, and platinum)
4 Aerospace metals (rhenium and tantalum)
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HIGH PERFORMANCE Nd-Fe-B 
MAGNET ENSURING HIGH 
EFFICIENCY OF 
MOTOR
Some hydrogen fuel cells 
contain platinum-group 
metals. In the future, fuel 
cells could play a key role in 
the de-carbonisation of 
transport, and also can be 
used to produce heat and 
power in stationary 
applications. 
Batteries used in electric vehicles and 
stationary energy storage systems need 
cobalt, nickel and lithium.Also 
important are materials such as 
graphite, used in anodes.  
The most efficient electric vehicle 
motors use neodymium rare-earth 
magnets for efficiency.
Platinum-group metals are 
essential in a range of 
industries, including refining, 
bulk chemicals manufacture, 
and pharmaceuticals, where 
they are essential for the 
manufacture of drugs.
Neodymium rare-earth
magnets are used in 
generatorsin off-shore 
wind turbines.Modern 
large wind turbinescan 
contain up to three tonnes
of magnets. This represents
an enormous resource that 
could be harnessed at the 
end of a wind turbine’s 
lifecycle.
The marine sector will use 
neodymium-based 
rare-earth magnets in 
efficient electric drives, 
together with batteries and 
fuel cells, all of which 
contain technology-critical 
metals.
Rhenium is used in  
superalloys which help to 
make more efficient, 
cleaner aircraft engines.
Samarium cobalt alloys 
will be used in magnets 
in future electric aircraft 
engines.
Platinum-group metals are 
used in the catalytic converters 
of internal combustion engine
vehicles to reduce emissions.
APPLICATIONS IN THE MODERN WORLD
Technology-critical metals are essential to many current and future energy 
technologies. They underpin energy systems, transportation, manufacturing and critical 
infrastructures. It is essential that the UK has access to the technology-critical metals 
that it needs.
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ELEMENTS WIDELY USED IN PATHWAYS
NB: POSITION ON TIME AXIS IS INDICATIVE ONLY
1700 1800 1900 2000
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APPLICATIONS OF TECHNOLOGY-CRITICAL METALS
Our modern lifestyles are increasingly reliant on advanced technologies to keep us moving, communicating and living in comfort. 
Critical-metals are indispensable to many modern technologies, and their unique properties cannot easily be replaced.
As nations around the world commit to de-carbonise their energy systems, 
the transition away from fossil fuels will require the move to new energy 
vectors. Access to technology-critical metals will be fundamental to 
the production of those key technologies. Whether the UK has 
unhindered access to technology-critical metals will be decisive 
in determining whether it can benefit from the opportunities 
that come with the transition to a clean future. Technology-
critical metals are the building block materials for the green 
economy and without them the UK government’s 10 point 
plan for green growth will be impossible to realise11.
The shift to renewable energy and other low-carbon 
energy sources means that electricity will grow in 
importance as a means of transferring and storing 
energy. Where previously fossil fuels were used to 
heat homes and provide a dense energy store for 
transportation, the shift to electricity as a principal 
energy vector will require significant investments in 
both mobile and stationary storage. Electric vehicles 
will require energy-dense lithium-ion batteries that need 
technology-critical metals, like lithium, cobalt and nickel. 
Furthermore, a future hydrogen economy will require platinum-
group metals (PGMs) for use in fuel-cell manufacture. 
PGMs also find many applications as catalysts in industrial 
processes and the pharmaceutical industry.
In addition to materials used for energy-storage devices 
and generators, technology-critical metals are also 
essential in the manufacture of efficient electrical drives 
to convert electricity into motion. The most efficient 
electric-vehicle motors make use of neodymium-iron-
boron magnets.
Aerospace is a key UK industry that will require access 
to technology-metals. Superalloys used for aircraft 
engines include cobalt, tantalum and rhenium. But in the 
future, hybrid aircraft will require access to materials 
for batteries, fuel cells and magnets for use in electric 
motors.
The digital economy also requires extensive use of 
technology-critical metals. There are a multitude of 
technology-critical metals in electrical and electronic 
equipment. These products tend to have relatively short 
operating lives, sometimes just a few years, and frequently contain 
a large number of valuable materials including rare earths, tantalum, 
nickel, gold, cobalt, PGMs and lithium.
Figure 4: Representation of the range of metals used in technologies vs time.
TECHNOLOGY-CRITICAL METALS ARE THE BUILDING BLOCK MATERIALS 
FOR THE GREEN ECONOMY AND WITHOUT THEM THE UK GOVERNMENT’S 
10 POINT PLAN FOR GREEN GROWTH WILL BE IMPOSSIBLE TO REALISE.11
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LEVELLING UP AND RETAINING JOBS
For many years our national narrative has been that the UK is in the process of a transition to a knowledge and services economy.  
It is now clear that a mixed economy including high-value manufacturing will provide the country with greater resilience and strength 
than one based on services alone. The UK government’s aim to see a levelling up of the economy is also an opportunity to stimulate 
growth in high-tech manufacturing through the 10 Point Plan for a Green Industrial Revolution 11.
Regional rebalancing will be dependent on retaining and developing highly 
skilled, high-value-added jobs in sectors like manufacturing. Restricted access 
to critical materials would do great harm to the future development of these 
sectors. In the very near future whole industries will be reliant on access to critical 
materials, and without access to these materials there will be job losses across 
many sectors.
The Faraday Institution, predict that in a case where the UK is successful in 
transitioning to the manufacture of electric vehicles (EVs), the automotive and EV 
battery ecosystem would grow by 29% from 170,000 to 220,000 employees by 
2040, with 78,000 new jobs created in the new UK battery gigafactories and in 
their battery-material supply chains12. The ability to create and retain these jobs 
will depend on the UK’s access to critical materials13.
The Advanced Propulsion Centre (APC) estimates that the market opportunity for 
power electronics and electric machines is a £12bn opportunity by 202514. Rare- 
earth magnets represent 40-60% of the materials cost for electric machines. So 
the APC identifies magnet manufacturing as a critical process in the supply chain.
While there are many factors that make the UK an attractive 
location for high-value manufacturing, in a competitive world 
those countries that can secure access to key materials will 
have a significant advantage. Many of these  manufacturing 
industries are changing rapidly and therefore the time left to act 
is very short. Diesel, for example, will be phased out by 203515. If 
the UK is to retain workers in this sector, not only will they have to be 
re-trained, but the production of electric vehicles will require access to 
lithium, cobalt and nickel for batteries and rare earths for the magnets in 
the drive motors. It is also important to realise that it is not enough to have 
access to the raw materials; we also require access to the processed forms 
of these metals in the form of alloys or chemicals. These are often complex 
supply-chains and for this reason the different sub-groups are dealt with 
separately in detail in the report.
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OUR GROWING GLOBAL APPETITE FOR  
TECHNOLOGY-CRITICAL METALS
With the global population set to grow to 9.7 billion by 2050, we can anticipate further strain on the world’s resources. Furthermore, 
there are additional challenges posed by the increasing affluence of the global population, and the resources required to service people’s 
lifestyles and expectations. The 47 least-developed countries are among the fastest growing, and their populations’ spending power 
is increasing16. Sales of consumer goods, motorcycles and cars have surged in many African countries, a sign that consumers have 
discretionary income to spend on consumer durables. In 2018, the world reached a tipping point, where half of the population, 3.8 billion 
people, now live in households with enough discretionary income to be considered “middle class”. This number is expected to grow to 
5.3 billion by 203017. Achieving the UN’s Sustainable Development Goals18, and ensuring that we do so in a way that is just and equitable 
on a planet with finite resources and a growing population, is a challenge that will only intensify.
WORLD POPULATION






Figure 5: The earth’s increasing population19
GLOBAL INCOME TIPPING POINT









Figure 6: Global income tipping point, Sept 2018 (number of 




Risk of losing the SME base
As an example evidence was 
presented at the commission 
highlighting an SME that moved from 
South Wales because of the price rises for 
rare earths, during the “rare earth crisis”. The 
company moved its operations to China, taking 
skilled engineers with them.
Large companies have the purchasing power to buy 
materials in volume, to stockpile and hedge against 
future price rises by buying futures in technology metals. 
By contrast, smaller companies do not have this luxury which 
makes them more vulnerable to price volatility. 
 
UK: New Trade Deals: Risks And Opportunities
As the UK has left the European Union, there is now a period of 
uncertainty and change as trade deals are negotiated with countries 
around the world. For countries that are rich in mineral resources, access 
to critical materials is an advantage and an opportunity for leverage over the 
UK in trade negotiations. This feeds into wider concerns about the exposure 
of UK industry to export quotas, as well as price fluctuations and the variability 
of key feedstocks.
New trade flows building on access to primary materials have the potential 
to be mutually beneficial, however, if the UK can offer significant downstream 
processing capacity. Opportunities like the Comprehensive 
and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(CPTPP) open the possibility to join trading blocs 
with new partners, some of whom have access to 
mineral resources, whilst others are developing the 
technologies to solve the challenges of materials 
criticality.
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MATERIALS: CRITICAL FOR THE CLIMATE
The UK has shown great leadership on the issue of climate change. With the 2008 Climate Change Act, the UK became the first 
country to make a legally binding, long-term commitment to change the trajectory of national carbon emissions to tackle climate 
change with “Carbon budgets”, the Climate Change Commission, and the development of a climate-change action plan20.
Significant pledges were made by the members of the 
European Union in Paris. At the time, it was noted that the 
Paris pledges might slow global warming to between 2.5 
and 3oC - still above a level where dangerous tipping points, 
might be exceeded21.
Member States committed to reducing emissions by 55% 
below 1990 levels, by 2030. With Brexit, and the UK 
leaving the EU, there might be changes in the way that 
these commitments are delivered: it is unclear how policies 
previously developed at the EU level will be transposed 
into UK law. The need to reduce carbon emissions is 
incontrovertible; carbon budgets are set into UK law and 
there is a duty on the UK Government to tackle climate 
change22.
The UK is on track to meet its third carbon-budget target, 
which covers the period 2018-2022 (the 
CCC); however, it is not yet on track 
to meet the fourth carbon-budget 
target covering the period 2023-
202722 or the fifth covering 
the period 2028-2032. The 
UK has passed laws to 
reduce emissions to zero 
by 205023, ending its 
contribution to global 
warming. Reaching 
net-zero emissions will 
require reductions of 
15 MtCO2e per year.
The significant 
challenge remains: the 
necessary emissions 
reductions on this scale 
will require the massive 
deployment of a wide 
spectrum of clean-energy 
technologies to aid the 
transition away from fossil fuels. 
Many of these technologies require 
technology-critical metals as part of the 
production process. The UK is not the only 
customer for these materials in a global marketplace where 
the world is attempting to transition away from fossil-fuel-
based technologies, and there will inevitably be tensions 
that arise in the competition for limited resources. Some 
have suggested the need for a better framework to facilitate 
the mineral resources necessary for this transition24.
All eyes will be on the United Kingdom as it hosts the 
UN Climate Change Conference COP26 in Glasgow 
2021. Technology-critical metals will be at the forefront 
of discussions as they are essential for many green 
technologies. Both domestic and international responses 
to the pressing challenge of access to technology-critical 
metals will be the key to developing new energy systems. 
The UK is well placed to contribute to the solutions, with 
the innovative technologies being developed 
here. We should use this opportunity to 
showcase our contribution to the 
global challenge of sourcing 
technology-critical metals for 
the clean transition.
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TECHNOLOGY METALS AS LEVERAGE IN TRADE DISPUTES
There is an uneven distribution of critical materials, and the processing capability, to refine them into usable materials, around the 
globe. Accordingly, there is the potential for countries that have, or have secured access to critical materials, to use this position as 
leverage in trade disputes and negotiations. This is something that the UK needs to be particularly mindful of, as it seeks to forge 
new trade deals following its departure from the European Union. As highlighted in the rare-earth crisis of 2011 box out there is 
precedent for supply disruption.
In the United States, successive presidents have grappled with the issue of the US’ vulnerability to disruption in critical 
materials supply. President Barack Obama recognised the challenge critical materials presented to the US, saying “We 
prefer dialogue. That’s especially true when it comes to key trading partners like China,” But Obama also said, “but when 
it is necessary, I will take action if our workers and our businesses are being subjected to unfair practices25.” The political 
style of his successor was notably different; however, the recognition of the problem is the same. 
President Trump signed an executive order, which stated that the county’s “undue reliance on 
critical materials, in processed or unprocessed form, from foreign adversaries constitutes 
an unusual and extraordinary threat, which has its source in substantial part outside 
the United States, to the national security, foreign policy, and economy of the United 
States. I hereby declare a national emergency to deal with that threat.”26 
It has been pointed out that China recognises its dominance in the rare-earth 
supply chain as a tool for achieving geopolitical influence27. Other countries 
around the world have realised the challenges that restrictions on rare earths 
could pose to their industry and have taken proactive measures. We cover a number of case studies of other nation’s 
responses to materials criticality including the US and Japan later in this report. There is concern in American policy 
circles that foreign restrictions on the USs’ critical materials’ supply could have serious implications for national 
security and defence28. China has threatened to embargo the supply of critical materials to the US29. In the US the 
Critical Materials Institute was a major strategic investment designed as a US response to this problem. There is 
a recognition that the supply of critical materials could lead to the movement of jobs from the US. Despite these 
measures, there is still concern as to whether the US approach has reduced the problem28.
President Biden will issue an executive order reviewing US Critical Material Supply chains.30 He pledged on 
the campaign trail to review US vulnerabilities31 and has set out how this should be co-ordinated between 
the state and federal levels of governance. Delivering on his campaign pledges, it is anticipated that 
he will take many steps to address US critical materials’ challenges as set out in his 
manifesto32.
Whilst the efficacy of different measures can be debated, what is clear 
is that the US has a considered policy response in this area, which 
at present the UK lacks. This is an issue that will only increase 
in importance as the UK seeks to forge its own trade policies 
independently of the European Union, and the potential 
for critical materials to be used as leverage presents a 
significant challenge and potential national-security issue.
As an island nation reliant on imports of technology-
critical metals, there is much that we can learn from 
Japan’s approach to managing the impacts of materials 
criticality on Japanese industry (see conclusions 
section).
Between 2005 and 2012 China introduced export quotas and taxes for rare-earth materials. This resulted in large price fluctuations for 
rare earths and was exacerbated by an alleged diplomatic incident in the South China sea when a Chinese fishing trawler collided with a 
Japanese coastguard vessel. It was reported at the time that the Chinese threatened to embargo exports of rare earths to Japan unless 
the fisherman was released from custody, although the Chinese have subsequently denied this. This was one of the drivers for Japan to 
develop a coherent critical-materials strategy to minimise the risks of future supply restrictions.
Within a year prices were back to pre-crisis levels and have generally continued to fall ever since (see figure 7). Of course, this does 
not mean that the problem has gone away. China still controls around 90% of the rare-earth market and the UK has no rare-earth 
deposits of its own (see figure 8).
The 2012  
WTO dispute
In 2012, the United States filed a case 
with the World Trade Organisation 
(WTO) after the US, EU and Japan 
argued that China’s restrictions on 
the sale of rare earths violated the 
WTO’s regulations. China argued that 
it had environmental concerns and 
was legally conserving resources. 
The WTO ruled in favour of the US in 
2014, which forced China to remove 
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Figure 7: Rare earth price history
Figure 8: World mine production of rare earths 2019. Reproduced from USGS. 34
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When the Chinese President Xi Jinping visited a rare-
earth processing plant in Jiangxi, just a week after the 
Trump administration blacklisted Huawei in May 2019, he 
highlighted the importance of rare earths in global supply-
chains (see figure 9). This statement was widely seen as 
a threat to restrict Chinese exports or rare earths to the 
United States.
The Trump administration has subsequently looked at 
accelerating the process for mining permits, increasing 
R&D, and more trade in rare earths with allies. The former 
president also asked the Department of Defence (in the 
US) to increase the production of rare-earth magnets, with 
Australia announcing that it would boost supplies.
President Biden has said that he will direct his 
administration to conduct a review of key US supply-chains, 
including those for rare earth metals.35
Commentators have said that while the executive order 
does not explicitly mention China, the directive is “likely 
in large part an effort by the administration to determine 
how reliant the US economy and military are on Chinese 
exports.”36
Last year in the Senate Energy and Natural Resources 
Committee, Sen. Lisa Murkowski, (a Republican from 
Alaska) asked what would happen in the event that China 
decided to cut off the US from access to critical materials. 
Simon Moores, the Managing Director of Benchmark 
Minerals Intelligence replied that the move would leave 
the US with few options and prove devastating to the US 
economy.
Figure 9: Chinese President Xi visits a rare earth processing plant. 
On 20th May, 2019 the Chinese President Xi Jinping, the general secretary of the Communist Party of China Central Committee and chairman of the 
Central Military Commission visiting JL MAG Rare-Earth Co. Ltd.
ACCESS TO PRIMARY SOURCES 
OF TECHNOLOGY-CRITICAL METALS
One of the main challenges for the European Union is the limited opportunities to 
produce critical materials from indigenous resources. In many cases either the 
deposits of materials do not exist, or where those materials are present, they cannot 
be extracted at a competitive price, using methods that would be environmentally 
acceptable in Europe. There are a few notable exceptions to this, and efforts are 
underway to evaluate what primary resources exist within the European territory37. 
There are opportunities for the small-scale production of certain strategic elements, 
and consideration is being given to methods for extraction that might be more 
environmentally benign than current processes38. Before Brexit, the UK had considered 
its strategy as part of this continental alliance; however, the UK must now consider the 
challenges and opportunities around critical materials as a separate entity.
Focusing on the UK, there are very limited opportunities in the UK for the 
domestic production of critical materials, however; there are some notable 
exceptions. e.g., Cornish lithium39, tungsten40 etc. These opportunities will be set 
out more comprehensively later in this report.
The UK must therefore consider what its unique strengths are, and how these can 
be leveraged in ways that bring a competitive advantage in the quest to secure access 
to critical materials. There is also the opportunity for the UK to invest, as other countries have 
done, in developing access and extraction of other critical primary resources around the world and 
this should be part of our trade negotiations.
Considering the supply-chain as a whole, the UK might be better placed downstream, with opportunities to 
develop supply chains for processing critical materials into value-added products and partnering with resource-
rich nations around the globe that have access to critical materials. Here, the UK could be well placed to create the 
infrastructure to process primary materials that are extracted overseas, thereby reducing our dependence on the present 
restrictive supply-chains and capturing the high-value-added elements for Britain.
In this respect, the UK has an asset in the City of London; as a global financial hub, a great deal of finance 
for mining projects flows through the city. It might be possible to leverage this position to create 
opportunities for new resource and project developments to secure UK access to technology-
critical metals.
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MOVING TOWARDS A CIRCULAR  
ECONOMY IN TECHNOLOGY-CRITICAL METALS
In many cases there are synergies between the processing of primary materials and the 
ability to be able to process secondary material from recycled feedstocks. Here, there is 
some potential to create capabilities that in the first instance could be used to process 
a higher volume of imported primary material, and as secondary materials become 
available, could switch to processing a greater proportion of secondary scrap. For some 
materials there is an abundance of secondary material, but the supply-chains for primary 
material have not yet been developed. Here, these secondary materials could be a basis 
for developing processing capacity in the UK in order to fill supply-chain gaps.
One example of this could be in the rare-earth supply-chain. The recycling rate for 
rare-earth magnets, which are used in electric motors, is very low today. However, 
the UK has unique patented technology to remove and to recycle these materials 
from waste streams. This could be leveraged to build the supply for magnets that 
would subsequently support the primary supply chain. Taking material from new 
primary resource exploration projects and secondary resources from 
recycling could provide supply-chain resilience for a UK magnet 
manufacturer. These recycling processes can process scrap 
material from further up the supply chain, cutting the cost 
and environmental burden of producing technology-
critical metals.
As a product reaches the end of its useful life, it 
must be seen as a resource rather than something 
to be disposed of as quickly as possible. 
For simple products like glass and paper, 
the practicalities of this are not difficult to 
implement. However, as products become 
more complex - a mobile phone can contain 
two-thirds of the elements from the Periodic 
Table - it becomes increasingly difficult for 
consumers to become involved and for 
recyclers to operate a profitable business.
Currently, many products that cannot be 
recycled economically in the UK are exported 
to countries with 
low-cost economies. 
These products are 
often processed in 
conditions that would 
not be considered 
acceptable in the UK from a 
health-and-safety perspective, 
and  in some instances  involve  
child  labour  and/or poor working  
conditions. The extent of this exporting should not be 
underestimated. As much as 80% of the metal products 
that are classified as waste are exported from the UK, 
making us the largest exporter out of the EU. The UK also 
scraps more End-of-Life (EoL) vehicles than any other 
country. This is partially due to the relatively large market for 
vehicles in the UK, but also because, unlike Germany, for 
example, the UK has few options for re-selling its second-
hand, right-hand-drive cars and lorries. At end of life some 
of the components, such as the battery and the catalytic 
converter, are removed and then the car is shredded with 
subsequent material separation and sorting. The switch 
to hybrid and electric vehicles will have  implications 
for the value of recycled vehicles and materials, on the 
technologies which are used for separation and on the 
safety of workers at these facilities.
Here, there is an enormous opportunity for the UK to 
develop globally exportable intellectual property around 
recycling processes and novel approaches to mitigating 
against materials criticality.
In order to stem the outflow of these technology-critical 
metals that are found in vehicles –  like rare-earth permanent 
magnets, lightweight magnesium alloys and the cobalt 
and nickel found in lithium-ion batteries – some form of 
intervention is required. Although the prices and availability 
of these materials are currently acceptable, this will not 
always be the case. Continuing to buy in these materials, 
use them until the product’s EoL is reached, and then 
shipping them out again, often at considerable cost, is a 
very risky route for a country to take in the long term.
The intervention the UK requires is 
establishing R&D centres, university 
funding, joint government-private 
investments and a well-managed strategy 
to secure complete industrial value chains 
based on resource efficiency, recycling and 
closing the loop for technology-critical metals to 
which the UK cannot have guaranteed access over the 
next 25–50 years. 
The main technical challenges that stand in the way of a 
circular economy of technology-critical metals are sensing 
and automated sorting technologies tailored to the recycling 
challenges of technology-critical materials. 
Given the immediacy of the challenge, rapid co-investment 
is required to get these technologies to scale quickly. The 
dividends from this rapid technology development will be 
substantial, but will be realized over a longer time period as 
material is processed through these new processes.
To support the efficient operation of this future industry, 
key data and statistics on these materials streams will be 
required. 
Regulatory and legislative changes could also support the 
circular economy of technology-critical metals. All of these 
elements are covered in more detail later in the report.
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The report is broken down into separate chapters starting with primary materials. The primary 
chapter begins by explaining the way in which these technology-critical metals flow through our 
economy and sets out the current global context for access to key technology-critical metals. It then 
expands upon this with a series of case studies on specific technology-critical metals employed by 
various sectors. Each case study covers the applications where these materials are used, demand 
growth, location of deposits and processing capacity, the global supply chain, environmental and 
social issues, and how to build a UK supply chain. 
The chapter on secondary materials initially introduces the current overall recycling rates for all 
critical materials on the EU list. It covers the potential positive impact of recycling, the current 
recycling industry and processes, and the generic barriers to recycling of technology-critical metals. 
The chapter then focuses on case studies of the same materials sectors as the primary chapter. These 
cover areas including the potential size of secondary markets, the technical difficulties for reuse 
and recycling, design for recycle, and advanced technologies for sensing, automation, separation, 
purification and re-processing of these materials.
The chapter on governance and regulation covers trade, the impact of REACH regulations 
on technology-critical metals, labelling, standards, eco-design directives, extended producer 
responsibility and environmental and social governance (ESG). Finally there is a case study on EU 
legislation for lithium-ion batteries.
The final chapter looks at the way that the supply of technology-critical metals is managed by a 
number of other countries around the world including Japan and the EU. It covers how technology-
critical metals are dealt with by different UK government departments. The chapter then sets out the 
need for a single body to create a national strategy for the management of technology-critical metals. 
A detailed set of recommendations are presented that outline what a national technology-critical 














Figure 10: Representation of the circular economy
the UK and Europe in manufactured 
components and products than we 
process internally from primary raw 
materials. For example, the ERECON 
report (2015) estimated that we import 
around 10,000-12,000 tonnes of rare 
earth magnets into Europe every year, 
while we only manufacture around 
1000 tonnes of the same material. 
Therefore, there is an incentive to 
access these large volumes of material 
if technologies can be developed to 
extract them from end of life products. 
However, there are technical, 
economic and societal challenges 
that need to be addressed for this to 
happen. The secondary section of the 
report explains the challenges for the 
secondary market and how the UK 
might intervene to gain a competitive 
advantage.
It should be noted that the processing 
of many of these materials from 
primary ores often requires the same 
technologies and downstream supply- 
chains as the secondary (recycling 
market). The secondary and primary 
markets are often seen as rivals, but 
in fact they are mutually beneficial and 
interlinked. Smelters, for example, can 
use either primary ore or scrap metals. 
Sometimes a recycling activity can 
be set up faster and at a lower cost 
than a primary-mining operation with 
associated processing, but the same 
supply-chain and processing might 
be able to handle both primary and 
secondary materials. Both scenarios 
will be extremely important, as 
although a recycled source of material 
could give the UK a competitive 
advantage this will only meet a 
proportion of the demand, particularly 
in a growing market.
Market Size
Figure 11: Global production of primary metals and ores. Source: British Geological Survey 2019.45
MATERIAL FLOW
Technology-critical metals flow into the UK in a variety of forms, ranging from ores, elements, alloys, chemicals and other raw 
materials to be manufactured into products. In order to develop a strategy for critical materials, it is important to understand 
geographically where the raw materials are coming from, how they are processed and where and in what form the materials enter 
and leave the UK economy.
There are limited data on technology-
critical metals flows coming into 
and out of the UK, as highlighted by 
Velenturf et al. as part of the NERC 
programme - Resource Recovery 
from Waste41. The Office for National 
Statistics is exploring the feasibility 
of a National Materials Datahub to 
provide access to reliable data on 
the availability of materials including 
technology-critical metals42. 
The UK has no current indigenous 
production of primary (mined) 
technology-critical metals and 
therefore is reliant on resource-rich 
nations around the globe. Mined 
materials are typically converted into 
metals, alloys or chemicals by refining 
the ores and then manufactured 
into specialist materials such as 
magnets or cathode materials, which 
are then used to make components 
such as electric motors or batteries. 
The primary section of this report 
describes the geographical locations 
for mining and refining of technology-
critical metals, applications for each 
material and the global and UK supply- 
chains. The descriptions highlight why 
many of these materials are at risk of 
short supply. Although critical-metal 
definitions often refer to a restricted 
distribution of mines, in some cases 
the concentration of refining capacity 
in one part of the globe is even more 
extreme. 
Responsible sourcing is rapidly 
increasing in importance, driven 
originally by the conflict minerals 
agenda, and now widening out to 
human rights and environmental 
performance. Tracking of materials 
flows and the need for supply-chain 
assurance are likely to increase in the 
near future. 
Ideally, the technology-critical 
materials would move around the 
UK system in a circular economy, 
whereby the materials or products 
are reused or recycled at their highest 
level to minimise the environmental 
footprint and maximise the value of 
the assets. However, at present many 
of the technology-critical materials 
flow into the UK in products and pass 
through what can only be described 
as a linear economy, whereby the 
materials end up in landfill at their end 
of life (see figure 10). Other products 
and materials leave the UK for reuse 
and recycling abroad. This is not 
the case for all of the sub-groups of 
materials discussed in this report and 
case studies are presented in the 
secondary-materials section below for 
PGMs and aerospace materials where 
successful recycling is carried out.
There are multiple organisations 
encouraging movement towards the 
circular economy in the UK. DEFRA 
leads for the UK Government on the 
circular economy and the Waste 
and Resources Action Programme 
(WRAP), the Green Alliance and 
the Ellen MacArthur Foundation are 
examples of NGOs who promote a 
circular economy43,44. The ultimate 
aim for a circular economy is to 
redefine growth, create positive 
society-wide benefits, whilst 
decoupling economic activity from 
the consumption of finite resources. 
A circular economy favours activities 
that preserve value in the form of 
energy, labour and materials. This 
means designing for durability, reuse, 
remanufacturing, and recycling to 
keep products, components and 
materials circulating in the economy. 
A circular economy is based on the 
principles of designing out waste 
and pollution, keeping products and 
materials in use, and regenerating 
natural systems.
In many instances we import more of 


























Although the demand for some technology-critical metals is 
growing rapidly, the overall market size for them is dwarfed 
by the main industrial metal sectors (see figure 11). To put 
this in perspective, in 2019 around 1.5 billion tonnes of iron 
and 64 million tonnes of aluminium were extracted from 
primary mined sources, whereas only around 160,000 
tonnes of cobalt were produced45. In some instances this 
means that the major mining companies have not invested 
in technology-critical metals and most exploration and 
development is carried out by junior companies. Single 
entity mines in niche resources are more vulnerable to price 
fluctuations. It is also important to note however that  many 
of these technology-critical elements are a co-product 
or by-product of mining operations for the major metals. 
These are more likely to be produced by the major mining 
companies, but they are vulnerable to variations in demand 
for the ‘parent’ major metal. Some of the ores of technology-
critical metals, such as tantalum, tungsten, cobalt and rare 
earth ion adsorption deposits, are amenable to production 
by artisanal and/or small-scale mining (ASM) as well as 
large scale industrial mining. ASM is more likely than large- 
scale mining to lead to informal or illegal supply-chains but 
has also been subject of some of the best know mining 
industry fairtrade-style schemes46.
As rare earth metals are top of nearly all critical materials 
lists outside of China47, this section starts with these 
elements and then moves through battery materials, 
platinum group metals and then aerospace materials. Again 
it should be emphasised that this report does not attempt 
to cover all critical-materials that might form part of a UK 
strategy, but has concentrated on a subset of materials, 
to explore the issues around the supply-chain. If a broader 
range of materials had been covered this would not have 
been possible.
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CASE STUDY: RARE EARTH ELEMENTS
The rare earth elements (REEs) are a group of seventeen elements that can be found mainly in the lanthanide series of the periodic 
table. Sometimes scandium (Sc) and yttrium (Y) are included in deposits that are economic to mine48. Not all of the rare earths are 
scarce in terms of earth abundance. In fact cerium is as abundant as copper, but their restricted geolocations combined with the 
difficulties in separating the individual rare earths have resulted in the concentration of production in certain parts of the globe (see 
figure 12)49. The rare earths are often split into the light rare earth elements (LREs) , including for example neodymium (Nd) and 
samarium (Sm) and the heavy rare earth elements (HREs), including dysprosium (Dy) and terbium (Tb) (see figure 13).
Once it became possible to obtain the rare earths as individual elements, their interesting magnetic, optical and physical properties 
began to be exploited. The first resources to be developed were mineral sand deposits; this was followed by the opening of the 
Mountain Pass rare earth mine in California. Today, China dominates the world of rare earths. China produces around 90% of the 
world’s supply of refined light rare earth oxides (LREOs) and > 95% of the heavy rare earth oxides (HREOs)50.
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Applications of rare earth elements 
For a long time the rare earth elements were principally used for the polishing and colouring of glass and ceramics. They were also 
used in small quantities in specialist steels, in various alloys, and for phosphors used in lighting51. More recently they have found uses 
in permanent magnets and in catalysts (see figure 14).
Light Rare Earth Elements (LRE) Heavy Rare Earth Elements (HRE)
Cerium and lanthanum are used 
in catalysts and alloys, whereas 
permanent magnets require 
neodymium, praseodymium, samarium 
and small amounts of the heavy rare 
earths (dysprosium and terbium). 
By volume the magnet market 
represents around 35% of total rare 
earth demand, however, by value this 
represents 91%50. In reality, cerium 
and lanthanum are in over supply 
and therefore have a low value. If 
alternative applications could be found 
for these elements it would increase 
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Figure 12: World mined production of rare earth oxides34.
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Figure 14: Applications for rare earth elements.52
Figure 13: The rare earth elements shown on the periodic table.
Figure 15: Fully dense sintered Nd-Fe-B magnets Figure 16: Resin-bonded Nd-Fe-B magnets
Figure 17: Historical global consumption and forecasted demand for  
Nd-Fe-B magnets by end-use category50 (recreated from Adamas 
Intelligence) Figure 18: Cost breakdown (%) of a typical permanent magnet motor
WHAT IS A RARE EARTH MAGNET?
Rare earth permanent magnets are found in two main commercial forms: alloys of samarium and cobalt (SmCo-type magnets), 
which are mainly used for very-high-temperature applications such as those found in the aerospace industry, and alloys of 
neodymium, dysprosium, iron and boron (Nd-Fe-B type magnets). The permanent rare earths magnet market is dominated by Nd-
Fe-B magnets, where around 130,000 tonnes are manufactured per year53. Around 88% of these materials are produced in China, 
with the second largest producer being Japan; less than 1% are produced in Europe54.  Nd-Fe-B magnets are produced in a few 
different forms, including fully dense sintered magnets produced from an alloy powder55, hot-pressed magnets56, or in the form of 
resin-bonded magnets by mixing Nd-Fe-B powders with a polymer57 (see figures 15 & 16).
Rare earth magnet applications and demand growth
Rare earths magnets are used in a vast array of electrical 
equipment and it is predicted that we will require around 
270,000 tonnes by 2030, an increase of over 140,000 
tonnes compared to current production. The magnet 
function can be roughly split between holding magnets, 
motors and generators, which are then used in a vast 
number of commercial sectors. They are a key component 
in electronics (e.g., - loudspeakers, vibrators and small 
motors), offshore wind turbine generators, electric and 
hybrid vehicles (e.g.,- drive motors, power steering, 
generators, actuators), cordless power tools, electric bikes, 
efficient pumps, robotics, separators, filters, loudspeakers, 
MRI scanners and many more50.
Rare earth magnets are a building block material for 
electrical devices, many of which will be used in clean 
technologies to tackle climate change. For a permanent 
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Figure 19: World deposits of rare earth elements (recreated from the British Geological Survey 202149
LOCATION OF RARE EARTH DEPOSITS 
The name “rare earth” is a misnomer as there are rare earth deposits all over the globe. Around 210,000 t of rare earth elements 
were mined in 201959. Production of rare earths has more than tripled in the last 35 years, and although China has quotas for official 
production, there are also producers operating illegally to satisfy demand. 
China has invested heavily in its rare earth market and in the processing of these materials all the way along the value chain and 
now dominates. At present, around 70% of neodymium is mined in China, followed by 11% from the USA (Mountain Pass), 9% 
from Australia (Mount Weld), and 6% from Myanmar. However, the vast majority of the extracted material (produced worldwide) 
is processed in China. China now produces around 92% of the world’s rare earth alloys and 88% of the world’s rare earth magnets. 
The major non-Chinese refiner is based in Australia, producing oxides from Lynas Rare earths, from the Mount Weld mine via a 
processing plant at Kuantan, Malaysia60. The main non-Chinese magnet producers are based in Japan.
It is important to understand that there are rare earth resources in many regions of the globe which could provide a supply to the UK 
if economic extraction can be developed (see figure 19).
The ore that is extracted from the ground contains a mixture 
of rare earth elements in different ratios. Typically, the ores 
are rich in the light rare earths (e.g.,- lanthanum (La), cerium 
(Ce) and neodymium (Nd)) but lean in the heavy rare earths 
(e.g., - dysprosium (Dy) and terbium (Tb)). This creates 
what is often described as the balance problem, where the 
largest downstream markets (ie.,- magnets) require more of 
the elements that are less abundant in the ore. This presents 
a particular challenge for mining companies, as only a 
proportion of the rare earths are profitable.
SUPPLY CHAIN FOR RARE EARTH MAGNETS 
There are different types of rare earth deposit including hard rock, ion adsorption clays and mineral sands. If this ore is a hard rock 
deposit, then once it is extracted from the ground it is crushed, milled and pass through a range of physical sorting techniques (e.g.- 
screening and magnetic separation). The separated rare earth-rich fraction is then dissolved with strong acid and passed through a 
chemical solvent-extraction process (see figure 21). The ore processing steps produce significant amounts of tailings, which are the 
chemical by-products of the processing (see environmental section). 
The extracted oxides are converted into rare earth metals 
using molten salt electrolysis, which is similar to aluminium 
processing but on a much smaller scale. The extracted 
pure metals are then converted into alloys by melting at high 
temperatures and rapid cooling onto a water-cooled wheel 
either by melt spinning or strip casting (see figure 20).62
In Europe, magnet companies buy in rare earth alloys and 
use them as the starting point for magnet manufacture, 
whereas in China the supply-chain is fully integrated from 
mine to magnet. 
There are multiple ways of manufacturing rare earth 
magnets with various levels of control from China. Fully 
dense magnets can be manufactured either by breaking 
the alloys into a powder, pressing and sintering65 at high 
temperatures (sintered magnets) or the molten alloys can 
be rapidly quenched and hot pressed56 (known as the MQ3 
route). The other forms of rare earth magnet are based on 
polymer-bonded magnets where Nd-Fe-B powders are 
mixed with a polymer and pressed into net-shape magnets. 
The only large-scale manufacturer of magnets in the UK (SG 
Technologies) is based upon this polymer bonded route57. 
Polymer-bonded magnets are magnetically weaker than 
the fully dense form as they have a non-magnetic fraction 
Therefore, they are used in different markets to the fully 
dense form of material. Where the highest energy density 
is required (i.e., for high-power motors) then only fully dense 


























































































































1 Bokan Mountains, USA
2 Alay, Canada
3 Rock Canyon Creek, Canada
4 Thor Lake, Canada
5 Nikikkatch, Canada
6 Hoidas Lake, Canada
7 Elliot Lake, Canada
8 Saint-Honoré, Canada
9 Strange Lake, Canada
10 Snowbird, USA
11 North Fork, USA
12 Lemhi Pass, USA
13 Bald Mountain, USA
14 Bear Lodge, USA
15 Iron Hill, USA
16 Wet Mountains, USA
17 Pea Ridge, USA
18 Hicks Dome, USA
19 Carolina Placers, USA
20 Green Cove Springs, USA
21 Mountain Pass, USA
22 Gallinas Mountains, USA
23 Pajarito Mountain, USA
24 Sierra de Tamaulipas, Mexico
25 Morro Dos Seis Lagos, Brazil
26 Catalão I, Brazil
27 Araxá, Brazil
28 Serra Verde, Brazil
29 Pocos de Caldas, Brazil




34 Thor Lake, Norway
35 Bastnäs, Sweden
36 Norra Kärr, Sweden
37 Olserum, Sweden
38 Sokli, Finland
39 Lovozero & Khibina 
complexes
40 Tomtor, Russia
41 Gornoe Ozero, Russia
42 Khamna, Russia
43 Kizilcaoran, Turkey
44 Aksu Diamas, Turkey
45 Tamazeght complex, 
Morocco
46 Bou Naga, Mauritania
47 Nile Delta & Rosetta, Egypt
48 Karonge (Gakara), Burundi
49 Mrima, Kenya
50 Wigu Hill, Tanzania
51 Kangankunde, Malawi









60 Steenkampskraall, South 
Africa
61 Zandkopsdrift, South Africa
62 Pilanesberg Alkaline 
Complex, South Africa
63 Naboomspruit, South Africa
64 Phalabowra, South Africa
65 Richards Bay, South Africa
66 Chavara, India




71 Mushgai Khudag, Mongolia
72 Lugin Gol, Mongolia





78 Dong Pao, Vietnam




83 Mount Weld, Australia
84 Brockman, Australia
85 Nolans Bore, Australia
86 Mary Kathleen, Australia
87 Olympic Dam, Australia
88 WIM 150, Australia
89 Dubbo Zirconia, Australia
90 Fraser Island, Australia
Figure 21: Image of solvent extraction process 
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SUPPLY CHAIN FOR RARE EARTH MAGNETS 
MINING DISSOLUTION AND SOLVENT EXTRACTION ELECTROWINNING CASTING




RE ore RE oxide Nd metal Nd alloy
SINTERED MAGNET 
PRODUCTION
Figure 20: Supply chain for the production of rare earth magnets.  
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There has been a lot of publicity about the environmental burden of rare earth production in China63 and certainly there has been 
historic concerns about the safety of the separation processes. It is one of the reasons given by China why the industry was brought 
under state control to clean up these operations. This in part led to the introduction of export quotas around 2005-2012 The export 
quotas were subsequently removed after the US, Europe and Japan took China to the World Trade Organisation in 2012. The satellite 
image in figure 22 – shows the largest rare earth mine in the world at Bayan Obo. Next to the mine, the tailings lakes can be 
observed where the effluent from the leaching processes are poured onto the land. It should be noted that this one mine produces 
over 40% of the world’s supply of rare earth materials. The ion adsorption deposit mines in southern China that produce almost all 
of the world’s heavy rare earths as well as light rare earths also have a very poor environmental record. The Rare earth Industry 
Association (REIA) based in Belgium is developing standard procedures for life-cycle assessments to compare the environmental 
footprint of rare earth mines. Lynas Rare earths, the main provider outside of China set store by their responsible sourcing standards.
The negative impact of the materials production is far 
outweighed by the positive impact that rare earth magnets 
have on the efficiency of electrical machines. However, this 
does not mean that the international community should 
not push to limit the environmental impacts of rare earth 
production and technology-critical metals production, 
generally. Generally, a permanent-magnet motor or generator 
will be more efficient than an induction machine (which does 
not contain rare earth magnets). This is because electricity 
does not need to be passed through the material to generate 
magnetic flux. Typically the efficiency gain has been reported 
to be around 5% although this is very dependent upon the 
type and size of machine and its drive cycle. If rare earth 
magnets are not used in generators and motors then the 
impact on global CO2 emissions would be enormous. This 
will be exacerbated by the growth of electrical machine use 
over the next 20 years. If the motor was being used in an 
electric vehicle the drop in efficiency would also have an 
impact on the size of the battery and therefore the amount of 
cobalt, lithium and nickel that would be required for the same 
range. 
Rare earth deposits have diverse geology and this gives a 
range of production routes and environmental characteristics. 
The mineralogy of the deposit is more important than 
the grade (i.e. how rich the deposit is in rare earths) in 
determining which deposits might be economic to mine, and 
also their environmental characteristics. Figure 23 shows 
a comparison of several types of rare earth ores and their 
characteristics. This kind of qualitative comparison can be 
quantified using a life-cycle assessment64.
Most rare earths are produced from either carbonatite-
related deposits (e.g. Bayan Obo and Maoniuping China, 
Mountain Pass USA, Mt Weld Australia)  or ion adsorption 
clay deposits in southern China and Myanmar. Monazite is 
mined currently as a by-product of mineral sand deposits in 
India, Madagascar and Australia and this amount could be 
increased from other deposits around the world. The problem 
is that mineral sand monazite typically contains 2-10 wt% 
thorium as well as rare earths. This makes the concentrate 
radioactive and produces a radioactive waste. Given 
transport and processing regulations and public concern 
regarding radioactivity, most mineral sand monazite has been 
avoided, although interest has risen again recently. A new 
use for thorium, in nuclear reactors, for example, would be a 
‘game changer’ in making mineral sands more favourable as 
sources of rare earths. 
Figure 22: NASA image of the tailings ponds outside of the largest rare earth mine in Inner Mongolia. 
Figure 23: Examples of rare earth element deposits and qualitative analysis of their mining and processing characteristics. Characteristics shaded yellow 
are generally advantageous to responsible sourcing, grey are less so and unshaded cells are less favourable. From Wall, F., Rollat, A. Pell, R.S.(2017)64.  
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Positive and negative environmental impact of rare earths 
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Chinese dominance of the market 
There are multiple factors which have resulted in China dominating the rare earth market. Firstly, the state has invested heavily for over 25 
years in the extraction and processing of ores, alloys and magnets. The Chinese premier famously stated that while the Middle East has oil, 
China has rare earths68. Since that time, the Chinese have gradually moved up the value chain from processing of ores, to alloys, magnets and 
components. This has given China a strategic advantage in the downstream product markets. The largest rare earth mine in Inner Mongolia 
(Bayan Obo) is actually an iron-ore mine with the rare earths being produced as a by-product. This factor, accompanied by relatively cheap 
labour and state intervention, has meant that the rare earth alloys can be produced at a lower cost than in other regions of the world. The 
historically lower environmental and safety standards have also allowed China to reduce costs compared to heavily permitted mining and 
separation plants elsewhere in the world. Local incentives are in place in China, which subsidise the production of magnets. Western producers 
also have to compete with an internal VAT charge that has been implemented on rare earths alloys. It is possible to claim this 13% levy on 
magnets, but not on rare earth elements or alloys, which immediately puts western producers at a disadvantage. For all of these reasons, 
the western producers of sintered Nd-Fe-B magnets sell at the top end of the market and often not into the bulk automotive or wind-turbine 
markets. This makes some of our largest industries vulnerable to near-total reliance on imports from China.
ADVANCES IN MANUFACTURING AND  
SUBSTITUTION OF RARE EARTHS IN MAGNETS 
Over the last twenty years there have been multiple attempts to find substitutes for Nd-Fe-B magnets which contain more earth abundant 
elements through major programmes in the EU, Japan and US1,2,3. To date a competitive material has not been found. This is not to say that a 
substitute material will never be discovered, but this should not be a policy decision in isolation, as the rare earths have very unique properties 
which are difficult to replicate using other elements.
Where there has been significant development is around the 
processing and recycling of Nd-Fe-B magnets (the latter is 
covered in the secondary section). For example, it has been 
shown that it is possible to substitute cerium for Nd in some 
forms of Nd-Fe-B magnets up to around 40%, thereby using 
up some of the cheaper, more abundant rare earths54. Also, 
by controlling the processing and subsequent microstructure, 
manufacturers have also reduced the content of heavy rare 
earths in magnets (which are added to improve temperature 
stability). This is particularly important for high speed automotive 
magnets, which can contain up to 8% Dy65. Dysprosium is 
typically ten times the price of neodymium66.
There are multiple activities investigating new process routes 
to produce Nd-Fe-B magnets to lower the cost, increase 
safety, improve magnetic, corrosion and mechanical behaviour 
and to reduce losses during manufacture. At present the main 
magnet manufacturing route relies on pressing and sintering 
of fine powders, which are pyrophoric, and therefore burn 
in air, and as a consequence all the processing needs to be 
carried out in inert atmospheres, which increases the cost. 
After processing, the machining losses to cut the magnets to 
size can be anywhere from 20-60% depending upon size and 
shape67.
There is certainly scope for UK investment into the 
manufacturing processes for rare earth magnets. There is 
now investment being put into this sector at high technology-
readiness level (TRL 5-9) through the Advanced Propulsion 
Centre and Driving the Electric Revolution9. While this is 
important and these projects will help build up the supply 
chains in the UK, there is also an urgent need to invest at lower 
TRL levels. There are internationally leading research groups 
in the UK working on modelling, materials synthesis and 
processing of rare earth magnets, but the funding for these 
projects has almost exclusively been from outside of the UK 
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The rare earth elements are traded on private contracts that 
remain confidential to the buyers and sellers. Prices quoted 
as market prices are derived from journalistic reports from 
such subscription sites as Shanghai Metals Market (www.
metal.com) or Asian Metal (www.asianmetal.com). There 
is no public pricing mechanism that provides transparent 
pricing for the global metals market, as exists for dominant 
commodity metals (such as aluminium, copper, lead, tin, 
nickel, tin, and zinc) provided by the London Metal Exchange.
The prices quoted for rare earth metals and oxides may 
not represent the true prices paid by consumers of the 
materials. Prices quoted are normally in both local RMB/
kg and as US$/kg (FOB – “free-on-board” delivery terms); 
pricing includes 13% VAT which is imposed on exports but 
is reclaimable locally in China (see figure 25). At this time 
(February 2021), Nd pricing for 99% to 99.9% pure metals 
is standing at RMB710/kg (or US$109/kg FOB China). 
Specifications for the materials are not standardised; though 
standardisation is under development in an international 
standard ISO (technical committee TC298) which has been 
recently joined by the British Standards Institute (BSI).
Figure 25: Sintering of Nd-Fe-B magnets
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BUILDING UP THE UK SUPPLY CHAIN. 
There will be a requirement for more rare earth mines to open in the 
future, especially to meet demand for Nd and Pr for electric vehicle 
drive motors and offshore wind turbines. There is certainly scope for 
increased production, given the number of rare earth deposits around 
the globe. However there are technical, economic and geopolitical 
factors that need to be addressed to accelerate this. The supply of REE 
as by-products of other ores is attractive as a means to diversify supply 
and should be explored. The rare earth market value is not large and low 
capital operations are likely to be the ones to come on stream.
The UK should be assessing viable projects globally and 
securing access to ores or oxides for the downstream 
market. Ultimately, there is no point in accessing the ores 
without the downstream refining into oxides, which could 
be carried out abroad or in the UK. Beyond that stage, Less 
Common Metals has pilot facilities for producing rare earth 
metals (which should be expanded) and they have large-
scale capacity from producing strip-cast alloys. Although 
the UK has a large-scale manufacturer of polymer-bonded 
magnets in SG Technologies it requires a fully dense 
magnet producer which would service the car industry for 
electric drives. LCM is currently working on a feasibility 
study with the Automotive Transformation Fund, looking 
at how a magnets supply chain could be developed 
in the UK. The UK should be working in 
partnership with other regions of the globe, 
particularly with Japan who have been 
at the forefront of novel magnet 
manufacturing, which has 
given it’s companies 
a competitive 
advantage. 
Most of the fully 
dense magnets made 
outside of China are made in Japan. 
UK SUPPLY CHAIN 
The UK has significant parts of the value chain for rare earth magnets. Several companies, including Mkango Resources and 
Pensana Rare Earths are developing rare earth deposits overseas and have potential for connection via rare earth refining to the 
UK value chain. Less Common Metals Ltd (see figure 27)69 is the only company that can produce rare earth metals and alloys in 
Europe for the magnet market (based in Ellesmere Port) and one of the largest producers of polymer-bonded magnets in Europe 
(SG Technologies)70 is based in Rainham, making a wide range of magnetic materials and components for the automotive industry. 
Beyond magnet production, there are a number of companies that distribute rare earth magnets, and that machine and assemble 
these into components, including for example, Bunting, Eclipse Magnetics and Arnold Magnetic Technologies. This then branches out 
into a very large number of industries and companies that will be purchasing rare earth magnets, mainly from China.
The UK has supply-chain gaps in the chemical processing 
of rare earth ores to liberate separated oxides and there 
is no large-scale producer of fully-dense magnets (either 
sintered or hot pressed). However a start up company 
based in Birmingham (Hypromag)71, is aiming to produce 
sintered magnets in the UK from recycled feedstocks 
(covered in the secondary section of the report). There 
are also start up companies that are proposing to build 
chemical processing facilities in the UK to convert ores to 
separated oxides and metals (Peak Resources, Pensana 
and Seren)72,73,74. 
Ultimately all the parts of this supply chain have to compete 
against a state-sponsored industry in China, which has 
made significant interventions in the market over many years. 
Figure 27: Less Common Metals Limited
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CASE STUDY: LITHIUM-ION BATTERIES 
In 2019 the Nobel Prize in Chemistry was awarded to John B. Goodenough, M. Stanley Whittingham, and Akira Yoshino for their 
groundbreaking work leading to the lithium-ion battery as we know it today, which has already had a profound impact on modern 
society75. 
The oil crisis of the 1970s encouraged Goodenough, then working for Exxon, to investigate the batteries76. The batteries he developed led to 
electrification of many applications that were previously reliant on energy-dense hydrocarbon fuels. Akira Yoshino replaced the lithium anode 
with carbon76, which led to safer, more practical cells. The present challenge is to scale up lithium-ion battery production and its complete supply 
chain to meet the demand of the automotive and other sectors. The next challenge is to develop and bring to market batteries that are cheaper, 
safer, longer-lasting, and with higher energy densities76. Work also continues apace to develop new battery technologies that are not reliant on 
technology-critical metals, substituting more problematic elements with those that are easier to source. The scale of this challenge is captured 
well in the Automotive Council Electrical Energy Storage roadmaps77. 
What is a Lithium-Ion Battery?
Lithium-ion batteries are a type of rechargeable battery that improves 
significantly upon previous technologies in a number of key areas. 
Lithium-ion battery is a common name for a large variety of battery 
types, not only in the shape and packaging of cells, but also in the 
chemistries contained within the battery. In particular, there are 
many different formulations of cathode material, each with different 
attributes. They have a relatively high power and energy density, 
making them useful for applications ranging from mobile phones to 
vehicles and grid storage. The batteries consist of individual cells. 
As a single unit, a cell performs functions of a rechargeable battery 
and the cells come in a variety of different types. A module is formed 
by connecting multiple cells, providing them with a mechanical 
support structure, a thermal interface and the attaching terminals. The 
modules are designed according to the cell format, the target pack 
voltage and the requirements of the application. A pack is formed by 
connecting multiple modules with sensors and a controller and then 
housing the unit in a case. Electric vehicles, for example, are equipped 
with batteries in a pack format. The packs are connected to the 
powertrain. 
Compared to conventional batteries, lithium-ion batteries have 
different chemistries and constructions. Unlike lead-acid car batteries, 
which are easy to recycle, containing the lead and acid in a plastic 
housing, lithium-ion batteries are much more complicated in their 
assembly. This makes manufacturing more challenging and end-of-life 
recycling difficult in comparison to lead-acid batteries.
The main types are lithium cobalt oxide (LCO), nickel manganese 
cobalt (NMC), lithium nickel cobalt aluminium (NCA), lithium iron 
phosphate (LFP), lithium manganese oxide (LMO) (see figure 28). 
Different chemistries are used for different applications because 
of their inherent performance characteristics, properties and cost 
curves. It is expected that automotive and grid storage applications 
will be dominated by the NCA, NMC and LFP chemistries.
Over time, it is projected that high nickel content lithium nickel 
manganese cobalt oxide (NMC) cathodes. [NMC-High] cells will 
occupy a sizeable proportion of the market for lithium-ion batteries.  
NMC cathodes have a lower cobalt content (less than 20%) that 
some other designs of cell, whilst offering many performance benefits. 
Cobalt makes batteries expensive, because of complex supply 
chains and constrained supply. Work is underway to try and reduce 
the cobalt content of batteries. There are cells such as LMO and 
LFP cells which do not require cobalt - however, the trade off is that 
these cells have lower energy density, and so lower performance. 
The projected changes in market share for different chemistries is 
illustrated in Figure 28 below.
Figure 28: Long term battery technology trends. Courtesy of the APC / IHS Markit, 2021. 
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LITHIUM-ION BATTERY APPLICATIONS 
There are a wide range of applications for lithium-ion batteries. Anywhere portable electrical power is required, lithium-ion batteries 
provide the lightest, densest source of rechargeable electrical power. What differs dramatically among these applications is the scale 
on which they employ batteries, while the capacity of mobile phone batteries in watt-hours may be in the single digits, with a small 
number of cells, electric vehicles will have battery capacities that are several orders or magnitude larger. To add further contrast, 
enormous grid batteries require an enormous quantity of batteries, e.g. the Hornsdale Power Reserve in Australia, with a capacity 
of 194 MWh (see figure 29). Although the number of batteries used in an application varies dramatically by several orders of 
magnitude, so do the quantities sold to the market of the products that contain them. In a future energy scenario, a nation might only 
have a handful of batteries of the scale of Hornsdale Power reserve, while millions of vehicles will be sold, and likely even greater 
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Figure 29: Approximate size of lithium-ion battery applications in Wh 78,79.
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LITHIUM-ION BATTERIES: DEMAND GROWTH 
Global demand for batteries in all applications is rapidly expanding. The automotive sector, in particular light duty vehicle applications, 
accounts for most of the current demand for batteries.
The market for lithium-ion batteries is forecast to register a 
compound annual growth rate of over 16% from 2020 to 
2027. This rapid increase in use will be driven by laptops, 
PCs, smartphones, and above all, electric vehicles. The 
market for lithium-ion batteries also includes medical, marine, 
commercial aircraft, aerospace, and defence (see figures 
30-33).
Figure 30: One type of Lithium-ion battery, the pouch cell, used in automotive applications. In the section on secondary materials, Figure 112, there is some 
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Figure 32: Lithium-ion battery sales81
LITHIUM-ION BATTERY SALES [GWh]
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BATTERY BLASTOFF
DEMAND FOR ENERGY STORAGE IS FORECAST TO RISE AS PRICES FALL
DATA: BLOOMBERGNEF
PASSENGER EVS E-BUSES CONSUMER ELECTRONICS STATIONARY STORAGE
The growth in the number of EVs is expected to disrupt significantly the market for technology metals in the coming years. Emerging 
economies like India and China are seeing soaring sales of consumer electronics and a rapidly expanding middle class with the 














































































































BEV PHEV FHEV MHEV CONVENTIONAL FUEL CELL
Figure 34: Future global sales of main lithium-ion battery 
market segments. Source: APC Demand Databases using IHS 
AutoTechInsight data (December, 2020) NB: Passenger cars only, 
excludes LCVs.
Lithium-ion batteries are becoming pervasive in energy storage 
due to their high power and energy density82. The technology 
is undoubtedly a core component in our transition to a clean 
energy future, enabling green electricity to serve as an energy 
vector in many applications that previously required energy-
dense hydrocarbon fuels.
Whilst historically lithium-ion batteries enabled more 
sophisticated portable electronics, the transition to electro-
mobility is the main source of present and anticipated market 
growth for lithium-ion cells. This is understandable, given the 
large number of cells required to deliver the range consumers 
demand from electric vehicles.
Future energy systems that integrate storage, smoothing 
peaks and demands, providing backup power, stabilisation 
of weak-grids and off-grid power83,84, will also be a significant 
market, albeit smaller than the use in portable electronics and 
EVs. Lithium-ion batteries will also be important to global clean 
energy development, bringing clean power and access to 
energy to developing countries in places where there is limited 
or no access to the grid85.
The uptake is driven by a combination of rapidly falling battery 
prices, to the point where they are nearly cost competitive 
with conventional technology in key regions, and the need 
for automotive companies to meet various international and 
national CO2 and other emission targets. 
Estimates differ between different forecasters about the 
projected market growth for lithium-ion batteries, and the 
evolution of chemistries that will be manufactured in the future. 
However, there is a consensus that growth in the market for 
lithium-ion batteries in the coming years will be dramatic. 
This is illustrated in figure 34 which shows the market share 
of different types of vehicles containing lithium-ion batteries 
in the coming years. It is projected that the market share of 
pure battery electric vehicles will grow rapidly. Additionally, 
as we approach the 2030 deadline for the phase out of 
conventional vehicles, there will be growth in various degrees 
of hybridisation in vehicle powertrains. These hybrid vehicles 
will also use lithium-ion batteries. In Europe and China this 
is a pressing issue with automakers. Car manufacturers are 
expected to have 72% of all vehicles partially electrified, and 
26% of these plug-in or pure EVs by 2025, with the trend 
accelerating until 2030.
In the UK, the Faraday Institution estimates that by 
2040, eight gigafactories will be needed in the 
UK.12,13 It projects that this could increase 
employment in the automotive industry 
and battery supply-chain from 
186,000 to 246,000 jobs4. 
By way of contrast, if 
the UK cannot 
attract and 
develop a 
battery-manufacturing industry, there are significant risks14. The 
production of EVs could move offshore, attracted to locations 
where batteries are manufactured. UK jobs in the automotive 
industry and battery supply-chain could decline, with the 
potential loss of 114,000 jobs by 2040 according to the 
Faraday Institution (2019)4.
Lithium-ion batteries are increasingly 
constructed using many highly refined 
materials, which are in turn made 
from semi-refined raw materials 
that ultimately need to be 
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SUPPLY AND VALUE CHAIN FOR BATTERY MATERIALS CONTINUED
It matters that the supply and value chains for electric vehicles 
are complex, because the battery makes up more than 25% of 
the value of an electric car. This is more than for conventional 
powertrains. However, the value of the battery lies further 
upstream in the supply chain with over 60% of it embodied in 
the highly refined chemicals that make up the battery cell. The 
UK must devise ways to capture this value (see figure 35).
In 2025 the demand for the batteries needed for passenger 
cars and vans is expected to exceed 787 GWh globally 
and 249 GWh in Europe. To put this in perspective, all the 
European Nissan Leaf and e-NV200 batteries are produced in 
Sunderland with a maximum capacity of less than 2GWh. 
Considering this demand, one can work out the total demand 
for these commodities throughout the supply-chain. Assuming 
that most vehicle batteries will contain high nickel NMC, NCA, 
or the newer lithium nickel oxide (LNO) cathode materials 
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For a battery electric vehicle, the battery packs 
represent ~33% of the total vehicle cost
Battery cells make up 75% of the value of the battery pack, with module parts and 
assembly representing 11% and the final pack components and assembly making up 14%
Cathodes and Anodes make 
up over half of the cell value
Electric vehicles make up the lion’s share of this demand as shown in figure 36. This very significant demand for batteries both 
globally and in Europe means that the entire supply chain needs to scale up at the same time. Even if the overall scale is manageable, 
the speed at which this is happening is completely unprecedented. To illustrate this, in 2012 Nissan (now Envision AESC) built the 
first battery plant with a nominal capacity of 2GWh. It remained the largest battery plant in Europe until 2019. By 2025 Europe 
needs around 249GWh capacity, growing to a conservative estimate by the APC of 439GWh by 2030. 
At this scale it is best to consider the market on a European 
basis, as in most cases it does not make commercial sense 
to ship batteries and their (semi) processed materials around 
the world in the volumes that are required. Secondly, and more 
pertinently, the UK-EU Trade and Cooperation Agreement 
(TCA) stipulates that the battery and most of its components 
need to be made locally from 2024 (see figure 37 for an 
overview). If not, the vehicle will attract a 10% tariff when 
exported from the EU to the UK or vice versa. Since around 
80% of the vehicles made in the UK are exported to the EU, 
and 80% of the vehicles on Britain’s roads are imported from 
the EU, the trade rules summarised below will need to be met.
These components include cathode active materials, anode 
active materials and electrolyte which in turn contain nickel, 
cobalt, manganese, lithium, natural and synthetic graphite. The 
estimated the demand for these materials is shown in figure 
36. It is worth noting that these are highly refined, battery 
grade materials that make up most of the value of the battery 
as shown in figure 35. The refining process from the ore that 
is mined to the battery grade materials required by industry is 
complex, expensive, energy intensive and most important takes 
time and a vast investment to build. 
This refining capacity will be the main bottleneck for the next 
10 years especially in Europe, where hardly any of the required 
supply chain exists and secondly where rules stipulate local 
supply. To illustrate this, analysis by the Advanced Propulsion 
Centre suggests that in 2025 we could see capacity shortages 
of around 50% for cathode active materials, 80% for anode 
materials and 40% for electrolyte materials. This expected 
capacity shortfall in highly refined nickel, cobalt, manganese, 
lithium and graphite refers to Europe, and globally is even 
more significant as shown later in this report. For some of 
these materials such as nickel a substantial structural deficit is 
expected to arise in the next 3-4 years.  
These deficits will need to be resolved by both mining (virgin 
materials) and an increased level of recycled materials. For 
both primary and secondary material streams a highly effective 
refining capability and capacity is required.
  
 
What this means for the UK
As discussed earlier, the refining steps for most of the battery 
materials is where the majority of the value of a battery is 
added. The focus for the UK should be very much on this area 
of the supply chain, not only for its own needs but also for 
export to Europe. Critically cathode active materials need to 
be made locally by 2024. The local demand for battery grade 
nickel, lithium and to a lesser extent cobalt and manganese are 
therefore a given. Focussing on the refining of materials enables 
recycled battery materials to be fed back into the supply chain, 
thereby creating a circular economy and easing the structural 
deficits in the supply of virgin materials.
1 Cell and pack production
 A large number of cell production facilities 
(giga-factory) will need to be built with a 
capital investment of around £1bn per 
GWh. (See the boxout on the global race 
to build gigafactories)
2 Key battery cell commodities
 Battery commodity (cathode, anode, 
electrolyte, etc) production capacity needs 
to be built in Europe. APC estimates 
suggest that there are very sizeable gaps in 
capacity across the 6 main commodities, as 
shown in the table below
3 Refining of raw materials
 Nickel, cobalt, lithium for cathodes and 
natural and synthetic graphite for anodes, 
along with aluminium and copper for 
current collectors are needed in large 












NMC811 Nickel  Manganese Cobalt Lithium Anode Active Material Synthetic Natural
ALL # GWh $ billion $ billion kTonne $mil kTonne kTonne kTonne kTonne kTonne $mil kTonne kTonne
2020 9.6 160 21.9 16.4 225.7 6,777 120 14.0 15.0 17.7 191.4 2,500 127.6 63.8
2025 41.3 787 76.4 57.3 1,114.2 23,690 591 69.3 74.0 87.4 944.9 8,740 630.0 315.0









NMC811 Nickel Manganese Cobalt Lithium Anode Active Material Synthetic Natural
ALL # GWh $ billion $ billion kTonne $mil kTonne kTonne kTonne kTonne kTonne $mil kTonne kTonne
2020 3.0 50 6.8 5.1 70.3 2,112 37 4.4 4.7 5.5 59.7 779 39.8 19.9
2025 13.9 249 24.2 18.1 352.7 7,499 187 21.9 23.4 27.7 299.1 2,767 199.4 99.7
2030 18.6 439 33.8 25.4 621.5 10,489 329 38.7 41.3 48.8 527.1 3,870 351.4 175.7




70% maximum non-originating material 
allowance
Or
Change in tariff heading except from non-
originating active cathode
50% maximum non-originating material 
allowance
Or
Change in tariff heading except from non-
originating active cathode materials
35% maximum non-originating material allowance
Or





70% maximum non-originating material 
allowance
Or
Change in tariff sub-heading
Or
Assembly from non-originating cells or battery 
modules
40% maximum non-originating material 
allowance
Or
Change in tariff heading except from non-
originating active cathode materials
30% maximum non-originating material allowance
Or




60% maximum non-originating material 
allowance
55% maximum non-originating material 
allowance
45% maximum non-originating material allowance + 
originating battery for PHEVs and BEVs
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Figure 36: Demand for battery materials. Source: IHS, The Advanced Propulsion Centre UK Ltd.
Figure 35: GM bolt cost breakdown in 2025. Source: The Advanced Propulsion Centre UK Ltd.
Figure 37: Rules of origin for batteries and electrified vehicles provide a 6-year phase-in period. Source: BEIS
LITHIUM-ION BATTERY MATERIALS:  
COBALT, NICKEL, LITHIUM AND GRAPHITE
Electric vehicles will replace internal combustion engines in most new road vehicles by the 2030s. They will also play a key role in 
decarbonising our energy systems through stationary battery energy-storage systems. As more intermittent renewables join the 
electricity grid and displace fossil fuels, batteries will be one of the main energy-storage technologies that helps to balance supply 
and demand. Their name is misleading, as lithium-ion batteries are complex products containing much more than the element 
lithium. The most common battery cathodes for electric vehicles (known as NMCs) are made from lithium, nickel, manganese and 
cobalt, while the anode is usually made from graphite (see figure 39). While manganese is widely available, cobalt and lithium have 
possible supply-chain problems in terms of availability, ethical mining, geolocation and supply restrictions. Nickel has not previously 
been considered a problem, however, as new battery chemistries decrease their cobalt content and increase their nickel content, 
it is increasingly seen as a technology-critical metal which should be carefully monitored. Lithium, cobalt and nickel have many 
commercial uses outside of the battery sector (see figure 40).
Figure 39: Image Courtesy © BGS / UKRI (2021)
Figure 40: Main uses of Co, Ni and graphite
MATERIAL APPLICATION COMMENT
LITHIUM
Batteries, Ceramics & Glass, 
Greases & Lubricants, Continuous 
Casting, Air Treatment, Polymers, 
Primary Aluminium Production.
Primary use is now batteries, and this is increasing rapidly. Most of the 
world’s lithium comes from South America, where the lithium is extracted 
from lithium-containing brine by a process of evaporation. The variety of 
sources means that lithium is not a technology-critical metal, but China 
does refine most of the world’s lithium. 
COBALT 
Rechargeable Batteries, 
Electronics, Catalysts, Magnets, 
Inks and Pigments, Alloys, 
Healthcare
Increasing amounts required for batteries. Cobalt is a by-product of 
copper mining in the Democratic Republic of Congo. Reports of child 
labour being employed in the DRC has created an interest in responsible 
sourcing. Cobalt refinement is currently dominated by Chinese 
companies.
NICKEL
Steels, Coatings, Coinage, Glass, 
Catalysts, Ceramics, Magnets, 
Batteries
Traded on the London Metal Exchange (LME), with well-established uses 
in steels. Batteries will dramatically increase the demand for nickel. 
GRAPHITE
Writing Materials, Lubricants, 
Refractory, Nuclear Reactors, 
Batteries, Graphene Sheets
Natural graphite is a critical raw material for the UK, with China being the 
world’s largest producer. 
LCO BATTERY NCA BATTERY NMC-111 BATTERY NMC-622 BATTERY NMC-811 BATTERY
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SUPPLY AND VALUE 
CHAIN FOR BATTERY 
MATERIALS 
Figure 38 provides a simplified view of 
the process steps from raw materials to 
recycled product. The takeaway message 
is that there are a large number of 
complex refining and processing stages 
before the battery  
cell is made.
RECYCLED MATERIALS
REPROCESSING OF BATTERY MATERIALS
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Figure 38: Battery value chain, courtesy of APC.
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BOX OUT
008
Materials for lithium-ion batteries
Cobalt market balance
Cobalt is produced mostly as 
a by-product or co-product 
of copper or nickel mining 
(see figure 42). The only 
exceptions to this are mines 
in Morocco or Canada, 
where cobalt is extracted 
from arsenide ores. The 
supply is, therefore, largely determined by the demand for 
copper and nickel. The major cobalt-producing region is 
the Central African Copper Belt, which stretches from the 
Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) into Zambia, with 
the highest grades of cobalt in the DRC. There are also 
large deposits of cobalt in Australia, Russia, Cuba, New 
Caledonia and Canada. There is only one mine in the world 
where cobalt is the main ore, and that is at Bou Azzer in 
Morocco. Currently, the DRC produces approximately 64 
ktonnes of cobalt per year, equal to 63% of the world’s 
output. This figure is set to reach 73% by 2025, if planned 
expansions are realised (see figure 41). A review of cobalt 
deposits in Europe identified 509 cobalt-bearing deposits 
and occurrences in 25 countries, 104 of which, mostly in 
the Nordic countries, were under exploration. Three mines in 
Finland produce cobalt. The geological availability of cobalt 
in Europe is not a problem, but exploration projects have to 
pass many technical, economic, environmental and social 
hurdles before they can become commercial. 
The deep oceans are also a potential future source of 
cobalt. Iron- and manganese-rich nodules and crusts 
contain concentrations of cobalt and nickel that are of 
economic interest. Consideration of these deposits is still 
at an early stage, with more work to be done to understand 
the environmental impacts of deep-sea mining as well as the 
technical challenges. There is much debate about the pros 
and cons of extracting material from the ocean floor. Many 
countries, including the UK, have exploration licences but 
no mining operations have started yet. Several companies 
have equipment ready to deploy if licences are granted. 
Mining is regulated by the International Seabed Authority 
and revenues are required to be used for the benefit of 
humankind.
Cobalt has many unique properties, leading to its key 
roles in rechargeable batteries, electronics, catalysts, 
aerospace alloys and healthcare. Cobalt is also the major 
component in Sm-Co permanent magnets, which are used 
in many aerospace applications where temperature-critical 
performance is demanded. Several cobalt-based materials 
can be used as catalysts for oxidation reactions and as 




















































































Figure 43: Cobalt price history














































Cobalt price history   
Cobalt is traded on the London Metal Exchange. Major 
EV/HEV battery makers have been contracting with 
cobalt producers in order to protect supply, but these 
are considered to be on a market-price-index basis. One 
strategy available to OEMs to protect against market 
volatility would be to contract with cobalt producers at a 
fixed price over the medium term (see figure 43).
However, where cobalt is produced is only part of the story. 
Significant value is added at locations where the cobalt 
is refined (see figures 44/45). Here, China has captured 
a considerable part of the market, vertically integrating 
large parts of the supply chain for battery materials. Whilst 
we cannot choose where primary materials are located, 
processing capacity is something that could be built in the 
UK. In particular, there could be future synergies around 
raw materials from primary sources and secondary supplies 
(covered in the next section). Here, Umicore in Belgium 
provides an example worthy of consideration.

































Figure 41: Cobalt market balance. 
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Nickel
Nickel is much more widely 
produced than cobalt, with 
more than 2.3 m tonnes 
being mined every year. There 
is availability of nickel and 
technologies to extract it that 
are well known.
 Capital costs are high 
and development cycles are long. The nickel industry will 
need to invest up to US$ 70 billion by 2030.Currently, 
prices are not reflecting the need to grow nickel mining 
to such  an extent Indonesia is the largest supplier, with 
just over half a million tonnes being mined in 2019. 
Other countries that produce large quantities of nickel 
include the Philippines, Russia, New Caledonia, Australia 
and Canada. Nickel has two main types of ore, (nickel 
sulphides and nickel laterites). Nickel sulphides are formed 
in magmatic rocks (including meteorite impact) and are 
mined underground or in open pits and then usually 
smelted. Bioleaching is carried out on some low-grade 
ores. Nickel laterites, that now account for about 60% 
of nickel production, are formed by tropical weathering 
of nickel sulphides and silicates. They are extracted in 
open cast mines (see figures 54,55) and then subject to 
hydrometallurgy (chemical treatment) to produce nickel. 
Cobalt is a co-product of some nickel laterite operations. 
Of the Nickel produced annually, roughly half is Class 1 
(containing a minimum of 99.8 percent nickel) and the 
rest is Class 2 (containing less than 99.8 percent nickel) 
units This is illustrated in Figure 49. Of the Class 1 Nickel 
produced, a significant proportion is used for battery 
production. It can be seen that demand for refined nickel 
is predicted to outstrip supply, as ilustrated in Figure 47. 
This is particularly acute for Class 1 Nickel, as illustrated in 
Figure 46. The process for extracting Class 1 battery-grade 
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1 Including only highly probable projects.
Note: Considers the amount of capital expenditures needed to provide sufficient supply based on third-party 
source estimates (CRU and Wood Mackensie) and Vale’s expected deficit by 2030 (50% Upside Case and 50% 
Conservative Case).
Source: LME, Barclays, BMO, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, Macquarie, Morgan Stanley, RBC, 
UBS, Wood Mackensie






























Class 1 surplus Class 1 inventory Class 1 ideficit
Figure 47: Refined nickel supply capacity and demand, by Class of  
nickel 89.
Figure 49: Majority of finished nickel production is Class 2 nickel89.
FINISHED NICKEL SUBSEGMENTS, %1
2,402 KILOTONS
CLASS 1 CLASS 1 CLASS 1 CLASS 1 CLASS 1 CLASS 2
BRIQUETTE 
AND POWDER




1FIGURES MAY NOT SUM TO 100% BECAUSE OF ROUNDING
2012 2014 2016 2018 2020 2022 2024 2026 2028 2030
REFINED NICKEL SUPPLY CAPACITY AND DEMAND, BY CLASS OF NICKEL, KILOTONS (ESTIMATES)
CLASS 1
DRAW DOWN OF CLASS 1 
INVENTORIES COMPENSATED 
BY PREVIOUS STOCKS




Figure 48: We know there will be a shortage due to electric cars
Figure 46: Why do we care about nickel88
BOX OUT
009
Materials for lithium-ion batteries
WHAT DOES THIS MEAN FOR NICKEL?
The nickel industry is lagging behind in investments 
due to the lack of incentive price
The downstream industry has committed over US$ 150 billion
Over US$ 70 
billion needed in 
investments for 
nickel
Over US$ 40 




constrained in as 
much as Ni and Cu 
are under invested
Meanwhile over 




The nickel industry needs better prices
WHAT DOES THIS MEAN FOR NICKEL?
Increasing competition for suitable sources for nickel  
sulphate production, particularly Class 1 nickel
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Using nickel as an example (but the same largely holds 
for the other battery materials) these materials will need 
to be highly refined to get to the >99.9% purity for use in 
batteries. The process flow from nickel ore through to Class 
1 nickel battery-grade materials consists of a number of 
steps, following a variety of routes. All of these are CapEx 
and OpEx intensive.
The refining capacity for these highly refined metals is in 
short supply (see figure 53), once projected additional 
demand for batteries is included. The nickel industry (see 
figure 52), however, is reluctant to build new capacity as 
the nickel price does not currently warrant the investment 
of around $70bn (see figure 51), according to one of 
the world’s largest nickel miners and refiners (Vale), who 
summarised the issue like this:
“This points at a structural deficit of nickel supply for 
batteries from 2023 onwards which has been corroborated 
by a number of sources including McKinsey.”
(see figure 48)
Figure 52: Percentage of global nickel production 201791
LATERITE SULPHIDE COLOUR REPRESENTS THE COMPOSITION OF NICKEL RESERVES BY ORE TYPE



















































































































Figure 51: Nickel price history
Mining (and recycling) of raw materials
Only some of the highest grades of nickel are good enough 
for batteries (Class 1). 
Class 1 nickel can be made from limonite and sulphide ores. 
(Figure 52 shows the global distribution of these resources.) 
The latter is cheaper, less energy- (and often carbon-) 
intensive, as well as having less of an environmental impact. 
(Figures 53, 54 and 55 are illustrative of Nickel mining and 
refining operations).
 Nickel is used primarily as a constituent (6-10%) in stainless 
steels, in superalloys and increasingly in the batteries for EVs.
Nickel is abundant and has been traded on the LME for 
many years. Prices are volatile as speculators can raise 
them much higher than normal supply/demand dynamics 
would dictate, see figure 51. Conversely, they can 
sometimes be driven below the nickel miners’ break even 
price. 
OEMs can manage price volatility by financially hedging 
nickel with various banks. This eliminates market volatility as 
prices are effectively pegged to the hedged price. 
Nickel is an ingredient (typically ~50%) in all nickel-based 
superalloys for the aerospace sector. 
Figure 54: Nickel miningFigure 53: A nickel refinery
Figure 55: Nickel Mining in New Caledonia
Materials for lithium-ion batteries continuedBOX OUT009
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BOX OUT
010
Materials for lithium-ion batteries
Lithium
Until recently, the main use 
for lithium was in ceramics. 
Its key role in lithium-
ion batteries for electric 
vehicles and energy storage 
now sees it increasing in 
importance (see Fig 57) 
and becoming more vital 
to UK manufacturing as the automotive industry switches 
over from internal-combustion-engined vehicles to battery-
powered cars and lorries. Lithium has recently been added 
to lists of critical raw materials (see the EU’s graph of CRMs 
Figure 1). Previously, the range of sources in a number of 
countries kept it sub-critical but given the ‘race to build 
gigafactories’ and the consequential need for a rapidly 
increasing supply of raw materials, it is not surprising to 
see lithium now classed as critical. The main sources of 
lithium are: (1) shallow underground brines, salars, in the 
Lithium Triangle sourced, in South America (see figure 
58,59,60), which are evaporated in large ponds in desert 
areas to produce lithium compounds: and (2) granite-related 
pegmatites, hard rocks, usually mined in open-cast quarries 
with associated processing to make a concentrate of the 
lithium ore minerals. The most famous pegmatite deposit 
is the Greenbushes mine in Western Australia. There are 
many other lithium pegmatites that are potential sources 
if they can be mined economically. There are also non-
conventional sources of lithium, like seawater, but they are 


























































Figure 58: Salar de Uyuni, Potosi, Bolivia, South America. The world largest salt and lithium reserve at 3650 meters above sea level. Potosi, Bolivia, 
South America.
Figure 59: The Rockwood Lithium Mine
Figure 60: Evaporating ponds for lithium production. Image courtesy: Alexandra Sweeney. 
Figure 56: Lithium market balance
Source: Created from data from benchmark mineral intelligence
not economically viable at present.
Lithium is also one of a few metals that could be sourced, 
to some extent, in the UK. There are projects looking at 
unconventional sources of lithium, such as underground 
brines circulating in fractures in South West England. 
Another approach is to extract the lithium from lithium-


















































































USES OF LITHIUM IN 2016 USES OF LITHIUM IN 2026
Figure 57: Uses of lithium
Lithium in the UK
There are active exploration projects for lithium in the UK, 
(see figure 61-64) providing the potential for domestic 
production of some battery raw material. British Lithium 
and Cornish Lithium are assessing the recovery of lithium 
from the mineral, mica, in Cornish granite. Cornish Lithium 
are developing lithium extraction from brines in conjunction 
with a deep geothermal energy project at United Downs in 
Cornwall.
Figure 61: Exploration for lithium mica
Generation and sale of 
geothermal energy:
ZERO CARBON FOOTPRINT
The deep groundwaters will  
be brought to the surface  
via geothermal wells
Lithium enriched granite Lithium enriched granite
Production of low 
carbon lithium from 
geothermal waters Electric vehicle battery 
powered by green UK lithium
Regional  





Figure 63: Pilot lithium extraction plant. Supplied by Cornish Lithium
Figure 64: Cutting core for analysis
Figure 62: Exploration for lithium mica
The ultimate source of lithium is the mica in granite, but 
natural, deep fluids have already done the hard work and 
leached the lithium into solution. Northern Lithium have 
recently announced a new project to test the Weardale 
Granite of County Durham for deep lithium-bearing 
brines. These are all highly innovative projects that require 
substantial research and development and have been 
successful in attracting investment as well as research 
grants. They have also been highlighted in regional 
development opportunities and plans.92,93
The exploration for battery raw materials is part of a 
renewal of interest in metals exploration in the UK. In the 
southwest, there are active projects for the critical metal, 
tungsten, the technology metal, tin, and also copper 
(Tungsten West, Cornwall Resources, Cornish Metals, 
Cornish Tin). Elsewhere, there are projects exploring for 
gold and base metals. These new projects have to navigate 
a complex mineral rights system, which some consider to 
be old-fashioned and hard to navigate. Mineral permitting 
is part of our overall land-use planning system and as such 
needs to balance competing interests (economic, social 
and environmental) in a relatively small, densely populated 
country. It has been subject to a regular review by the UK 
Government and Parliament.
Most of the permitting issues relevant to metals mining 
also apply to industrial minerals and the construction 
minerals industry, which is a major UK sector. In 2018, the 
CBI Minerals Group and Mineral Products Association 
published a UK Minerals Strategy94 setting out proposed 
environmental planning and regulation principles for 
environmental protection, while delivering the economic 
benefits of domestic production. Consideration of these 
proposals alongside the development of new regulations for 
geothermal energy rights95 (see figure 63), and extraction 
of metals from natural waters would be timely. (see the 
Governance and Regulations Section).
Materials for lithium-ion batteries continuedBOX OUT010
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LOCATION OF BATTERY MATERIALS
The number of countries with the resources required for lithium-ion batteries is small (see the map below). In fact, the Democratic 
Republic of Congo and China dominate with their large reserves of cobalt and graphite, respectively. The UK and Europe have no 
significant resources of any of the materials required for lithium-ion batteries and will continue to remain reliant on imports. Ensuring 
access to these technology-critical metals and natural graphite must be central to any UK strategy for ensuring that high-technology 
industry and skilled jobs in manufacturing are retained. 
BATTERY MATERIALS: THE CHALLENGE
The figure below, based on estimates by the Faraday Institution in 2020, indicates the expected huge increase in raw-material 
demand from the UK over the next 15 years. Imports of cobalt are expected to exceed 10 ktonnes, while the amounts of lithium 
carbonate equivalent and nickel are likely to top 50 and 60 ktonnes, respectively, by 2035, driven largely by the requirements of 
batteries for electric vehicles. 
Figure 66: UK demand for raw materials to 2035. 
Source - Faraday Institute estimates4.
The issue is not that there isn’t enough nickel, cobalt, 
lithium and graphite in the ground, but rather that it is not 
economically viable to mine (or recycle) and refine it to the 
specification required for battery electric vehicles in the 
quantities required by 2030. Higher prices are inevitable 
and required to bring on more supply. This will directly 
lead to higher battery prices and therefore higher vehicle 
prices, which are likely to slow down the production and 
uptake of electric vehicles globally, leading to adverse 
climate impacts.
Graphite
Graphite plays a crucial role 
in a number of key industries, 
including steelmaking, 
nuclear reactors and lithium-
ion batteries. Spherical 
graphite, also known as 
battery-grade graphite, is 
processed into an ultra-high-
purity form (>99.95 % carbon) for its use as the battery 
anode. Its spherical shape allows more graphite to fit into a 
smaller space, which improves the conductivity and the rate 
at which the battery can be charged and discharged. China 
is currently the only producer of battery-grade graphite in 
industrial quantities96. 
However, sustained high prices are encouraging 
developments outside of China97. The global market for 
graphite is expected to grow to $21.4 billion by 2024, with 
a compound annual growth rate of 5.6%. Demand is being 
driven by a 20% year-on-year growth of lithium-ion battery 
producers98. The expansion of the hydrogen economy, 
where hydrogen is used as an energy vector, will also drive 
the demand for graphite in some types of fuel cells.
Figure 65: Graphite market balance.























































































As can be seen on the following page, while the mineral 
resources for lithium-ion batteries are far from uniformly 
distributed, there is even more of a concentration in terms of 
processing capability, much of which is currently associated 
with China, which has a large concentration of battery 
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Figure 67: Primary resources for technology-critical metals99.
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Figure 68: Flow of cobalt around the world100
Figure 69: Flow of nickel around the world90
ELEMENTS OF A  
UK SUPPLY-CHAIN
There is no mining capacity for nickel or 
cobalt in the UK, but Vale has a nickel 
smelter at Clydach in South Wales, 
where it refines nickel materials that are 
rich in cobalt. Opened in 1902, Clydach 
refinery is one of the oldest in the world, 
producing refined nickel in the form 
of powder and pellets that are sold to 
more than 280 customers in over 30 
countries across Europe, Asia and the 
US. The refinery is supplied with nickel 
oxide, an intermediate product, from 
Vale’s smelters in the Sudbury region of 
Canada101. According to EU figures, $302 
million of unwrought, unalloyed Ni was 
exported from the UK in 2017. However, 
existing data on cobalt and nickel are 
not detailed enough to allow commodity 
traceability across the UK supply chain. 
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UK IS WELL POSITIONED WITH A NUMBER 
OF GLOBALLY LEADING COMPANIES WELL 
PLACED IN THE VALUE CHAIN
CATHODE AND ANODE MATERIALS ARE A 
GAP THAT IS BEING ADDRESSED
Figure 70: Battery value chain courtesy of APC.
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ELEMENTS OF A UK SUPPLY-CHAIN CONTINUED
Figure 71: Mwinilunga, Zambia - December 6th, 2012: Three young African miners work in an underground mine and dig for resources
 See previous page for a diagram of existing elements of a potential UK battery supply chain.
ETHICAL ISSUES  
AROUND THE PRODUCTION OF BATTERY MATERIALS
UK steel producers, the chemical industry and makers of cemented carbides and other hard materials, together with battery 
manufacturers like Johnson Matthey, rely on imports of cobalt as there are no significant cobalt resources in the UK.
Unregulated mining in the Democratic Republic of Congo, 
sometimes referred to as artisanal mining, including the 
use of child labour, has been in the headlines as the price 
of cobalt has risen. However, most cobalt is still supplied 
by large mining companies like Glencore, which produced 
46,300 tonnes of cobalt last year, up 10% from 2018, but 
expects to generate only about 29,000 tonnes this year 
after shutting down its Mutanda mine in the DRC, the 
world’s largest cobalt operation, last year.
In recent years, cobalt has been subject to controversy 
due to reports of human-rights abuses, including the use 
of child labour, in artisanal and small-scale mines in the 
DRC. Between 15-30% of the DRC’s output, comes from 
artisanal mines102. Ethically focused OEMs have taken 
measures to ensure their elemental cobalt supply is sourced 
to international ethical standards and in some instances 
from outside of the DRC. 
Prices nearly quadrupled, (see page 64), in the 18 months 
to Q2 in 2018 as speculators warehoused thousands 
of tonnes of high-grade cobalt in anticipation of greatly 
increased prices due to the projected increase in demand 
from the EV/HEV sector. Prices started to slide back to 
normal as speculators left the market and real market 
supply/demand dynamics resumed. 
Some argue that artisanal mining plays an important role 
in stabilising cobalt prices and meeting demand. They 
contribute as so-called “swing producers”, who are able 
to act quickly when market prices are high, but then tail off 
in periods of low demand. Figures for artisanal production, 
are hard to track, as there is an understandable lack of 
transparency and supply-chain data around how it is traded, 
but it was estimated that in 2007, artisanal production 
from the DRC was the second biggest global producer 
after DRC’s official sector. That said, the DRC does still 
recognise the sector and provides some assistance through 
Potential Elements of a UK Supply-Chain
P66 is the only needle coke (a precursor to synthetic graphite) producer of note in Europe. Its Humber facility 
produces enough to satisfy Europe’s demand for electric vehicles until 2030. With no major synthetic graphite 
producers in Europe and the process being energy intensive (and therefore potentially carbon intensive) this is a 
unique opportunity for the UK with large amounts of wind power coming on line.
Vale operates one of Europe’s largest nickel refineries, in South Wales, currently supplying very-high-grade nickel 
into various high-value applications such as alloys for Rolls Royce’s gas turbines. 
The UK has two lithium carbonate and hydroxide specialists with the capability to scale up quickly.
Mitsubishi Chemicals (Teeside) operates one of three electrolyte production sites in Europe. 
Johnson Matthey is a global leader in cathode active material manufacturing, covering both LFP and a high nickel 
eLNO materials. It has R&D and production sites around Europe.
Significant investments by these companies could create a snowball effect for the whole supply chain to develop 
very quickly. UK Government investment similar to what is being offered in Europe is required urgently, to ensure 
these investments are timely and with the scale necessary. The UK Battery Industrialisation Centre, which is 
currently the only one in Europe, offers a unique opportunity to assist this localisation effort.
the Service for Assistance and Supervision of Artisanal and 
Small-Scale Mining (SAEMAPE)
Ethical issues surrounding the mining of technology-critical 
metals first came to the world’s attention in the 1990s. 
This resulted in a “conflict minerals” law in the US, and a 
European conflict minerals regulation that comes into force 
on 1 January 2021. Cobalt is not part of this regulation, 
however. The Cobalt Institute, based in London, has 
implemented its own responsible-sourcing scheme called 
CERAF, which requires its members to be compliant with 
recognised schemes. Multinational NGOs such as the Pact 
Mines-to-Market programme are working with the artisanal 
miners to improve their conditions. The ethical approach 
is generally not to stop the purchasing of minerals from 
problematic regions – the local population could then be 
even worse off – but to intervene to ensure supplies are 
coming from responsibly run mines. Large companies 
such as Google and Apple are reaching back through their 
supply chains to help artisanal miners.
Environmental issues around the production of battery materials
The environmental standards of mines producing cobalt, 
nickel and lithium are varied, ranging from the highest 
international standards to practices that do not safeguard the 
environment. With global production increasing sevenfold 
between 2008 and 2015, there are also increasing reports 
of health problems. Environmental problems have been 
reported in Australia (water quality), Cuba (pollution plumes) 
and Zambia (poisoned soil). Two years ago, 17 nickel mines 
were closed or suspended in the Philippines because of 
environmental concerns. In Chile’s Salar de Atacama, a 
centre for lithium production, 65% of the region’s water is 
consumed by mining activities: one tonne of lithium requires 
1900 tonnes of water to extract the metal. This impacts on 
the farmers in the region, who are then forced to import their 
water from other parts of the country.
The UK must take a responsible position in the sourcing of 
materials as it transitions to a low-carbon economy. 
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All regions around the world are seeing industry move towards technologies that support decarbonisation; but some will get there faster than 
others. The scale of the investment required for sectoral transition is staggering and there will be winners and losers in the process. It is our 
recommendation that targeted investment in this sector needs to increase dramatically, if the UK is to catch up with international competition, 
let alone harbour any ambitions of being a world leader.
The International Energy Agency has called for global investment into battery supply chains in order to meet net-zero targets . The present 
trajectory has seen production capacity to double every three to four years. However, globally, they note that to meet our commitments, we will 
need to double capacity every two years103. Many other nations also have their eyes set on this prize and the rewards that will flow from building 
a successful EV industry. With ambitious net-zero goals and a plan to phase out ICE vehicle production, the UK must act decisively and ensure 
the attractiveness of the UK as a destination to build EV batteries, if it wants to avoid meeting these commitments primarily with imported 
products; however, this will require significant investment.
It was said that Tesla’s first gigafactory would eventually 
cost $5 billion104. Tesla have said that they will invest105 4 
billion euros ($4.41 billion) in their new European factory. 
The UK was scouted by Elon Musk as a potential location 
for Tesla’s European factory. However, he cited Brexit as 
amongst the reasons he decided against the UK106. The 
German Government named Tesla as one of 11 companies 
to receive billions of euros in government subsidies, aimed 
at stimulating an EV industry in Germany107; it will receive 
€1 billion ($1.2 billion) from the German Government 108. 
Britishvolt believes that it can deliver its first gigafactory 
for £2.6 billion ($3.5 billion)109, however, it still has to raise 
a significant portion of the funds110. If all goes according 
to plan, it aims to start producing batteries by 2023. The 
Faraday Institution estimates that UK market demand would 
make a Gigafactory viable in 2022, with a second following 
in 20254. In many other nations concrete foundations are 
being poured and factories constructed, while in others 
machines produce batteries by the million. In the UK, this 
remains, for now, an ambition.
BOX OUT
012
Lithium-ion Batteries & The Race To Build Gigafactories
Figure 72: Tesla’s new Berlin Brandenberg Gigafactory Under Construction In Berlin
Figure 73: The Tesla Gigafactory in Sparks, NV
It is estimated that we will need 8 gigafactories in the UK 
by 2040111. The Faraday Institution has said that in the 
absence of battery manufacturing, 114,000 jobs could be 
lost . Without battery manufacturing capacity, the future 
for UK EV and automotive production has been described 
as bleak112. To turbocharge the transformation, the UK 
Government will need to match the ambition of other 
countries that are fully committed to this race. Despite the 
existing dominance of Asian suppliers, and the significant 
progress made by European and US battery manufacturing 
to match this, as we are still in a period of rapid growth, 
there is still every opportunity to catch up. It has been 
estimated in a recent German report that this will take at 
least five to eight years and cost in the region of €10 billion, 
in addition to EU funding in this area.
Focusing on the UK, some commentators have questioned 
whether the present scale of investment in this area is 
commensurate with the scale of the challenge, and whether 
it begins to approach the levels of investment that are being 
leveraged by others globally113.
And yet, whilst globally, and in the UK, there is an intense 
focus on battery manufacturing, arguably the other key 
component of EVs, electric motors, receive far less attention. 
The comparative investment in the development of the UK 
supply chain for EV motors is more modest. There is the risk 
that without significant investment, the UK could also lose 
capability in this area. This should be a cause for concern, 
given China’s dominance of the rare earth supply chain.
Medium term
As stated in the Electrical Energy Storage roadmap,77 there 
are a number of technologies that enable low-cost batteries 
with much lower technology-critical metals requirements. 
Some of these technologies are actively being developed in 
the UK, ranging from silicon anode technologies to Na-ion 
and Li-sulfur batteries. A real focus on getting these scaled 
up and to market, for example, through the UK BIC, is a key 
priority. Significant government and private investment is 
required to do this at the speed and scale required.
In parallel,l the recycling of technology-critical metals such 
as cobalt, nickel and lithium is urgently required. This 
would enable the UK refining and automotive supply chain 
to prosper in the longer term, and will become even more 
important as regulation requires ever increasing amounts of 
recycled content.
PLATINUM GROUP METALS AS CRITICAL MATERIALS
What are the Platinum Group Metals?
There are six platinum group metals (PGMs), of which the 
best known are platinum and palladium. The remaining four 
PGMs are available in smaller quantities and always as a 
by-product. 
All six PGMs have unique properties, which make them 
difficult to substitute, and their usefulness, combined with 
their rarity, makes them very expensive.
What are they useful for?
CATALYTIC CONVERTERS – TECHNOLOGY FOR CLEANER AIR
Catalytic converters process the fumes that come out 
of petrol and diesel engines, converting harmful gases 
including carbon monoxide and nitrogen oxides (NOx) into 
gases which are already present in the air (see figure 74). In 
petrol cars, most catalytic converters contain palladium and 
rhodium. The major component of this is 2-5g of palladium, 
with small amounts of rhodium included to catalyse NOx 
reduction. In diesel cars, catalytic converters typically 
contain less palladium but 3-6g of platinum114,115, which is 
close to the amount in a traditional wedding ring. However, 
the amount of all the metals loaded onto a catalyst changes 
over time: in 2019, the global average palladium loading on 
a petrol car went up 14% and rhodium loading increased by 
20%. This was the result of tightening emissions legislation 
in several regions of the world.
Figure 74: Cutaway catalytic converter
Figure 76: London fuel cell bus
CATALYSTS FOR MAKING CHEMICALS – SUSTAINABLE MANUFACTURING
In large-scale industrial processes, catalysts are used to 
decrease the amount of energy, and hence environmental 
impact and cost, associated with the manufacture of bulk 
and speciality chemicals. Catalysts containing rhodium, 
iridium and ruthenium are used to produce acetic acid, 
which is a component of products including paints, 
adhesives and artificial fibres. Hull is home to Europe’s 
largest acetic acid production facility, which uses a 
ruthenium based catalyst. In Edinburgh, palladium catalysts 
are used in the manufacture of oxycodone, which is widely 
used for management of pain (see figure 75).
ELECTROLYSERS AND FUEL CELLS –  
CLEAN ELECTRICITY
Electrolysers make hydrogen out of water; fuel cells take 
the hydrogen and make electricity. At present, fuel cells 
are used in electricity generators and to power vehicles 
ranging from forklift trucks and passenger cars to boats 
and submarines. Since 2011, Londoners have been able 
to travel on zero-emission fuel cell buses and low-emission 
diesel/fuel cell hybrid buses make up 30% of the fleet (see 
figure 76).117
While not a huge market at the moment, the UK has 
a leading technology position and an expanding 
manufacturing base in fuel cell technologies. Hence, 
electrolysers and fuel cells offer an opportunity for the UK 
to move away from coal, gas, and hydrocarbon-powered 
vehicles, and to take a market lead in clean technologies 
including hybrid fuel cell/lithium-ion battery drivetrains.
The PGMs used in fuel cells and electrolysers are platinum, 
ruthenium and iridium. Of these, iridium is the scarcest as 
there is not very much available and relatively large amounts 
are required in each electrolyser. Fuel cells and electrolysers 
are not sustainably recycled in the UK at present, although 
there are a number of funded programmes investigating the 
value chain and technology options.
HIGH-PERFORMANCE GLASS – DATA AND DISPLAY 
PRODUCTS
A less well known application of platinum and rhodium is 
in alloys which are used in the manufacture of fibreglass 
used in the electronics, construction, renewable energy 
and automotive industries. These alloys are also used to 
produce next-generation LCD glass panels for large-screen 
televisions measuring over 60 inches.
Figure 75: Proportion of PGMs used in the various sectors and recycling 
in 2019; note that “Investment” can be positive or negative in any given 
year116
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JEWELLERY AND INVESTMENT
A significant amount of platinum is locked up as metal, 
in jewellery or in metal bars held by banks and physical 
exchange-traded funds (ETFs) (see figure 77). The amount 
held or sold depends on market sentiment. During 2019, 
for example, investors added over one million ounces of 
platinum to their ETF holdings, taking the total volume 
of platinum under investment to a record 3.4 million troy 
ounces (>100 tonnes). This quantity is equivalent to 57% of 
the 2019 primary Pt supply. In contrast, physical investment 
in palladium ETFs reached a peak in 2015 but holdings 
have declined sharply since then, as record prices have 
prompted profit-taking and the amount dropped to around 
590,000 ounces at the by August 2019.
Figure 77: Platinum bars
Figure 78: Fluctuation in platinum and palladium prices since 2015
PGM Metal Prices 
The value of each PGM fluctuates. For example, 31 g 
rhodium (1 troy ounce) was worth $13,800 on 13th 
March 2020, but only $7,000 on 7th May. From a financial 
perspective, PGM metal prices drive investment and 
the economic feasibility of mining and recycling. From a 
manufacturing perspective, in some applications PGM 
metal prices can influence how much metal is used.
For example, between 2002 and 2017, platinum has 
consistently been more expensive than palladium (see figure 
78), so it was cheaper to minimise the amount of platinum 
in a catalyst or product by adding more palladium. The 
price crossover in September 2017 has changed that. For 
automotive manufacturers, one way to mitigate rising costs 
is to exchange some of the palladium in catalytic converters 
for platinum. Due to the different metal chemistries this is 
not straightforward: it requires technical development of the 
catalyst and in some cases reoptimisation of the way the 
engine is calibrated.
There was an unforeseen consequence of this rise in the 
palladium price. In the first six months of 2019, more than 
2000 catalytic converters were stolen from cars in the 
UK 118. This is more than double the number stolen in the 
whole of 2018 and a direct result of high rhodium values 
and the value of palladium reaching unprecedented highs.
PGM supply and demand 
Unlike other strategic elements such as cobalt and the 
REEs, there have historically been reserves of refined 
platinum and palladium which can buffer fluctuations in 
metal price and supply. It is challenging to estimate what 
quantity of metal is held in above ground stocks at any given 
time, but there has been considerable drawdown in recent 
years: around 7m ozT platinum and 12 m ozT palladium have 
been exported via major trading centres in London and 
Zurich since 2007.
Primary and secondary refining of PGMs
Mining (primary refining) of PGMs supplies around two 
thirds of global PGM demand, and the remaining third 
depends on recycling (secondary refining). Europe 
is home to a number of secondary refiners in France, 
Belgium, Norway, Germany, Switzerland and the UK 
boasts the world’s largest secondary refiner of PGMs, 
Johnson Matthey. Secondary refining offers technologically 
advanced companies the security of PGM supply on which 
they depend to remain competitive. 
Figure 79: Global PGM primary supply - 2019
Why are the PGMs critical?
South Africa has a large proportion of the world’s platinum 
ore, while considerable amounts of palladium ore can be 
found in Russia (see figure 79). The supply of mined metals 
therefore depends on the political and economic conditions 
in these countries: wage negotiations, strikes, shaft 
closures, electricity shortages all contribute to fluctuations 
in supply. Added to that, PGMs come out of the ground 
in very small amounts - four kilos of ore produces about 
enough PGM to cover a little fingernail. How can it be 
economic to mine and recycle them?
The reason is that it is difficult to find cheaper metals that 
will do the same things as PGMs. While “thrifting” – using 
less - PGM can usually be achieved, the PGMs have unique 
chemical and physical properties that to date it has proved 
impossible to replicate. Without these metals, technology 
would never have advanced as far as it has. And demand 
continues to increase.
DATA FROM RDW 2019 DEC
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AEROENGINE MATERIALS
Since its earliest development the performance of the aero gas turbine has always been limited by the capability of available 
materials. This is particularly true in the high-temperature sections of the engine: the high pressure (HP) compressor, combustor and 
turbine (see figure 80). Here the peak temperature and pressure attainable and hence the thermo-dynamic efficiency of the cycle is 
limited by the temperature capability of the alloys used. Improvements in performance, fuel efficiency and emissions are therefore 
only possible through the use of advanced high-temperature materials systems. The materials used must combine temperature 
capability with the highest levels of mechanical integrity and resistance to corrosion and oxidation.
ALLOY Ni Cr Co Mo W Re Al Ti Ta Nb Hf Fe C B Zr
U720 Bal. 18 15 3 1.3 2.5 5.0 0.035 0.033 0.03
IN718 Bal. 19 3 0.5 0.9 5.1 18.5 0.04
CMSX-4 Bal. 6.5 9 0.6 6 3 5.6 1 6.5 0.1
Figure 81: Table shows the typical composition of the commonly used disc alloys IN718 and U720, and blade alloy CMSX4 (in wt%). 
The high-temperature components in the engine, i.e., static 
casings and rotating discs and blades, are all manufactured 
from nickel-based superalloys. These materials have 
complex compositions, based on nickel, but containing 
numerous alloying additions (see figure 81). Each of these 
yields specific benefits while interacting in multiple ways 
with the other elements present. The overall composition 
is carefully balanced and optimised to meet a wide range 
of performance requirements, including high-temperature 
strength, fatigue and creep resistance, environmental 
resistance and density.
In addition to chemistry, the performance of an alloy in 
an application is determined to a large degree by its 
processing route and subsequent structure. Processing 
routes are component specific and tailored to provide 
the necessary properties. Raw-materials sources and 
manufacturing methods are rigorously controlled to ensure 
consistent product quality. 
High-performance disc components are manufactured 
through powder metallurgy to achieve the highest levels 
of mechanical integrity, whereas HP turbine blades are 
manufactured via single-crystal casting to achieve extremely 
high-temperature capability (see figure 82). 
This component is required to operate directly behind 
the combustor in a gas stream in excess of 1750K while 
rotating at more than 10,000rpm, extracting the energy 
necessary to drive the compressor. To survive in this 
environment the blades are cast as a single crystal with 
complex internal cooling passages and are subsequently 
protected by environmental and thermal barrier coatings.
The composition, as shown in table 1 for the alloy CMSX-4, 
contains multiple elements, some of which may be classified 
as strategic or scarce according to the terms of this report.
Nickel (Ni) is present as the majority element. It provides a 
strong, ductile matrix with good environmental stability and 
alloying potential. Cobalt (Co) is also present to strengthen 
this matrix. 
Chromium (Cr) additions are made predominantly to provide 
environmental protection together with aluminium through 
the formation of stable oxide films. 
Molybdenum (Mo) and tungsten (W) are added for 
resistance to high-temperature deformation. Rhenium (Re) 
is also a very powerful element for providing strength at the 
highest temperatures for extended time periods. In more 
recent alloy developments, ruthenium (Ru) additions were 
also introduced, working together with Re to provide the 
very highest levels of high-temperature performance, but 
with significant cost implications.
Aluminium (Al), titanium (Ti) and tantalum (Ta) all provide 
very significant strengthening through the formation of 
a high volume fraction of fine-scale particles within the 
matrix and their levels are optimised to control the amount 
and properties of these precipitates. Hafnium (Hf) is also 
present at a low level for a range of reasons, including the 
‘gettering’ of oxygen and sulphur.
In addition to those elements present in the alloy itself, 
coating systems for oxidation and corrosion protection can 
contain platinum (Pt), typically in conjunction with Al or Cr. 
Ceramic coatings for thermal protection contain low levels 
of yttrium (Y) in the form of yttria-stabilised zirconia. These 
coatings are essential to protect the underlying metal from 
the aggressive engine environment and achieve desirable 
levels of performance and component life. Some of these 
elements can also be used in the manufacturing processes, 
for instance in foundry ceramics, but this is beyond the 
scope of this report.
In general, the substitution of elements is extremely difficult 
since, as outlined above, each addition is present for a 
specific reason and contributes to the performance of the 
alloy and hence the system as a whole. Careful alloy design 
and processing control ensures that maximum benefit is 
gained from each percentage addition employed. Revert 
and recycling are used throughout the manufacturing 
and product life cycle to maximize material recovery. One 
exception is Ru, where in general manufacturers have 
sought to remove alloys containing this element from their 
products as a result of unacceptable price instability. 
Future technology developments may bring additional 
materials into consideration for aerospace propulsion 
systems. The development of hybrid electrical propulsion 
will require high-performance magnetic materials using 
rare earth elements such as samarium (Sm) and again Co. 
Figure 82: A high-pressure turbine blade
Figure 80: A cross-section of a modern gas-turbine engine indicating key engine components of relevance to this section.
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HP TurbineHP Compressor Combustor
Figure 80: A cross-section of a modern gas-turbine engine indicating key engine components of relevance to this section.
Energy-storage systems are also likely to require Co and Ni 
within high-performance electrodes. 
Aspects of sourcing and control of the alloying elements of 
major interest for this report, i.e., Re, Ta, Co and Ni. Co and 
Ni have already been discussed earlier in the report. In each 
case secure and sustainable supplies must be assured 
at acceptable cost to support the production demands 
for engine components. Ethically focused OEMs, such as 
Rolls-Royce, take robust measures to ensure elemental 
materials are sourced to recognized international standards 
with regard to conflict and wider human-rights issues, such 
as OECD ‘Due diligence guidance for responsible supply 
chains of minerals from conflict affected and high risk areas’.
Rhenium 
Rhenium is a by-product of 
molybdenum production, 
which itself is a by-product of 
copper production. Rhenium 
sources are primarily found 
in Chile, USA and Poland. 
Rhenium is not mined or 
produced in any regions 
classed as “conflict” or associated with any human-rights 
abuses. 
Some 80% of rhenium demand is for aerospace 
superalloys, with the balance being used in catalysts in the 
petro-chemical industry. Increasing aerospace demand and 
the threat of an additional use in liquid-to-gas distillation 
created a tight market during the mid-2000s and the price 
leaped six-fold in two years to nearly $12,000/kg, (see 
figure 8).
Tight primary supply and accompanying high prices in 
2006/07 triggered the creation of the rhenium recycling 
industry. This captured rhenium units previously lost in 
producing other nickel superalloys. 
At the same time OEMs applied pressure on melters to 
utilise more of their closed-loop solid revert. This consisted 
of cleaned up casting foundry solids, scrapped blades and 
eventually EoL blades. Increased revert reduced the virgin 
rhenium units required and reduced costs. Nowadays, 
common rhenium-containing superalloy melts use ~40% 
revert in the melt composition. 
Over the years increased primary supply, various OEM 
rhenium reduction programmes, increased revert usage and 
the generation of rhenium units via the rhenium recycling of 
grinding wastes have caused the rhenium price to plummet 
to pre-crisis lows, see figure 83. 
It is believed that aerospace OEMs place long-term 
agreements (LTA’s) for rhenium directly with rhenium 
suppliers to cover their requirements as rhenium is not 
traded on any exchange.
Tantalum
Tantalum is supplied from 
two sources; the mining 
of Tantalite ore and the 
revert of various scrap 
and recycling of wastes. 
Tantalite ore is supplied via 
both conventional mining 
in heavily mechanised 
open pit/underground mines and produced via artisanal, 
labour intensive methods, in typically central African 
countries. Tantalite ores are found primarily in central Africa 
(Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC) and bordering 
countries), Australia and Brazil. 
Tantalum is one of the four “conflict minerals” along with 
tin, tungsten and gold which are produced in central 
African countries. Ethically focussed companies, such as 
Rolls-Royce (RR), have, since 2010, only purchased and 
contracted tantalum supply from ethically approved sources, 
i.e. approved by the Responsible Mining Initiative, formerly 
EICC. 
The tantalum capacitor industry consumes approx. 50% 
of World supply with other industries, such as superalloys, 
sputter targets, carbides and chemicals making up the 
remaining demand.
Starting in 2008 some large tantalum mines were closed, 
central African supply was classed as conflict minerals and 
the remaining primary supply (Brazil) was removed from the 
market via a long-term contract. In tandem with dwindling 
ore supply, the recovery, starting ~2010, of the consumer 
electronics (capacitors) and aerospace industries saw 
prices near triple, (see figure 84).
In 2013 prices started to trend downwards, due to two main 
factors. First the creation of ethically produced, certified and 
auditable ores out of central Africa, driven by the capacitor 
makers. Second was the increased quantities of tantalum 
in closed loop revert, at similar percentages as rhenium 
containing alloys, and the increased recycling of tantalum 
containing scraps and wastes. Both reduced the virgin units 
required. 
Prices started an upward trend at the end of 2016 this time 
due to the Chinese Government shutting polluting tantalum 
smelters and processors on environmental grounds. As 
processors cleaned up their factories licences were granted 
and supply (and prices) returned to normal levels. 
Since tantalum is not traded on any exchange it is usually 
contracted by OEM’s over a one to three-year timeframe in 
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SUMMARY FOR PRIMARY MATERIALS 
The technology-critical metals metal market often operates in a different way to the market for major metals, resulting in specific 
challenges for access. Several of these metals are not traded on the London Metals Exchange, the mining and refining is often state 
controlled and this has resulted in near-monopoly situations in these supply chains for some technology-critical metals. 
The true cost of the environmental and ethical impact of technology-critical metals is not currently factored in to the price of the 
metals. There are international measures being proposed, however, to resolve this which would have an impact on the viability of 
mining and refining operations globally.
Ultimately the UK will need access to raw materials around the globe and resource diplomacy should form a key 
part of any UK technology-critical metals strategy. The City of London is an epicentre for global mining 
operations, consultancy and finance and this should be leveraged in developing strategic plans 
around these technology-critical metals.
The UK  has a few indigenous reserves of these technology-critical 
metals (e.g. - lithium, tungsten) and we should accelerate the development 
of these sites by updating the regulatory environment. 
Without the refining capacity to convert the extracted 
ores into metals, alloys and materials there is no point in 
gaining access and the UK will miss out on some of the 
highly valuable parts of the supply chains (e.g.- motors and 
batteries). The UK has key companies in the supply chains 
for technology-critical metals, as outlined in the report,  
but also supply-chain gaps that need to be filled in order 
to capitalise on the large economic opportunity for the 
downstream markets. Any refining capacity should support 
both primary and secondary markets, with secondary 
materials covered in detail in the next section.
The supply issues around different technology-critical 
metals are complex and often targeted measures are 
required for each subset of material, as outlined in the 
recommendations. 
Large multinational 
companies can  put measures 
in place to protect themselves 
from the price volatility of technology-
critical metals, by, for example, hedging on 
metals and putting in place long term agreements. 
Around the world we are seeing  companies vertically 
integrating down the supply chains to secure access. It 
was clear however that SMEs are particularly vulnerable 
to price volatility in the technology-critical metals markets 
and examples were presented at the commission where 
companies had moved to other regions of the globe where 
technology-critical metals access could be guaranteed at 
controlled prices.





Carbon Footprint of Metals From Primary and Secondary Production 
Recycling aluminium is around 92% more energy efficient 
than primary production120. The Waste and Resources 
Action Programme (WRAP121)has estimated that the 
adoption of resource-efficient business models, such as 
remanufacturing, repair, leasing and recycling, could deliver 
a net GVA gain of £86bn for the UK by 2030, with 21million 
tonnes of materials avoided and 37million tonnes of 
materials diverted. A recent OECD report on global material 
resources concluded that recycling will become more 
competitive than the mining of minerals due to projected 
technological developments and changes in the relative 
prices of production inputs. This will mean the recycling 
sector could grow faster than that of mining. The report also 
notes that the high labour costs for secondary production 




UK Government Strategy 
The UK Government published its strategy for waste in 
December 2018 entitled “Our waste, our resources: A 
strategy for England”123. The report covers plastics, Waste  
Electrical and Electronic Equipment (WEEE), batteries, 
automotive and food waste, but there is little reference 
to technology-critical metals. It is important to note that 
although technology-critical metals are present in these 
waste streams, their use is far broader than these sectors 
and a comprehensive policy on the circular economy should 
include all markets. 
Technology-critical metals have unique challenges for the 
waste industry. As they are often only present in small 
quantities, they cannot be processed using conventional 
technologies, and in some cases the supply-chains do not 
exist. 
Ultimately, as set out in the UK Strategy for Waste, any 
circular-economy policy should maximise the value of a 
resource while minimising waste and its impact on the 
environment.
In the UK Government waste and resources action plan 
and the recently published DEFRA124 report on waste 
management there is a clear drive to develop a waste 
hierarchy (see figure 87). The first step should be to avoid 
products entering the waste stream and to minimise the 
production of waste materials during manufacture. Next, 
materials should be re-used where possible, and recycled 
if this is not realistic. Finally, for materials that cannot be 
recycled, for some there is a possibility of energy recovery 
through thermal processes. If none of these approaches 
are possible then waste should be treated to make it inert or 
safe with disposal as a last resort. 
It should be noted that recycling covers a range of 
processes. Bulk-materials recycling processes are not 
necessarily suited to the recovery of critical materials. Many 
of the materials-separation techniques designed for bulk 
materials produce poor returns when recovering critical 
materials.
Furthermore, while we are familiar with the recycling of 
consumer products, there is significant potential to recycle 
scrap materials within manufacturing processes. There 
are significant gains to be made in new manufacturing 
techniques for many of these materials, for example, for rare 
earth magnets where the losses during manufacture can 
be from 20 to 60%. When these materials enter the waste 
market we should be reusing the products or components, 
or keeping the material in a processed form by re-using 
them in a “short-loop” recycling process to minimise costs. 
Some specific examples are described later in this report. 
As the materials cascade down the waste hierarchy, the 
ability to keep these materials in the UK supply chain 
diminishes as the value decreases and the processing 
will have to compete with cheaper competitors around the 
globe. This is one of the reasons why 80% of the metals 
we extract in the UK in the recycling industry are shipped 
offshore for processing125. In fact the largest tonnage of 
waste exported from the UK is for metals compared to all 
other waste streams
The waste and resources action plan (WRAP) provides 
good-practice guides for the re-use and recycling of WEEE, 
but there are specific challenges that exist for technology-
critical metals, which are outlined in this report.
CURRENT RECYCLING RATES 
A secondary market for technology-
critical metals would provide a strategic 
resource for the UK and diversify the 
supply where risks exist. However, there 
are technological, economic and societal 
challenges that must be addressed 
to make this happen. Current re-use 
and recycling rates for many of these 
technology-critical metals are low (see 
figure 85)1,  although there are examples 
of successful circular economies. For 
example, while only 1% of rare earths are 
recycled, rates of 25% for platinum and 
over 50%119 for rhenium (which provides 
the majority of supply to the aerospace 
industry) are being achieved. 
Figure 85: European Commission report on critical materials 2020.1
Niobium, Indium, Lithium, Tantalum, Bauxite, Beryllium, 
Bismuth, Coking Coal, Dysporsium, Gallium, Hafnium, 
Phosphorous, Scandium, Silicon Metal, Strontium
0%
Neodymium, Fluorspar, Baryte, Cerium, Erbium, 
















The Advantages of Recycling
Developing secondary markets for 
materials and products can shrink 
the environmental footprints for 
manufacturing, lower the costs for 
production and reduce greenhouse-
gas emissions (see figure 86). 
Recycling can also avoid the social 
and health impacts outlined in the 
primary section, but only if high-quality 
recycling processes are applied. 
Primary kt CO2/t Primary kt CO2/t Secondary % reduction
Aluminium 383  29 92%
Copper 125  44 65%
Ferrous metals 67 70 58%
Lead 163 2 99%
Nickel 212 22 90%
Tin 218 3 99%
Zinc 236 56 76%
Figure 86: CO2 footprint of secondary production of metals compared to primary
120. 
Fig 87: The Waste Management Hierarchy & Range of Recycling  
Options for lithium-ion batteries126
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Range of Recycling Technologies
CHALLENGES FOR THE RECYCLING OF  
TECHNOLOGY-CRITICAL METALS
Technology-critical metals are particularly challenging to recycle, in part, due to the small quantities of these materials in many 
applications, but also due to the design of the components where they are used.
Society is rapidly shifting from a fossil fuel based economy towards clean growth, where electrically driven products will dominate. 
This is resulting in the rapid expansion of wind-turbine technologies, photovoltaics, robotics and electric motors and batteries for 
EVs127. These technologies are still being optimised for performance and therefore there is often a lack of design standards, which 
presents challenges to the recycling/re-use industries. It is clear that at present design-for-recycle/re-use is not one of the major 
drivers for many of these applications. Often the technologies and supply chains to recycle some of the technology-critical metals are 
not mature or do not exist, so the machine designers sometimes have a lack of information from the downstream market. There is 
also a risk that by standardising a design this limits innovation and therefore the efficiency of electrical equipment. 
Although a large proportion of technology-critical metals 
are contained in waste electrical equipment (WEEE) 
and the automotive sector, their use is far broader than 
this. However due to the life cycle of WEEE, in the short 
term, this sector is likely to provide a large proportion of 
technology-critical metals. As an an example a mobile 
phone contains rare earth magnets in the speakers, vibrator 
and optics; they contain cobalt and nickel in the battery and 
tantalum in the micro capacitors (see figure 88). Over 61% 
of the world’s population owns a mobile phone. The number 
of mobile devices is growing at a rate five times faster than 
the number of people. Only around 12%128 of them are 
appropriately recycled. 350,000 mobile phones a year were 
dumped every day in 2010 – about 15 million phones.
CURRENT RECYCLING INDUSTRY
WEEE and end-of-life vehicles(EoL) tend to be treated as waste rather than as assets to be kept in the supply chain at the highest 
levels of function and value. They are often treated by coarse shredding and separation with a focus on the main materials by weight.
The UK has around 1600 firms129 
that process EoL vehicles. This 
ranges from very small companies 
that manually strip cars to large, 
multinational businesses that shred 
EoL waste and physically sort the 
materials prior to the metals being 
shipped on for further processing. 
The average car arriving at a recycling 
plant today is around 14 years old 
and based on an internal combustion 
engine (ICE). Approximately 70% 
of the car consists of ferrous metal, 
9% plastics, 8% non-ferrous metals, 
3% tyres and 3% glass by weight 
(see figure 89). Such a vehicle is 
relatively simple in terms of materials 
compared to the EoL vehicles that will 
come online in 10 years, when larger 
volumes of hybrid and electric vehicles 
will reach the end of their useful lives. 
The current target for re-use and 
recycling of an ICE car is 95%130, but 
this is a weight-based figure and does 
not distinguish between materials. 
Given the relatively small amounts of 
critical materials in ICE cars, they tend 
to fall foul of this target as they do not 
represent a significant proportion of 
the weight, despite being important 
to the functionality of the vehicle. The 
importance of these materials will only 
increase in the coming years. It should 
be noted that there is legislation in 
place for vehicle batteries (both lead 
acid and lithium-ion)131, which will be 
discussed in the governance section 
of the report.
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 Figure 88: Breakdown of technology-critical metals in a mobile phone
TOUCH SCREEN
The touch screen contains a 
thin layer of indium tin oxide, 
providing a highly conductive, 
transparent, thin layer, allowing the screen 

























MICROPHONE, SPEAKERS & VIRATION UNIT
Nickel is used in the microphone dia-
phragm. Alloys containing neodymium, 
praseodymium and gadolinium are used 
in the magnets contained in the speaker 
and microphone. Neodymium, terbium and 

































The display of a smartphone contains several 
rare earth elements. Small quantities are used 
to produce the colours on the liquid crystal 
display. Some give the screen its glow.
CASING
Nickel can be included in the phone casing to 
reduce electromagnetic interference.Magnesium 
alloys are superior at electromagnetic 
interference (EMI) shielding and often used in 











Nickel is used in electrical connections. Galli-
um is used in semiconductors. Tantalum is the 











The majority of smartphones use lithium-  
ion batteries.
CURRENT RECYCLING PROCESSES FOR  
ELECTRONICS AND AUTOMOTIVE APPLICATIONS
When a car reaches its end-of-life (EoL) in the UK, it passes 
through multiple processes to liberate components from the 
vehicle or to separate materials. Initially, the car will pass 
through a depollution facility where the oils, gases and fluids 
are drained from the car. The tyres, battery, catalytic converter 
will then be separated from the vehicle. This is performed either 
because there is legislation driving the recycling (eg., - the 
battery) or because there is an economic value that is more 
than the manual labour costs for separation. The engine block is 
pulled from the vehicle; the shell of the vehicle is then crushed 
and shredded. The shredded material, which is typically below 
10 cm is then processed in an auto-shredder-residue (ASR) 
plant (see figure 91). 
At an ASR plant the shredded feed is separated into 
different materials, including ferrous metals, plastics, 
non-ferrous metals, combustible materials and brittle 
materials (e.g., glass). This is performed using physical 
sorting techniques including magnetic separation, eddy-
current separation and density/size separation. All of these 
use some physical, electrical or magnetic property of 
the material to distinguish it from the other components/
materials (see figure 93). Electronic goods are also often 
shredded and passed through similar physical processes to 
liberate different materials.
The metals that are extracted from these processes are 
passed onto downstream processing facilities, which are 
either based on chemical techniques (e.g., hydrometallurgy) 
or  pyrometallurgical processes where the metals are 
melted down and the impurities removed. At present, 
around 80% of the metals that are extracted in the UK are 
exported to different regions of the world. This is partly due 
to a lack of investment and support in the UK’s materials-
processing industries.









• SEPARATION BY SHAPE AND COLOUR
 














 Figure 90: Depollution facility (EMR)
 Figure 91: Auto shredder residue (ASR) plant  Figure 92: Shredded electronics  Figure 93: Examples of processes uses at an ASR plant.







Bolts / fixings may be rusted
Heads of fixings may be rounded / sheared
Position of bolt heads not always fixed
Vehicle bodywork may be distorted
Vehicle may be crash damaged
Weight of battery
Removal of wiring looms tricky
Manipulation of connectors (especially where locking tabs fitted)
High voltages until wiring loom / module links removed
Lack of data on module condition in many present EV batteries
Lack of labelling and identifying marks
Potential fire hazards
Potential HF off-gassing
Variety of vehicle shapes / sizes
Different pack configurations / locations



















Clean separation of anodes and cathode for direct recycling difficult.
Very finely powdered materials present risks (nanoparticles)
Potential for HF compounds formed from electrolyte
Potential for thermal effects if cells shorted during disassembly
Chemistries not always known / proprietary
Additional challenges with cylindrical cells (unwinding spiral)
Sealants may be used in module manufacture (difficult to remove)
Cells stuck together in modules with adhesives (difficult to separate)
Components may be soldered together (difficult to separate)




Variety of vehicle shapes / sizes
Different pack configurations / 
locations
Different fixings / tooling required
Bolts / fixings may be rusted
Heads of fixings may be rounded / 
sheared
Position of bolt heads not always fixed
Vehicle bodywork may be distorted
Vehicle may be crash damaged
Weight of battery
Removal of wiring looms tricky
Manipulation of connectors (especially 
where locking tabs fitted)
High voltages until wiring loom / module 
links removed
Lack of data on module condition in many 
present EV batteries
Lack of labelling and identifying marks
Potential fire hazards
Potential HF off-gassing
Sealants may be used in module 
manufacture (difficult to remove)
Cells stuck together in modules with 
adhesives (difficult to separate)
Components may be soldered together 
(difficult to separate)
Module state of charge may not be known
Clean separation of anodes and 
cathode for direct recycling difficult
Very finely powdered materials 
present risks (nanoparticles)
Potential for HF compounds formed 
from electrolyte
Potential for thermal effects if cells 
shorted during disassembly
Chemistries not always known / 
proprietary
Additional challenges with 































BARRIERS TO THE RECYCLING OF TECHNOLOGY-CRITICAL METALS
There are technical, economic, legislative and societal barriers that have so far prevented a circular economy from developing for 
many of the technology-critical materials and components outlined in this report.  
In a hybrid or fully electric car the range of materials is much wider than in internal combustion engine vehicles (ICE), while 
the components are often more complex. For example, the drive train will contain a large lithium-ion battery pack (see figure 
94) and power electronics that deliver the electrical power to a drive motor. This is supplemented by regenerative braking 
systems, cooling fans, screens, electrical sub-components, which all contain technology critical metals. Many of these 
components contain a complex range of multicomponent materials (see figure 95), rather than single materials, such as a 
ferrous engine block, which are present in ICE vehicles. Therefore, the recycling challenge will become more complicated in 
the future and many of the current recycling processes that are applied to products containing critical materials either cannot 
be applied or result in a lower grade of material that is challenging to recycle in the UK.
One of the other major challenges is related to collection of products containing technology-critical metals. There are good 
collection systems for EoL vehicles but much lower collection rates for WEEE. Although it is extremely important, this topic is 
well covered in other publications and is not a focus here 44.
 Figure 94: Examples of components that contain technology-critical metals in an electric vehicle.
 Figure 95: The challenges of disassembling lithium-ion batteries at different levels of scale126.  
LITHIUM-ION BATTERY PACK 
Contains Li, Co, Ni.
FANS 
Contain Nd, Dy, Pr
DRIVE MOTOR, GENERATOR,  
PUMPS, COMPRESSOR 
Contain Nd, Dy, Pr
POWER STEERING UNIT 
Contain Nd, Dy, Pr
LOUD SPEAKERS 
Contain Nd, Dy, Pr
PGMS CONTAINED WITHIN ELECTRONIC COMPONENTS 
THROUGHOUT THE CAR
THE SPECIFIC CHALLENGES AROUND RECYCLING LITHIUM-ION 
BATTERIES ARE EXPLORED IN MORE DETAIL ON PAGE 113
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There have been multiple top-down 
studies investigating the potential 
waste flows and recycling potential 
for rare earth magnets in the EU and 
worldwide, but at present none for the 
UK 132,53. The results show significant 
variations, partly because they make 
assumptions about the possible 
recycling rates prior to industrial-scale 
recycling being put in place. It should 
be noted that there is a lack of good 
quality data about where magnets 
are located in waste streams, which 
makes identifying and separating 
these components difficult. 
Shultz et al 132. proposed that 
18–22% of light-rare earth demand 
and 20–23% of heavy-rare earth 
demand could be met between 2020 
and 2030 worldwide. This equates 
to around 15,000 tonnes per annum 
(tpa) globally, in their pessimistic 
scenario, and 25,000 tpa in their 
optimistic scenario. Reimer et al 53. 
attempted to predict when substantial 
Nd-Fe-B extraction could be expected 
in the EU from recycled sources. 
The paper highlighted that by 2025, 
18,000 tonnes of potential return flows 
of Nd-Fe-B will become available, but 
predicted a very low recycling rate of 
around 600 tonnes in the same year. 
Part of the problem with these studies 
is in the technological assumptions 
that are made for the rate of extraction 
and reprocessing compared to the 
state of the art in this field, because 
the market is immature. 
It should be noted that the mix of 
applications coming to end of life will 
change over the next 10-25 years, with 
large volumes of automotive waste 
and wind-turbine assemblies. The UK 
could use this as a strategic resource 
and manage this to the benefit of the 
UK.
 Figure 96: ERECON  
prioritisation list for the  recycling 
of rare earth magnets54.
 Figure 97: Nd-Fe-B demand and net supply 
from EOL magnets (losses during collection & 
disassembly have been subtracted), low and 
high Nd-Fe-B demand scenario, years 2020-30, 




What is the recycling opportunity ?
As outlined in the primary materials section of this report, the rare earth market is dominated by the 
permanent-magnet sector (Nd-Fe-B and  Sm-Co magnets). This is split between many different 
applications54, which means collecting these waste streams can be difficult. The EU ERECON 
report (2015) attempted to identify the “low hanging fruit” for the recycling of rare earth magnets 
based on Nd-Fe-B (see figure 96). The ranking list took into account  the availability of the 
scrap, the ease of identifying the products, the collection rates, the amount of material in 
the application, the rare earth fraction in the material, the ease of removing the rare earth 
from the application and the extent to which particularly scarce REEs like dysprosium are 
used in those applications. It should be noted that there are other markets that should 


































































































1 Hard disk drives, DVD 
and CD players
2 Automotive applications









see permanent-magnet powder cascading down the side 
of the shredder plant (Figure 102). The powder is very 
air sensitive, so it oxidises, breaks apart and becomes an 
increasingly fine powder. A study by Rowson et al. showed 
that the technology-critical rare earths are to be found in 
the finest fraction of the shredder plant, in the metallic dust, 
or they are stuck to the shredder itself133. At this stage the 
Nd-Fe-B is contaminated with other materials and has little 
economic value due to the high costs of separation. The 
downstream re-processing routes are also very limited at 
this point due to the oxygen contamination and impurity 
levels coming from the other waste. This is one of the 
reasons why less than 1% of the rare earths are 
recycled today. It should be noted that WEEE 
is often shredded and processed in the 
same processing plants. Exactly the 
same problem exists for Nd-
Fe-B magnets in these 
waste streams (see 
figure 101).
This is due to the fact that if a permanent-magnet motor 
containing rare earth magnets is passed through a 
conventional shredder plant, the soft-magnetic laminations 
distort (see Figure 100) and can blunt the shredder’s 
tooling, leaving the extremely brittle rare earth magnets 
to be crushed into a powder. This powder is permanently 
magnetic and sticks to the shredder and to the other ferrous 
scrap (see Figure 101). At an ASR plant it is possible to 
WHY IS THE RECYCLING RATE LOW?
Rare earth magnets are found in a wide range of applications. In an electric vehicle the magnets can be located in over 50 different 
applications, including drive motors, power steering motors, loudspeakers and seat motors. Most of these applications use soft 
magnetic laminations (Fe-Si), with the magnets very often glued or potted in epoxy resin (see figure 99). If the applications are left 
in the car during shredding the rare earth magnet material will be lost. 
 Figure 98: Toyota Prius generator and motor.  Figure 99: Rotor from an electric motor with glued Nd-Fe-B magnets.
 Figure 101: Shredded hard disk drives Figure 100: Rotor from an electric motor after shredding
 Figure 102: Permanent-magnet powder cascading down the side of 
the shredder plant
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Nd-Fe-B magnets
Oxidised Nd-Fe-B magnet powder
Permanent magnet powders
DESIGN FOR RECYCLE
If the various components of the car cannot be shredded and then separated to remove the technology-critical metals, then some 
level of dismantling is required prior to shredding (see figure 103). Unfortunately, many of these technology-critical metal containing 
products are very complex, making them time consuming to dismantle manually. In many cases the associated costs can exceed the 
value of the extracted materials. However, only a few studies have been performed to ascertain the economic case for the extraction 
of many of these components pre-shredding and therefore feasibility studies are required to determine this. This needs to be 
performed across a wide range of applications. 
Although shredding is a quick way 
of separating  bulk materials  it can 
also produce large quantities of 
impurities in technology-critical-
metal waste streams and therefore 
destroy value and increase the 
complexity and environmental footprint 
of the downstream reprocessing 
technologies. Disassembly as a 
precursor to recycling could retain 
more value; however, it is fraught with 
challenges and is labour intensive if 
done manually. By way of example, 
(see figure 104) shows the process 
of disassembly for an electric vehicle 
motor from a vehicle
 Figure 103: Dismantling of a Nissan Leaf to expose Nd-Fe-B magnet containing components
 Figure 104: Challenges of EV motor disassembly at different scales.  
Reference: Harper, G., Degri, M., Awais, M., Walton, A., (2021) Image of Electric Vehicle Motor Disassembly Challenges, UBIRA eData, University of 
Birmingham https://doi.org/10.25500/EDATA.BHAM.00000605 [Website] [Accessed: 16/03/21]
It is also important to note that not all 
of the rare earth application sectors 
will suffer from the same complexity 
of design. For example, wind turbines, 
MRI scanners and separators at 
recycling plants will contain large 
magnets, which contain anywhere 
from 150 kg up to 4 tonnes of Nd-
Fe-B (see figure 105). Although 
these markets are long term, given 
the lifetime of these products (10-
25 years), there is an argument that 
this should be secured as a national 
resource and viewed as a possible 
strategic supply for the future.
Design for recycle and re-use will be 
a key component in driving up the 
recycling rates for rare earths, but also 
many of the other technology critical 
metals. This is particularly important if 
the product / material is to be kept in 
its highest form in the waste hierarchy 
for re-use or recycling. Ultimately, the 
design will affect the quality of material 
that can be extracted for downstream 
re-processing. For magnets those 
design decisions need to be made 
with the downstream processors and 
should factor in the glues, binding 
structures and coatings, all of which 
affect the quality of recycled magnet 
that can be made from the material. 
There are already a few electrical 
machines that factor in some of these 











Potentially high residual voltages
Lack of data on motor condition
Lack of labelling and identifying marks
Manual handling hazards
Multiple layers of disassembly
Motor housing needs to be removed 
and rotor removed from stator
Manual handling risks due to weight 
of component and high magnetic field
Magnets often 




Lack of standardised 
labelling hampers 
recycling
Potential for design 
for recycling using 
mechanical fixings 
not glues
Shaft must be pressed out 
using hydraulic press
Manually, this is another 
labour intensive step
Automation could improve 
economics of motor 
disassembly
Figure 105: Large scale application with surface-mounted Nd-Fe-B magnets
Nd-Fe-B 
LoudspeakerCompressor Drive motor




Sensing and Automated Sorting of TCM Containing Waste 
In order to recycle rare earth magnets 
the magnet containing components 
require removal prior to shredding. For 
some components the costs of manual 
disassembly are likely to be too high 
in the UK. For this reason researchers 
and companies have started to develop 
automated systems for sensing and 
sorting waste. For example, in the EU 
FP7 Remanence134 project an automated 
system was developed for sensing the 
magnetic flux from magnets in hard disk 
drives then removing this part of the 
drive automatically (see figure 106/107). 
This is being extended for different 
magnets containing waste streams in 
the EU SUSMAGPRO project. In another 
example,  Apple have developed an 
automated system for disassembling 
particularly types of i-phones135. 
Waste handling presents significant 
challenges for robotics as most end- 
of-life products are not set sizes and 
shapes. However it is clear that these 
technologies will have a role to play in 
the future. If they can be implemented 
at industrial scale they would allow 
for re-use of components, improve 
the range of materials that could be 
recovered, potentially reduce costs 
and reduce the environmental footprint 
of the downstream processes. Similar 
automated processes are now being 
investigated for lithium-ion batteries, 
not just for these reasons, but also 
because of the safety concerns 
associated with the dissassembly of 
these products136 this is one of the 
activities of the ReLiB project funded 
by the Farraday Institution.
 Figure 106: Sensing of magnetic flux above a hard disk drive. Developed by RISE Sensor Systems as 
part of the REMANENCE project.          
 Figure 107: Automated handling and separation of voice coil motor from hard disk drives. Developed 
as part of the REMANENCE project.  
 Figure 108: Voice coil motors from hard disk drives
 Figure 110: HPMS Pilot plant at the University of Birmingham
Hydrogen is already used in the primary production of Nd-Fe-B magnets to break up the cast alloys into a powder for 
sintered magnet production138. This was developed by Harris et al in the Magnetic Materials Group at the University of 
Birmingham (UK) and is now used to process all the Nd-Fe-B magnets worldwide. Using hydrogen reduces the production 
costs for rare earth magnets by approximately 25%138. The same research group is now using hydrogen to separate and to 
recycle rare earth sintered magnets in the HPMS process (Hydrogen Processing of Magnet Scrap)139. During the HPMS 
process the hydrogen preferentially reacts with the Nd-Fe-B magnets in the waste stream. The Nd-Fe-B material expands 
and breaks apart into a demagnetised powder, which can be separated from the glues, coatings and housings where the 
magnet is contained (see figures 108,109,110). The extracted alloy powder is of a quality that can be reprocessed directly 
back into Nd-Fe-B magnets137. The patented HPMS process has been licensed to Hypromag Ltd, who aim to produce a 
range of magnet products at the Tyseley Energy Park in Birmingham (UK)140 It is interesting to note that the invester in 
Hypromag Ltd71 is a junior mining company, Mkango Resources Ltd141, who are developing primary rare earth 
resources in Malawi142.  
 Figure 109: Voice coil magnets after HPMS processing
SEPARATION  AND RE-PROCESSING 
One of the major problems with the recycling of rare earth magnets is how to separate the material from the component's 
binding structures and coatings. This is partly because of the very high magnetic fields that can be generated as well as 
problems with glues.  Several methods have been proposed to demagnetise and separate magnets from waste streams, 




Once a magnet is separated from the waste stream it can be 
re-processed in several different ways by putting the material 
back into the primary supply chain (see figure 111)143.
Ultimately the further the material is put back into the 
early parts of the supply chain the higher the cost and the 
larger the environmental penalty144. This also increases the 
capital costs for building a plant. It is very likely that multiple 
recycling routes will be required as not all of the magnets 
will be separated to a quality where the powder can be 
directly re-used to form magnets.

















During the separation processes either a separated rare  
earth metal is created or an alloy that can be re-used to form 
new magnets. The Magnetic Materials Group (MMG) at 
the University of Birmingham have led international efforts 
to recycle rare earth magnets. Working with Less Common 
Metals Ltd., they  have shown that it is possible to re-melt 
new alloys with comparable properties to the primary 
material. The MMG has also demonstrated that it is possible 
to produce sintered and injection moulded magnets 
from HPMS powders as part of several EU programmes 
(Remanence, Neohire and SUSMAGPRO)145,146. By directly 
re-sintering, the HPMS alloy powders can be converted 
back into magnets using 88% less energy and scoring 98% 
lower on Human Toxicity144.
Less Common Metals based in Elsemere Port are also 
developing technologies to extract rare earth metals from 
production swarf in the EU147. However, if the material is to 
be placed further back in the supply chain to chemically 
extract the rare earth metals from the alloys then this part 
of the supply chain does not exist in the UK at present. 
There are a number of potential projects to build up this 
capability in the UK, including Seren and Peak Resources in 
Teeside and Pensana in Humberside72,73,74. All of the above 
processes will be required for both primary and secondary 
materials and as such there needs to be coordination with 
both ends of the supply chain.  
ADVANTAGES OF A SECONDARY ECONOMY
If and when a secondary economy for magnets is created, it would significantly reduce the environmental burden compared to the 
primary production of these materials. If “short-loop” recycling can be initiated, then many of the expensive and capital-intensive 
processes can be avoided. 
Secondary materials can be sourced from a much wider array of companies and 
countries, which reduces the risk of supply shortages when the supply chain 
is narrow. We already have this material in the UK, and we have unique 
technologies to extract these materials at low cost.
The material that is extracted will only 
contain the rare earths that are 
in demand, unlike a primary 
ore, where all 17 rare earth 
elements are mixed together 
and need separating. A 
recycled source of materials 
will also not contain any 
radioactivity, a problem with 
some primary resources143.
It would be quicker to build up the secondary supply 
chain, particularly the direct re-processing options, and 
this would provide capital equipment and expertise that 
could be multipurposed for primary production. Secondary 
materials are not a competitor to primary production and 
should not be viewed as such. Both will be required as a 
recycled source of material will only meet  a proportion  of 
demand. Initial estimates suggest up to 20%.
There are now international efforts to recycle rare earth 
magnets, but the very limited flow of material tends to 
be exported for chemical extraction of the rare earth 
elements. This only exacerbates the problem of supply 
security and it increases the environmental footprint. 
The EU and US are now providing co-investment to 
scale up recycling processes into commercial activities. 
Without rapid intervention in the UK we will miss out on 
this important market, despite being at the forefront of 
research in this area.
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RECYCLING AND RE-USE OF LITHIUM-ION BATTERIES CHALLENGES IN THE RECYCLING OF LITHIUM-ION BATTERIES 
There are six main metals used in the production of cathodes for lithium-ion batteries: aluminium, cobalt, iron, lithium, manganese 
and nickel. The technology-critical metals, nickel and cobalt, are part of the most common battery cathode materials, which are 
oxides deposited onto an aluminium foil. This cathode foil is positioned between a separator and the anode, (see figure 113). The 
separator, cathode and anode are then packaged into different containers, with each vehicle manufacturer having its own layout, for 
example: cylindrical (Tesla), prismatic (BMW) or pouch (Nissan) cells.
Pyrometallurgical processes are capable of processing 
larger components like modules, depending on the 
size of the furnace, without prior shredding. However, 
hydrometallurgy and direct recycling techniques require an 
intermediate “cell-breaking” step to access the contents. 
This could be accomplished via shredding or disassembly. 
Some recyclers have suggested a “hub and spoke” 
model, where initial pack processing – the cell-breaking 
step – could occur in a distributed fashion, separating and 
concentrating the waste for onward transportation for future 
processing160.
Unlike the familiar lead-acid batteries that have been a 
component of every car for decades and have recycling 
rates of close to 100%161, lithium-ion batteries are much 
more difficult to recycle. This is primarily because of the 
many different ways in which they are configured, the 
complexity of their construction and the design of the 
constituent parts, which makes them difficult to separate. 
Lithium-ion batteries come in different designs. There is 
no consensus around the form factor, or style of different 
batteries among manufacturers. Some make a flat “pouch” 
cell, with layers of material stacked one on top of another. 
Others wind these layers into a spiral, much like a swiss roll, 
and put them into a can, forming a “cylindrical” cell, much 
like a larger version of the consumer batteries that we are 
familiar with. Others fold the layers and encase them within 
a rigid box, known as a “prismatic” cell. The enormous 
variety of different cells makes more sophisticated resource 
recovery at the end of life challenging.
To process the contents of a lithium-ion battery it must be 
broken apart: this can either be done in a ‘chaotic’ way, by 
shredding the module, or in a more structured way through 
disassembly. As is the case with rare earth magnets, at 
its end-of-life a lithium-ion battery cannot be broken apart 
in a conventional shredder, but in this case owing to the 
risk of explosion and fire, potentially putting workers at 
considerable risk. Specialist equipment must be used 
to make the battery safe prior to manual removal and/
or shredding162. Only then can it be sent for subsequent 
downstream processing. A review of current automotive-
battery recycling processes was recently published in 
Nature by Harper et al. 2020. Figure 95 on Page 101 
summarises the many challenges of disassembling lithium-
ion batteries at different levels of scale.
Many researchers have concluded that recycling outcomes 
could be improved through disassembly rather than 
shredding. Designing cells for disassembly could facilitate 
this process, as there are challenges to the recycling 
of existing cells that are not designed to be easily taken 
apart. Given the volume of batteries requiring end-of-life 
treatment, manual disassembly would be labour-intensive 
and uneconomic. Robotic automation has the potential to 
improve dramatically the economics of disassembly in a 
similar way to rare earth magnets163,164,165.
CYLINDRICAL PRISMATIC POUCH
CAN CATHODE ANODE SEPARATOR CAN CATHODEANODE SEPARATOR POUCH CATHODEANODE SEPARATOR
 Figure 113: Cylindrical, prismatic, and pouch battery-cell configurations159.
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Not all of these batteries will need to be recycled 
immediately. As has been shown, the bulk of the battery 
market will comprise large automotive batteries. At some 
point, their state of health drops below the point where 
they can provide an acceptable range in an automotive 
application (often taken to be 80% State of Health)149, 
however, they still have the ability to store energy. Many 
of these batteries will be suitable for use in second-life 
applications that are less demanding, for example, stationary 
energy storage. To quantify this residual value, it has been 
estimated that EV batteries could achieve a second-life 
value of £83.00/kWh150.
Some of these batteries will leave the country, exported in 
products destined to be refurbished and resold into markets 
in developing countries. Mobile devices are often collected, 
exported, and repaired or refurbished in countries with 
lower labour costs151,152. For electric vehicles, however, this 
situation is less acute for the UK, as being in the minority 
of countries with right-hand-drive vehicles, the export 
market for these vehicles is more limited. That said, battery 
packs may be exported for second-life applications. When 
batteries leave the UK, the value of the materials and the 
opportunity to recycle them is lost. Given the importance 
of these materials, there are risks to losing this strategic 
resource to other countries.
Some predictions see the growth in demand for batteries 
outstripping the availability of technology-critical metals. 
This could occur as soon as the 2020s153. From a battery 
owner’s point of view, if an end-of-life battery can be sold 
into a second-life application, rather than paying to dispose 
of waste, it becomes an asset rather than a liability, so this is 
the economically prudent course of action. However, taking a 
broader resources perspective, second-life use of lithium-ion 
batteries, while better exploiting the lifetime storage capacity 
of lithium-ion batteries, delays the return of technology-critical 
metals back into the economy154. It is not clear whether 
the optimum strategy is to have used lithium-ion batteries 
performing poorly in a second-life application, or whether it is 
better to recycle the materials in these batteries, turning them 
into new, high-performing batteries.
Globally, Asian countries lead in the development of 
volume recycling of lithium-ion batteries155. Many of these 
operations are vertically integrated with the large Asian 
battery manufacturers. The recycling market for lithium-ion 
batteries is better developed, compared to some other 
technology-critical metals, with commercial activities in the 
EU. Presently, there are no operational, commercial lithium-
ion battery recyclers in the UK, although there are a number 
of planned initiatives and pilot plants.
The recycling processes employed by various firms vary 
in their techniques, impacts and efficiency156. As noted 
in the previous section on rare earths, there are a range 
of recycling technologies and our approaches to battery 
recycling are evolving rapidly.  
Some recycling initiatives do not have the capability to take 
an end-of-life battery and transform it into a form where 
materials can be re-used in new battery manufacturing. 
They are effectively ‘pre-processing’ operations that 
reduce the battery into what is known as a “black mass”. 
Through the process of mixing the materials in the battery, 
value is destroyed and the scope of subsequent recycling 
processes is limited157.
There are also challenges with the transportation of end-
of-life batteries and battery waste. If the supply chain is 
not developed to utilise this material from recycling, it 
could potentially be exported to large recyclers overseas. 
However, this represents a lost opportunity for the UK 
to capture the value in these materials. The international 
breakdown of the lithium-ion battery recycling industry is 
shown in figure 112.
Regardless of where lithium-ion batteries are manufactured, the UK will have to consider how to deal with the problem of battery 
waste when they eventually reach their end-of-life. It is estimated that in the near term, without a facility to process lithium-ion 
batteries, the total number of EV batteries reaching end-of-life for battery recycling, could be between 70,000 and 106,000 battery 
packs by 2025148.
Figure 112: Melin, H.E. (2018) The lithium-ion battery end-of-life market – 






























Lithium-ion batteries placed on the global market 
(Cell Level, Tonnes)
Re-processing  
The recycling of lithium-ion batteries is possible through 
a number of routes. Figure 114 shows five example 
commercial routes for lithium-ion battery materials recovery. 
These can be divided into two categories.
The simplest is pyrometallurgical recovery, which uses high 
temperatures to reduce the component metal oxides to an 
alloy containing nickel, copper and cobalt. This process is 
already commercialised, but has environmental drawbacks, 
such as the high energy costs, production of CO2 and 
the limited number of materials that can be reclaimed. 
The process transforms the material into a form where a 
significant amount of effort is needed to transform it back 
to a state where it can be used in recycled batteries. The 
value embedded in the structure of the cathode material is 
destroyed in this process.
Another option is hydrometallurgical recovery, which 
involves the use of aqueous solutions to leach the desired 
metals from the cathode material. Here the problem is 
environmental, with a lot of sulphuric acid used in some 
hydrometallurgical recycling processes. This process is 
happening at scale. Some plants in China have capacities 
in excess of 25,000 tonnes per year, and recently Brunp 
announced investment in a plant with a capacity of over 
100,000 tonnes per year166.
A third possibility is direct recycling, where the cathode and 
anode materials are removed for reconditioning and re-used 
in a similar way to the magnet routes being proposed in an 
earlier section. In principle, such cathode materials can be 
reincorporated into a new cathode electrodes with minimal 
changes to the material. There could be considerable 
advantages to direct recycling if the technology matures, 
as it could lead to enhanced cathode value recovery167. The 
challenge is ensuring the quality of the cathode material 
being recycled, and making certain that the material is not 
contaminated or degraded during the recycling process 167. 
This is not possible with existing pre-treatment techniques.
There are potential opportunities for this material to be 
processed in the UK within existing material supply chains. 
The UK already has processing capability for some 
materials used in batteries, e.g. the Vale ‘Mond’ refinery in 
Clydach168 which processes nickel.  It is anticipated that 
in the years to come, the proportion of nickel in electric 
vehicles (EV) batteries169 will increase as formulations 
change and cobalt is engineered out of batteries. Nickel 
is fully recyclable without loss of quality. Potentially battery 
wastes could be an attractive proposition for UK refiners, as 
they could provide a more concentrated feedstock than raw, 
mined material.
It is vital that the UK develops the capacity to recycle 
lithium-ion batteries. As electric vehicles take over in the 
2030s, companies in the vehicle-manufacturing sector 
will only be locating in regions and countries that have 
expertise in manufacturing and recycling of key electric 
vehicle components like lithium-ion batteries. From an 
environmental perspective, recycling battery material can 
significantly reduce the energy required to make new 
batteries. Recycling lithium-ion batteries could reduce 
battery material production energy demands by 50%170   
This is significant, as by way of example, in an NMC111 type 
cell, the manufacture of the cathode powder accounts for 
36.4% of the cradle-to-gate energy use and 39.1% of the 
greenhouse gas emissions of cell manufacture 171. 
The proposed new European battery legislation sets 
targets for the introduction of recycled content in the 
manufacture of batteries. If the UK wants to sell batteries 
into the European market, it will need to comply with these 
regulations and find a route to sourcing recycled material.
Any country that wishes to be active in this area will need to 
be able to access cobalt and nickel, and recycling existing 
batteries is likely to be the major source of these metals over 
the longer term. If the UK is to build the eight gigafactories 
anticipated to meet 2040 demand for lithium-ion batteries, 
it will need a strategy for sourcing materials to supply these 
factories.
Technologies to recycle Li-ion batteries do exist, although 
they are hampered by being inefficient and less-than 
environmentally benign. One key to improving processes, is 
in being able to separate battery materials cleanly. Presently, 
many recycling processes are reliant on comminution – 
shredding – of batteries. 
These enhanced processes have the potential to conserve 
more value within a circular lithium-ion batteries supply 
chain than some existing methods where value is destroyed. 
Recent Techno-Economic Analysis has shown that the cost 
saving through making batteries using recycled shredded 
material was generally < 20% whereas separation and 
disassembly could potentially result in cost savings in the 
range 40 to 80% depending on purity.172
It is important therefore, that the UK invests in the right sort 
of technologies – ensuring that its battery recycling industry 
has the right technology, at the right moment – when lots 
of end-of-life batteries start reaching the marketplace. 
Premature investment in suboptimal recycling technologies 
could result in the creation of stranded assets as the 
technology advances.
The UK has a vibrant innovation ecosystem and already 
there are a number of ongoing projects which seek to 
improve the recycling of lithium-ion batteries. The ReLiB 
project is one of the Faraday Institution’s initial fast-start 
projects addressing the challenges around the Recycling 
& Re-use of Lithium-Ion Batteries. In addition, the Faraday 
Battery Challenge is funding innovation and scale up of a 
number of projects related to the recycling and re-use of 
lithium-ion batteries. The Advanced Propulsion Centre is 
also funding projects of this type, including the RECOVAS 
project which aims to establish a lithium-ion batteries re-use 
and recycling supply chain in the UK173.
At present, recycling is often seen as an “end-of-pipe” 
solution, to deal with waste after it has arisen. As we can 
anticipate the growth in use of lithium-ion batteries, and the 
challenges that these will present at the end-of-life, there is 
a unique opportunity to design smarter batteries. This will 
be necessary to achieve profitability in the recycling of many 
battery types172. 
The new European Battery Directive131 proposes some 
solutions that will make batteries easier to recycle at the 
end of life: mandating open access to battery management 
systems, to allow data about the condition of the battery 
to be ascertained; product labelling to allow easier 
understanding of the contents of lithium-ion batteries; and a 
“battery passport” system174, which allows for the tracking of 
battery data containing information about the batteries in a 
database. This has also been one of ten guiding principles 
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REDUCE BATTERY MATERIAL PRODUCTION 
ENERGY DEMANDS BY 50% 170 
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Figure 114: Five of the common processe for recycling of lithium-ion batteries. Source: Nature paper - Harper et.al (2019)126
RECYCLING OF PLATINUM GROUP METALS
Unlike rare earths, the platinum group metals are recovered 
on an industrial scale from all their major markets, those being 
automotive catalysts, industrial catalysts and products, and 
electronics. Platinum, and to a much lesser extent palladium, 
are used in jewellery and both metals are also used as 
investment products. Overall in 2019 recycling provided around 
31% of global rhodium demand, 30% of palladium and 25% of 
platinum (see figure 115)125.
The recycling rates for some industrial markets, such as 
petrochemical refining and the glass industry, can be as 
high as 80-90%.  In these applications the secondary 
market forms an integral part of the supply chain. Likewise, 
industrial PGM catalysts are often provided on a supply 
and refine basis as part of a closed loop with the end user. 
In such cases, the PGM metal on the catalyst is part of the 
initial capital expenditure for the plant, and ownership of the 
metal is retained by the user when the end-of-life catalyst 
goes to the refiner for recycling.  The situation is different 
for the autocatalyst market, where ownership of the PGM 
in the catalyst ends up in the hands of each vehicle owner 
(see figure 117).  Reclamation of PGMs is then driven by 
metal prices and depends on a network of collectors, which 
has built up since the first autocatalysts were introduced in 
the 1970’s.  Now, the end-of-life recycling rates of PGMs in 
the automotive sector are around 60-70% (global average), 
with much higher rates in some of the more developed auto 
markets.  This recycle rate is very high compared to a lot 
of other minor metals and also compared to PGMs in the 
waste electronics sector where recovery is around 5-10%. 
Among the principal causes for low PGM recycling rates 
are the low concentrations of PGM, and the fact that they 
are present in a complex mixture of other components; one 
calculation suggests that PGMs, gold and silver constitute 
0.3% of the weight of a leading brand mobile phone, but 
that they contribute 93% of the value.  Because of this, 
it is necessary to use high temperature pyrometallurgical 
processes to achieve the recycling efficiencies that make 
refining commercially viable.     
There are several PGM refining facilities across Europe 
that rely on pyrometallurgical processes including smelting 
for bulk separation and concentration of PGMs.  Smelting 
has repeatedly proven to have the highest efficiency in 
recovering PGMs, in a business where most is not enough.  
Once the PGMs have been concentrated, they pass 
through numerous hydrometallurgical separation steps, 
which are necessary to deliver the extremely high purity 
final metal.  The UK is home to the world’s largest recycler 
of PGMs, Johnson Matthey, who around 150 years ago 
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Matthey run a smelting operation in Enfield near 
London and carry out the purification and product 
fabrication in Royston near Cambridge.  The long 
history of technical leadership in PGMs makes 
them one of the only companies able to refine 
all the PGMs, including iridium and ruthenium, to 
market grade sponge.
 Figure 117: Cutaway catalytic convertor
Recycling 
PGMs is a 
developed market 
because there are 
larger economic 
drivers compared 
to other metals, for 
example Rare Earth 
metals , lithium and cobalt. 
In January 2021, the monthly 
average trading values for platinum, 
palladium and rhodium were £26,000, 
£56,000 and £466,000 per kilogram 
respectively, whereas neodymium prices are around 
£100/kg and cobalt is currently trading at around £37/
kg. Conversely, the concentration of PGM in applications 
is often far lower than for rare earths and battery materials. 
For example, a typical catalytic converter will contain 2-10 
grams of PGMs, whereas a car's lithium ion battery can 
contain 2-11 kg of cobalt and the motors in an electric SUV 
can contain 1.5-2 kg of neodymium.  It is possible that the 
rare earth market could develop in a similar way to PGMs, 
with large industrial applications working in closed loops 
with refiners, however there is also a role for regulation 
in ensuring the circularity of developing product 
lifecycles.
Although the recycling loops for current 
PGM markets are well established, 
PGM recovery will continue to be 
a challenge in the future where 
PGMs are thrifted to smaller 
and less accessible amounts. 
Over time, the feeds into 
PGM recovery processes 
will change as new PGM-
based products gain 
market foothold.  In the 
longer term, PGMs have 
a key role in products 
that contribute to net zero 
targets, in particular in 
the fuel cell and “green” 
hydrogen economies, and 
PGM recycling technology 
will need to develop to keep 
pace with these changes.
 Figure 115: Quantities of PGM's produced worldwide from primary and 
secondary sources 114.
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 Figure 116: Lab experiment on hydrometallurgical separation of PGMs
AEROSPACE MATERIALS 
Turbine blades used in jet engines contain a range of technology critical metals including for example Co and Rhenium. The 
aerospace industry very effectively short loop recycles its own scrap in a closed loop circular economy. The value of the materials 
is such that manual disassembly of the engines makes economic sense and the turbine blades are removed. The blades are rmelted 
and converted back into new turbine blades. 
Superalloy melters use vast quantities of revert/scrap (in 
some alloys up to 80% scrap) of the same, or similar, alloy 
to achieve the required alloy chemistry. Large OEMs also 
have closed-loop revert programmes that capture machined 
turnings and solid scraps. These are returned to contracted 
melters to reduce the costs.
SUMMARY OF SECONDARY SECTION 
It is clear that many of the processes used for sensing, sorting and separation of bulk metals from end of life waste are unsuitable 
for processing of technology-critical metals and there is a need to invest in technologies that can improve these processes. This 
could involve new sensing technologies, automated sorting and novel chemical and metallurgical processes to improve the efficiency 
of separation and to reduce the cost. Some examples of this are presented in this chapter. 
From the evidence presented at the commission it was also 
clear that there is a lack of data, which means that recyclers 
do not know how much of these elements are likely to be in 
waste streams or where they are located within products. 
As we transition to a green economy it is an imperative that 
products are designed with re-use and recycling in mind. 
This is clearly not the case today and requires action to 
address this. It is likely to require changes to environmental 
regulation as the technology-critical metals often fall foul of 
the weight based targets in place today. This is covered in 
detail in the governance section of the report. 
There are good examples where significant recycling 
rates are achieved for some technology-critical metals 
which provides strategic access to PGMs and aerospace 
alloys. However, to develop a secondary market for battery 
materials and rare earth permanent magnets, this will 
require investment in new infrastructure if the UK is to be a 
global player and to secure access to the technology-critical 
metals it needs.
Figure 118: Jet engine cutaway showing turbine blades





The governance structure for critical materials is driven by, and needs to respond to, a range of policy issues, beginning with national 
security and security of supply. Any governance structure will need to consider primary production, trade and related issues of 
protectionism, protection of the environment and human health, and realising value from the waste chain.  By governance, we refer 
not only to legislation and regulation, but also to industrial initiatives and standard setting, which might help facilitate access to 
critical materials.
In February 2021, President Biden signed one of his earliest 
executive orders mandating a 100-day review of critical 
product supply chains in the US with critical minerals, 
strategic materials, computer chips and large batteries 
receiving explicit mention. In fact, the US has sought to 
protect its access to critical materials since the passage 
of the Federal Critical Materials Stockpiling Act of 1939. 
This allows for the determination of materials thought 
to be critical and to make provision for sufficient supply 
reserves. Over time, the US has defended this stockpiling 
approach by reference to its security and defence needs. 
It is regularly updated, including a revised list published 
in 2019. The European Commission has created a list 
of critical raw materials (CRMs) for the EU, which is also 
subject to a regular review and updates. Inclusion on the 
list of CRMs depends on the significance of the material to 
the EU economy combined with the significance of the risk 
associated with supply shortfall.
Given the coverage of the strategic need to consider 
access to critical materials throughout this report, it will 
be apparent why both the US and Europe engage in 
such policies. Post-Brexit, the EU policy will no longer 
have meaning and the UK will play no part in revising 
the list of CRMs. The UK will continue, no doubt, to give 
consideration to its access to CRMs but the question 
is whether it might do so formally, with a stated policy of 
producing and reviewing a strategic list, or whether any 
policy goes unstated. There will be other immediate points 
of departure from Europe as the UK has not implemented 
the EU’s regulation on conflict minerals which is effective in 
Europe from 1 January 2021. Producing a policy for the UK, 
whether enshrined in legislation or promulgated in the form 
of guidance, could have some disadvantages in drawing 
attention to vulnerability and to attempts to control material 
flows on world markets. Producing a transparent, stated 
policy is likely, on the other hand to direct greater efforts to 
secure supplies to future advantage.
PRIMARY PRODUCTION AND TRADE IN CRITICAL MATERIALS
While minerals production in the UK is not extensive, it is certainly possible that further production in the UK is held back by the 
complexity of both ownership rights and the multiplicity of consents necessary to commence operations. Property law begins with 
the assumption that land owners will own minerals beneath their land allowing them to licence exploitation rights to third parties, 
but in some cases, rights to explore for and exploit minerals is reserved for the Crown. Thus even the rights of reconnaissance may 
depend on the type of minerals which in turn will drive ownership rights.
On completion of any exploration, which may or may not 
require planning permission, exploitation will require a 
production licence either from the owner of the mineral 
deposit, or from the Crown in statutory form, which may 
itself vary for onshore and offshore working. The terms 
and conditions under which operations may take place will 
emanate from many documents including: mineral leases, 
planning conditions, environmental permits and health 
and safety controls. Moreover certain segments of this 
agenda such as planning and environmental permitting are 
devolved across the four nations of the UK, so that a variety 
of agencies could be involved working under increasingly 
different legal regimes. A review of the regulatory paths 
to primary production in the UK, bearing in mind other 
contextual factors such as the drive to net zero carbon 
targets and Brexit, might reduce some of the administrative 
difficulties facing investors and would-be producers.
Even with increased primary production in the UK, however, 
we are likely to depend primarily on imports to meet the 
requirements of green development. Trade policy is likely 
to be crucial therefore in ensuring a steady and adequate 
supply of primary critical raw materials from international 
markets. This needs to be borne in mind  in the negotiation 
of further trade agreements post-Brexit and Government 
needs to take greater interest in and influence over data 
collection and collation which might point to vulnerbilities 
and inform trade policy. Again there may be room for 
simplification of trade codes for critical materials that guide 
the necessary declarations and paperwork for import and 
export, govern any duty or tax payable and highlight any 
relief on duties.
As in other areas of the economy, efficient global markets 
are necessary to allow access to critical materials 
and to guard against price volatility. The limited points 
of production for certain critical materials make this 
problematic and there are examples of market manipulation 
such as unilateral export controls on the part of producing 
countries. International trade law, which has historically 
focussed on restrictions on imports, is not always well 
placed or speedy in addressing such issues. It follows that, 
outside of the EU, the UK will need to continue a dialogue 
and pursue active cooperation with international partners to 
help secure continuing access to critical materials.
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CHEMICALS’ 
REGULATION
It is not unusual for regulation to intervene when 
goods are placed on the market which, it is feared, may 
pose the threat of harm to human health or the environment. 
There are examples of such laws in specific sectors (e.g., for novel 
foods) and there are more general, overarching regulations that may cut 
across sectors. In relation to chemical elements, the main form of regulation 
is REACH, the Regulation of the Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and 
Restrictions of Chemicals (EC Regulation No. 1907/2006).
REACH oversees the production, 
import and use of chemicals to 
ensure health and environmental 
protection and the mechanisms 
of risk governance are as stated 
in the REACH title. Chemical 
substances on the EU market must 
be registered and this can then lead 
to evaluation of potential harms, 
authorisation or restriction on use.  
Since its inception, the UK has been 
operating under REACH, which 
applies across all EU member states 
to businesses manufacturing and/
or importing chemical substances 
into the European single market. The 
European Chemicals Agency (ECHA) 
acts as the regulatory agency and 
provides an infrastructure that the UK 
is rapidly trying to replicate post-Brexit.
Although most critical materials 
may be notifiable under REACH, 
not all may need to be registered; 
it is necessary to check the list of 
substances subject to registration and 
assessment and there are exemptions 
for naturally occurring substances that 
have not been chemically modified. 
Once modified, substances produced 
from critical raw materials are likely to 
be caught within the regulation. The 
main consequence of this concerns 
the future availability of these materials 
on the market. REACH carries a 
candidate list of substances of very 
high concern (SVHCs) and, to take an 
example, chromium has a number of 
derived substances on the candidate 
list. Such substances are not banned 
as such but are more likely to be 
restricted in future use.
It follows that, post-Brexit, a company 
established in the UK will not be 
governed by REACH in placing 
substances on the UK market or if 
exporting to non-EU countries.  If 
exporting to the EU then supply chains 
will still be policed by REACH. In 
order to sell into the EU (in fact the 




their registrations to 
an affiliate in the EEA. The UK 
will need to monitor closely future 
determinations made in relation to 
substances by ECHA to safeguard 
continuing availability, while 
deciding how it will deal 
with SVHC materials on 
the UK market.
LABELLING AND PACKAGING OF  
CHEMICAL SUBSTANCES AND MIXTURES
Alongside REACH are rules on classification, labelling and packaging (CLP) of substances and mixtures in accordance with 
Regulation (EC) No 1272/2008. As this suggests, it constitutes an attempt to harmonise safety information, data and measures in 
the placing on the market of potentially hazardous substances. Suppliers and importers of relevant substances must inform ECHA, 
and REACH dossiers supporting registration are often the source of the underpinning hazard assessment. 
Outside of the EU, the UK will continue to operate under 
CLP. It would be  open to the UK to  depart from the CLP 
but because it is based on the UN initiative for a Globally 
Harmonised System (GHS) the UK is likely to remain in 
broad harmony with the EU in the longer term. 
There may be room, however, for separate labelling 
requirements for goods on the UK market which incorporate 
critical materials. Many such goods would not be caught 
by CLP. Labelling of component materials in this way would 
improve data flows in the value chain and help build good 
practice in the handling and use during and at the end of 
life of key products. In some instances, there may be a 
safety case for labelling. At present there are no specific 
requirements to label lithium ion batteries in terms of their 
chemistry or even to indicate that a battery is lithium ion, 
which is proving increasingly problematic for those handling 
waste streams of batteries or products which may contain 
batteries. In December 2020, the EU proposed to introduce 
such labelling in a revision of the Batteries Directive’ again 
leaving the UK Government to determine whether it will 
follow suit - see boxout 15.
STANDARDS AND STANDARD SETTING
It may well be that issues such as labelling could be promoted by agreed standards. There are examples of this. Three European 
Standardisation Organisations, CEN, CENELEC, and ETSI have produced recent standards, one of which EN 45558 of 2019 sets a 
standard for the declaration of CRMs in energy related products. Alongside this EN 45559 of 2019 establishes a method for the 
presentation of information relating to material efficiency in energy-related products. 
The aim of these standards is to promote both circular- 
economy approaches and the need for material efficiency. 
Although conformity with such standards is not a legal 
requirement, wide acceptance and reliance on such 
standards can ensure industrial compliance much more 
effortlessly than can regulation. Moreover, the adoption of 
international standards can assist in facilitating the trade in 
the relevant products. 
Standard setting can be used much more widely to 
support the security of critical materials, for example by 
supporting eco-design and brokering agreement on design 
for disassembly. For example, there is a recent publicly 
available specification (PAS 7061:2020 – in effect a code 
of practice) from the BSI on the safe and environmentally-
conscious handling of electric vehicle battery packs and 
modules. In the early days of green technology, competition 
in innovation means that companies in the same sector 
might be reluctant initially to share information 
in a manner that supports the setting of 
standards.  As these markets mature, 
however, there may be greater appetite to engage in the 
setting of common standards.
Whether or not this is so, may depend on wider regulation 
so that, for example, standardisation to allow ease of 
disassembly might itself be driven by targets for 
recycling. Although standard setting agencies 
have an obvious interest in promoting 
standards, the Government may 
wish to consider how it could 
incentivise the development 
of appropriate 
standards. 
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recyclable goods or offer incentives for re-use. Arguably 
current effort in EPR schemes has been directed at low 
quality waste streams for which unambitious and poorly 
policed targets have been set. Increasingly, however, there 
is a push from industry for better directed schemes which 
might realise better value from waste streams; for example 
low quantities of critical materials are being recycled from 
waste electrical or electronic goods and end-of-life vehicles.
In all of this, targets set as part of the EPR obligation are 
vitally important. Carefully devised, easily measurable 
targets will drive investment not only in recycling but in 
resource efficiency more generally. Experience from Wales 
suggests that more ambitious waste targets can generate 
greater efforts towards compliance. Thought needs to be 
given as to how targets would be set for critical materials. In 
the new EU Batteries Regulation these are set in relation to 
the percentage of recovered individual elements in a battery, 
though there are still technical issues of measurement and 
functionality. This type of model might serve as a blueprint 
for downstream electrical systems more generally, though It 
may also be useful to move away from simple weight based 
or percentage targets and look for other indicators of value.
While it is difficult to construct models of extended 
producer responsibility that work efficiently and effectively, 
if we are to take critical materials security seriously, it is 
imperative to devise schemes that guarantee access to 
these resources on a secure and reliable basis. This is 
challenging as EPR schemes tend to be product based and 
here we are advocating recovery of critical materials across 
a wide variety of applications. Nonetheless, extended 
producer responsibility schemes carefullly devised as part 
of a wider circular economy approach offer an important 
route to critical materials’ security. One significant issue is 
whether EPR should operate through individual or collective 
responsibility. Under individual EPR systems a producer will 
assume responsibility for take back and treatment of its own 
end-of-life products but responsibility can be discharges 
through collective schemes under which producers within 
the same product market discharge obligations for end-of 
-life management collectively via a producer responsibility 
organisation (PRO) which will meet legislative requirements 
for (fee-paying) members.
Collective approaches have proved efficient 
to organise and run, not least because 
they reduce administrative burdens 
inherent in individual 
schemes and improve 
the quality of 
data on 
waste product flows. They help collect large volumes of 
waste which may include otherwise orphaned products. 
The presence of a collective scheme does not prevent the 
assumption of individual responsibility but it may make an 
individual system harder to operate. The number of PROs 
in a particular product sector may be important as too few 
may lessen competition and heighten recycling prices. One 
important factor is that individual responsibility is more likely 
to drive product eco-design to ease end-of-life management 
and may help produce much tighter supply loops in which 
recycled materials are returned to the same use. It follows 
that careful thought needs to be given to the question of 
where the responsibility is allocated by policy makers in 
devising EPR schemes.
At the moment, as part of the Resource and Waste 
strategy for England, Defra has embarked on a review of 
current EPR schemes in order to ‘incentivise producers to 
redesign products in support of a more circular economy’ 
and is also exploring whether the UK might implement 
more stretching targets than those under the EU’s circular 
economy package. It states the objective is to double 
resource productivity and eliminate avoidable waste of all 
kinds.  Alongside this there may be room to review wider 
aspects of the waste law inherited from the European Union 
including perhaps the working of the waste hierarchy and 
the definition of what constitutes waste, which may at times 
have inhibited re-use and remanufacturing. As part of this 
work, it is crucial that attention is paid to the need to utilise 
valuable resources in the form of critical materials in the 
waste stream.
ECO-DESIGN
Eco-design can help in the reduction and recycling of critical materials in waste flows and can promote best use of these materials 
to advance resource efficiency. Products subject to eco-design may be built to be more easily repairable or prove more robust, 
requiring fewer repairs. Oddly, and often wrongly, eco-design has been criticised in the British press as having produced less efficient 
vacuum cleaners or poorer quality lighting, meaning that this is an area which might receive calls for divergence post-Brexit, though 
this is not the present intention of the UK Government. 
For UK companies with European markets, meeting EU 
products standards will remain a necessary condition of 
selling into that market. The UK would be free to depart 
from such criteria domestically, but that might allow lower 
quality imports which could undercut a UK market attuned 
to higher standards. 
Politically there may be a reluctance to abide by EU 
eco-design standards when the UK has no input into 
the underlying design standards. Yet in the area of 
critical materials, the gains from design for durability and 
recyclability in areas such as solar panels could prove 
considerable. Although the UK will not be covered by 
these rules as such, it is not a difficult matter to ensure, by 
statutory instruments, that technical requirements in the UK 
map on to those in Europe. Whether the UK Government 
would be minded to take this approach may depend on 
whether trade agreements with countries outside of the EU 
would allow for the maintenance of current standards. It is 
possible that the UK could seek to promote ever greater 
innovation in eco-design in an attempt to build competitive 
advantage through product quality. Whatever the policy 
decisions made in this area, there are advantages in 
marshalling scarce resources through effective design.
EXTENDED PRODUCER RESPONSIBILITY AND WASTE STREAMS
The UK departs the EU at the point at which the EU is adopting a Circular Economy Package to further resource management; 
for example, as mentioned above the EU plans to apply a new Batteries Regulation from 1 January 2022. While existing producer 
responsibility models will be copied over into UK law as EU retained law, the UK needs to consider the extent and future scope of 
producer responsibility regimes. Such schemes help shift the costs of waste management from the public to the private sector where 
they can be internalised into the costs of the product.
Producers then have an incentive to reduce such costs by 
eliminating poor design and by ensuring materials’ recycling. 
A circular economy will not only reduce waste and produce 
savings but it can extend employment opportunities 
in the UK economy and drive down costs 
of raw materials, including the 
environmental and social 
costs. 
By way of example, proposals in the EU Batteries 
Regulation for a minimum share of recovered materials 
such as cobalt, lead, lithium and nickel in new batteries 
are aimed, according to the Preamble of the Regulation, at 
strategic autonomy and increased resilience in preparation 
for potential disruptions in supply. 
EPR schemes require carefully devised and robust 
regulation to eliminate freeriding but can be supported 
by fees and taxes on goods sold which can be designed 
to cover recycling costs, produce incentives to buy easily 
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BOX OUT
015
EU proposals for battery regulation
December 2020: Highlights 
	S Mandatory requirements on sustainability including -
 Carbon footprint declarations from 2024; maximum carbon footprint threshold by 2027 (Article 7) Labelling 
requirements (e.g. hazardous substances, sustainability information, data on expected lifetime) (Article 13)                                    
	S Mandatory requirements on minimum recycled content for industrial / EV batteries (Article 8) -
  Obligation to report recycled content by 1 January 2027
  Batteries to contain minimum amount of recycled cobalt, lithium, nickel and copper by 1 January 2030 
	S End of life management 
  EPR for EV batteries to secure waste management obligations (Article 47)
  New reporting obligations for collection of EV, automotive and industrial batteries
  Increased collection targets for portable batteries
	S Mandatory supply chain due diligence (Article 39)
	S Reducing use of toxic substances measures 
	S Total prohibition of landfilling of waste batteries
	S Increased recycling efficiency targets for lead-acid and lithium batteries: 
	S  Recycling efficiency targets for LIBs: 
 • 50% currently 
 • Rising to 65% in 2025 
 • Rising to  70% in 2030 
	S Improved battery design and lifetime
 • Proposed minimum requirements for EV battery performance/durability (Article 10)
 • Design for removal and dismantling
	S Specific recovery targets for valuable technology-critical metals
 • Cobalt: 90% by 2025, 95% by 2030
 • Nickel: 90% by 2025, 95% by 2030
 • Lithium: 35% by 2025, 70% by 2030
 • Copper: 90% by 2025, 95% by 2030
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ENVIRONMENTAL, SOCIAL AND  
GOVERNANCE (ESG) RISKS AND OPPORTUNITIES
Access to critical materials is beset by ESG risks both in terms of sourcing, supply chain vulnerabilities and end of life management. 
As we have shown, demand for critical materials will increase in the foreseeable future not least to support efforts to decarbonise 
to mitigate climate change. As we have also seen only a small fraction of these materials are sourced by recycling rather than by 
primary production. Although recycling may reduce reliance of mining of metals, it is idle to think that demand can be met purely by 
recycling our existing stock of critical materials. There are ESG risks attaching to further primary production, and these may increase 
as the more easily winnable stocks dwindle, but there are equally important ESG issues facing the waste management sector. The 
governance of metal recycling has shown promising but relatively recent improvement.
Many of the ESG risks attach to the extraction of minerals 
are well recognised. We might include impacts on:
	S The landscape with large volumes of often hazardous 
waste generated;
	S Land use and the loss of  land for other economic 
purposes;
	S The water environment in terms of abstraction, water 
stress and pollution;
	S Human health in terms of safety and exposure of 
workers;Biodiversity in terms of harm to or loss of 
habitats;
	S Biodiversity in terms of harm to or loss of habitats;
	S Cultural heritage including destruction of sites of 
historical significance;
	S Indigenous populations through displacement or shifts 
to artisanal labour.
These examples are not exhaustive but they do suggest 
that thought needs to be given to where and how primary 
materials are sourced and the extent to which the UK can 
provide these materials from domestic sources as well as 
supporting the need to carefully harness existing resources 
won at significant ESG costs by a national programme 
of recycling. Ultimately, the wider political support for the 
technologies and products developed utilising critical 
materials may depend on how responsible the sourcing of 
those material is seen to be.
There are also potential large rewards for metals production. 
The World Bank has launched a Climate-Smart Mining 
initiative to encourage sustainable development through 
provision of the raw materials needed to combat climate 
change175. 
The UN, too, are developing new resource governance 
measures176. 
Sustainable development opportunities are present even in 
the UK, as well as in the developing world.
The Regulation on conflict minerals has now widened 
towards a more general responsible sourcing agenda 
for Europe.  Manufacturers are increasingly required to 
demonstrate their environmental and social credentials 
and are taking additional interest in their supply chains. 
High profile companies such as Tesla, Google, Apple 
are ‘reaching’ back through their supply chains and, for 
example,  working on assurance at the smelter/refiner stage, 
buying mines or working with artisanal and small scale 
miners. The Rare Earths Industry Association177 are creating 
a life cycle inventory database to measure and communicate 
the environmental impact of rare earth oxide-containing 
(REO) products. Lynas Rare Earths60 has established itself 
as the main rare earth supplier outside China and makes 
responsible supply of rare earths one of the selling points 
for its products.
The child labour issue in cobalt in particular has also 
influenced organisations who now have wider aspirations 
for responsible sourcing and materials stewardship. The 
Global Battery Alliance who are setting up a ‘Battery 
Passport’ have three targeting impact actions 178. A 
European Battery Alliance was launched in 2017 to ‘make 
Europe a global leader in sustainable battery production 
and use’. In the UK, the International Council on Mining 
and Metals is based on London, and the UK led the 
establishment of the Extractive 
Industries Transparency 
Initiative. The Cobalt Institute 
(in Guildford) have 
introduced a responsible 
sourcing scheme as 
has the London Metal 
Exchange. 
Recommendations
S	The UK  needs to consider the 
development of policies which 
seek overtly to promote critical 
materials’ security;
S	The UK  should have regard to 
access to critical materials in 
monitoring determinations by the 
European Chemicals Agency in 
addressing substances of very 
high concern and in its own future 
policy on chemical risk;
S	Consideration should be given 
to labelling of the chemical 
composition of technology 
products with significant 
incorporation of critical materials;
S	Greater deliberation on the role 
that standards might play in 
facilitating a circular economy 
in technology metals would be 
welcome;
S	There are advantages in 
employing eco-design to ensure 
ready access to scarce resources 
at the products’ end of the life;
S	Carefully devised and easily 
measurable targets embedded in 
extended  producer responsibility 
schemes aimed at critical 
materials should be employed 
to drive investment in recycling 
technologies and infrastructure;
S	There are a number of initiatives 
on responsible sourcing of 
key minerals, emphasising the 
increasing attention paid to ESG 
risks and Government needs to 
consider how to encourage the 
development and harmonisation 
of such private transnational 
regulation and harness the 
benefits that they could bring.
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Organization (NEDO), the Japan Science and Technology 
Agency (JST) and the Japan Society for the Promotion of 
Science (JSPS)179,180,181.
Japan has trade agreements with resource-rich countries 
based on public–private partnerships through the Japan Oil, 
Gas and Metals National Corporation (JOGMEC)3, which 
has made overseas field surveys and provides financial 
assistance to high-risk mine developments. As an example, 
JOGMEC invested in rare earth mining in Australia to secure 
access to these materials. Japan’s raw materials strategy is 
probably the most interventionist of any country. 
The EU adopted a Raw Materials Initiative (RMI) in 2008 and 
has funded multiple research projects which have focused 
on specific materials. This has now resulted in the setting 
up of the EIT on Raw Materials and targeted investment to 
take processing technologies to industrial scale through 
the European Raw Materials Alliance (ERMA)182. The UK 
has been a key partner in many of these programmes but it 
is unclear to what extent they will benefit UK industry post- 
Brexit. The ERMA alliance recently announced that it is 
developing a cluster to strengthen the EU domestic supply 
chain for rare earth magnets and motors with large scale 
investment. 
Similarly the EU recently announced a £2.5 billion public 
investment in the battery supply chain which includes 
developing batteries with a lower cobalt content, developing 
greener methods to recycle lithium-ion batteries and links 
through to the mining sector. This funding was made through 
the EU executive’s “Important Project of Common European 
Interest” (IPCEI) regulation, which allows EU countries 
exceptionally to circumvent the bloc’s strict state aid rules 
183. Similar proposals are being suggested for rare earth 
magnets. 
The UK needs to consider the effectiveness of its 
engagement with the large EU 
funded research projects 
on technology-
critical metals 
in the EU 
Horizon 
Programmes where it has been a major contributor. It also 
needs to consider how it engages with the EIT KIC on Raw 
Materials, where major investments in the technology-critical 
metals supply chains are imminent.
The UK has unique technologies for processing of 
technology-critical metals but unless these are taken to 
scale quickly with similar public–private investment as in 
the EU and the US, the shelf life of any advantage to UK 
companies will be short.
As the UK has few indigenous supplies of technology-
critical metals, any future strategy must include resource 
diplomacy and this should form a key part of current and 
future trade negotiations for example the Comprehensive 
and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership 
(CPTPP). The UK should also consider using overseas 
development funds to build capacity in other regions of the 
globe. 
The UK has a major mining centre in London, with 
multinational mining company headquarters, the International 
Council on Mining and Metals, the London Metals 
Exchange, mine finance specialists, specialist technology-
critical metals exploration and mining companies listed 
on the London stock exchange and a Critical Minerals 
Association8. It also has equipment manufacturers and 
consultancies distributed throughout the UK and mining is 
identified as a ‘high potential opportunity’ by the Department 
for International Trade. This is a resource that can be 
harnessed both in specific element strategies and in making 
sure that UK mining and manufacturing is at the forefront of 
responsible sourcing and international resource governance. 
The UK should also consider measures to accelerate 
projects that seek to develop its indigenous sources of 
technology-critical metals (lithium and tungsten), including 
updating the regulatory environment. Some regional 
authorities, such as Cornwall, have already identified their 
geo-resources as distinctive opportunities. 
It is important to note, however, that without the 
refining capacity to convert raw materials into 
metals, alloys or chemicals there is no point 
in accessing the minerals which contain 
technology-critical metals. Frequently, 
the valuable parts of the supply chain 
are in these refining steps and in 
the materials that are manufactured 
from them (e.g. cathode material or 
magnet). Without these metallurgical 
or chemical processes the UK will not 
capture the full value of the products 
that will enable the greening of the 
economy. 
At the moment many of the environmental 
impacts from our economy are ‘offshored’ to 
countries where the materials are manufactured 
and in many cases disposed of. With respect to 
longer term sustainability goals, it should be recognised 
There is no single department in UK government that is responsible for critical materials, and there 
is no specific critical materials strategy unlike in many other countries. As a result the investment 
and interventions that have gone into supporting supply chain development in the UK have 
come through various organisations funded through the Department for Business, Energy & 
Industrial Strategy (BEIS), such as the Faraday Battery Challenge, the Advanced Propulsion 
Centre, the Automotive Transformation Fund and Driving the Electric Revolution, which are 
often targeted at specific industrial sectors. 
The fact that there is no national strategy means that multiple organisations are 
working on different challenges related to technology-critical metals but without 
a common plan. For example the Department for International Trade, British 
Geological Survey, Camborne School of Mines (University of Exeter) and 
the Critical Minerals Association have a focus on the mining and the minerals 
processing sectors; organisations such as DEFRA, WRAP and the Green Alliance 
are focused on the secondary economy, including technology-critical metals, and 
research funding bodies such as NERC and EPSRC have had separate research 
activities but in similar fields. 
The UK needs a national plan to target current and future investments and to maximise the 
benefit to the UK economy. A well formulated plan would underpin resource diplomacy, 
target strategic investments and be used to direct governance structures to promote 
mining, refining and the circular economy. 
In order to produce a national plan for technology-critical metals the UK should set up 
a single body to develop a coherent strategy, which would coordinate activity across 
different government departments including BEIS, DEFRA, MoD, FCDO, DIT, MHCLG 
and the Cabinet Office This body should draw on national expertise from the entire supply 
chain from a broad range of stakeholders. 
It was clear during the course of the Commission that, although there are many common 
issues surrounding access to these materials, more in-depth discussions are required 
about specific material supply chains. As part of the national plan there should be 
targeted activities and task forces to develop specific strategies for strategically 
important technology-critical metals. 
Generally most of the national materials strategies developed in other nations have 
3–5 pillars: securing access through developing domestic resources, the circular 
economy, developing substitutes and efficient processing, resource diplomacy, and 
stockpiling. The last of these has previously been ruled out as a viable strategy 
for the UK.
Japan has a comprehensive raw materials strategy to guide policy on critical 
raw materials. This includes: re-use and recycling, diversifying supplies 
through resource diplomacy, promoting the use of alternative materials 
and stockpiling. Japan has invested heavily in R&D with funding 
from the New Energy and Industrial Technology Development 
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It is clear from the evidence gathering sessions that the market for some technology-critical metals is failing with significant 
levels of state intervention in parts of the world. This has led to a near monopoly situation for some technology-critical 
metals which makes many UK industries vulnerable to future supply constraints. The use of these technology-critical 
metals will expand rapidly in the coming years as we shift to green technologies that underpin many of the UK’s key 
industrial sectors, and the UK’s Ten Point Plan for a Green Industrial Revolution. The UK economy will be even more 
dependent on these materials during this transition, and access to them will to a great extent determine where 
downstream product manufacturing is located.  
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that a circular economy is necessarily 
a processing and manufacturing 
economy.
In developing refining and processing 
capacity in the UK there is a 
compelling case to connect both ends 
of the supply chain, processing both 
primary and secondary materials. The 
secondary market offers increased 
security of supply, and often a lower 
environmental footprint and reduced 
cost, but it will not meet the huge 
demand from the rapidly expanding 
markets in these materials. 
Therefore the UK needs to incentivise 
large-scale private investment in the 
processing of these materials by 
2025 if it wants to secure access.  
This could be by large scale targeted 
investments which are directed by the 
new national body on critical materials 
through existing and future funding 
routes (APC, ATF, DER, Faraday 
Battery Challenge/Faraday Institution 
or the wind turbine sector). In 
addition, tax incentives for processing 
or  recycling of technology-critical 
metals could be introduced and 
tariff-free trade in these minerals or 
semi-processed metals, alloys and 
chemicals could be negotiated in 
trade deals. The UK already has key 
companies that process technology-
critical metals who should be 
supported to expand their activities 
whilst identifying and filling supply 
chain gaps in key industrial sectors. 
The UK should, anticipate and 
support future international legislation 
aimed at reducing the environmental 
burden and enhancing the social and 
economic value of technology-critical 
metals production from both primary 
and secondary sources. As outlined 
in the report, this is already starting to 
happen in EU regulations for batteries 
and we should invest in responsible 
sourcing and mining, processing and 
refining technologies which could 
give our companies a competitive 
advantage. 
The UK should seek to drive 
innovation through its national 
technology-critical metals strategy 
by investing in R&D — targeted at 
key materials and processes — in 
areas such as the circular economy, 
developing substitute materials and 
efficient processing techniques, 
which would provide an additional 
competitive advantage to UK industry. 
The projects will need to bridge 
funding councils, and technology-
readiness levels, to have real impact. 
This should include transnational 
funds and initiatives to work with other 
nations on supply chain developments 
for targeted technology-critical metals.
Research areas to target could 
include, for example, refining, 
separation, sensing, automated 
sorting, and re-processing of 
technology-critical metals, and should 
also include efficient processing 
routes for selected materials to 
reduce the environmental burden of 
production, reduce waste and improve 
performance. This would give the UK 
a competitive advantage in terms of 
cost, particularly if the environmental 
footprint of materials production is 
factored into the cost of products. 
It is also clear that we have funding 
gaps in fundamental research around 
rare earth materials and permanent 
magnets. 
There is a lack of data on technology-
critical metal flows into the UK which 
urgently needs to be addressed in 
order to guide policy. The UK should 
be mapping its strategic secondary 
resource, in particular, from the larger 
markets. The case for this has been 
well made by Velenturf et al. through 
the NERC programme Resource 
Recovery from Waste 41. The Office 
for National Statistics is exploring 
the feasibility of a National Materials 
Datahub to provide access to reliable 
data on the availability of materials to 
the UK’s public and private sectors 
and this should be accelerated and 
supported 42. 
The UK should create a single body responsible for developing strategic access to technology-critical metals and effective 
inter-departmental collaboration at government level. This body should link the primary and secondary markets for 
technology-critical metals and develop, and oversee, a full UK technology-critical metals strategy. 
Seek opportunities to diversify its access to primary resources of technology-critical metals, through resource 
diplomacy. This should form part of any new trade negotiations.
Actively attract and provide support for large-scale strategic private investments for supply-chain development of 
technology-critical metals both at home and abroad, and aim to make the UK an international refining centre for 
specific technology-critical metals by 2025. 
Create individual task forces bridging primary and secondary materials for targeted technology-critical metals. 
These should identify the investments that would be required to set up primary processing, refining and 
recycling facilities for these materials.
Introduce incentives to encourage recycling, refining and processing of technology-critical metals in the 
UK, particularly for processes that deliver a lower environmental footprint.
Consider measures to accelerate projects that seek to develop our indigenous sources of 
technology-critical metals (lithium, tungsten), including updating the regulatory environment. 
Prioritise technology-critical metals in UK research and innovation strategies in areas such as 
the circular economy, developing substitute materials and efficient processing techniques 
for technology-critical metals. In particular, this could be in the form of transnational funding 
initiatives to work with other nations on supply-chain developments for targeted technology-
critical metals. The projects will need to bridge funding councils, and TRL levels, to have 
real impact.
Invest in the skills base in advanced materials processing and refining of technology-
critical metals. 
Urgently address the lack of data on material flows for technology-critical metals 
into and out of the UK economy. 
Review waste management law with a view to promoting recovery of 
technology-critical metals and ensure that there are no unnecessary 
regulatory barriers. 
Encourage information exchange through the whole supply chain to 
ensure the challenges for recyclers are well understood by the product 
designers. This will evolve through time and the new UKRI Met4Tech 
hub184 could and should be used as a vehicle for this. Schemes like 
the new battery passports could be implemented across different 
sectors. 
Consider how appropriate governance structures might ensure 
sustainability and resilience in the supply chain for technology-
critical metals (see detailed recommendations in the 
Goverance section of the report).  
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APPENDIX 1 - COMMISION WORK PROGRAMME
The Policy Commission heard and deliberated on evidence from a range of sources.  These were explored through a variety of tools 
including consultations and group discussions.
Scoping Phase Activities included:
Developing the idea for the Policy Commission with University of Birmingham 
academics and partners.
Appointing the Commissioners.
Survey of the Commissioners by email to agree the content and process of the 
Policy Commission and who to approach for evidence.
Evidence Gathering
Research of literature and data in the public domain.
Evidence Gathering Workshops
Four evidence gathering workshops were held, followed by an additional work-
shop to agree recommendations:
Session 1 – Overview of Critical Materials and Primary Sources (28th Octo-
ber 2019)
10 St. James Square, London
Session 2 – Supply Chain, Demand and Processing Capability (12th Novem-
ber 2019)
The Institution of Engineering & Technology, Austin Court, Birmingham
Session 3 – End of Life, Substitution and Efficient Use (13th January 2020)
Royal Academy of Engineering, London
Session 4 – Trade Investment, Economic, Ethical Considerations (14th Janu-
ary 2020)
Royal Society, London
Session 5 – Discussing Findings, Formulating the Report (4th March 2020)
The Institute of Materials, Minerals & Mining, London
Review and Writing Phase
Activities included:
Reviewing written evidence submitted to the commission.
Commissioners’ meeting to finalise the content and format of the report
Finalising the findings and recommendations of the Commission.
Policy Commission Launch
The policy commission was originally scheduled to launch in Westminster in 
April 2020.
The rapidly changing situation with the Coronavirus pandemic stymied several 
attempts to organise an in-person launch of the report. The report has been 
updated to reflect the changing context in the intervening period, and the re-
port will initially be launched virtually. It is our intention to convene face-to-face 
engagement events around the report as soon as the situation permits.
Parliamentary Preview of the Report Findings (4th March 2021)
Online
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Sir John Beddington
FORMER GOVERNMENT CHEIF SCIENTIFIC ADVISOR
John Beddington started his studies initially at the LSE where he took a BSc and 
MSc.  He then moved to Edinburgh to do a PhD in what was then the rather new 
discipline of Mathematical Ecology.  His academic career was initially at York 
University and subsequently at Imperial College. He was elected Fellow of the 
Royal Society in 2001 and appointed CMG in 2004.
He was from 2008 until 2013 the Government Chief Scientific Adviser (GCSA) 
reporting directly to the Prime Minister.  As GCSA, he was responsible for 
increasing the scientific capacity across Whitehall by encouraging all major 
departments of state to recruit a Chief Scientific Adviser.
During his time as GCSA he set up the Scientific Advisory Group in Emergencies 
(SAGE) that reported to the COBRA committee.  He ran the Foresight Team 
that reported on such varied issues as Food Security, Climate Change Threats 
and High Speed Financial Trading and was responsible for reviews on inter alia 
Nuclear Energy, High Speed Computing in Climate Science and the Scientific 
Contribution to National Security.
He was awarded a Knighthood in 2010 and in June 2014 received The Order of the Rising Sun from the Japanese 
Government. 
He is Senior Fellow at the Oxford Martin School and Professor of Natural Resource Management at Oxford University.   
Amongst other activities he is a Non-Executive Director of the Met Office, chairs the Boards of Rothamsted Research and 
the Systemic Risk Institute at the LSE.  He is President of London Zoo and a Trustee of the Natural History Museum. 
Allan Walton 
PROFESSOR OF CRITICAL AND MAGNETIC MATERIALS, UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM. 
Prof Walton is the co-director of the Birmingham Centre for Strategic Elements 
and Critical Materials (BCSECM) and he leads the Magnetic Materials Group 
(MMG) at the University of Birmingham. He is the principal investigator for the 
UKRI funded network on Critical Elements and Materials (CrEAM).
He has an extensive portfolio of interdisciplinary research projects funded 
through the EU and UK on processing and recycling of rare earth magnetic 
materials. He was previously the chair of the UK Magnetics Society.
Dr Paul Anderson
READER IN INORGANIC AND MATERIALS CHEMISTRY, UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM.
Paul Anderson is the co-director of the Birmingham Centre for Strategic Elements 
and Critical Materials (BCSECM) and principal investigator for the Faraday 
Institution ReLiB project, dedicated to the development of new technologies for 
efficient end of life management of automotive lithium ion batteries. 
The synthesis and development of improved materials for energy applications 
has been the major focus of his research for over two decades, with particular 
interests in ion mobility in hydrogen storage materials and related lithium and 
proton electrolyte systems.
Andy Abbott 
PROFESSOR OF PHYSICAL CHEMISTRY, THE UNIVERSITY OF LEICESTER
Professor Andy Abbott is Professor of Physical Chemistry at the University 
of Leicester. His research focusses on material processing using sustainable 
wet methods to optimise process efficiency and ensure optimum selectivity of 
recovery. He developed a novel type of solvent called Deep Eutectic Solvents and 
exploited these through a spin-out company Scionix Ltd. He was Deputy Pro-vice 
Chancellor for Enterprise and is developing courses to embed entrepreneurial 
skills into undergraduate and postgraduate teaching programs.
Andy has worked on numerous circular economy projects covering a wide variety 
of metals and technologies including printed circuit boards, magnets, steel waste, 
lithium ion batteries, aerospace metals and car catalysts. He is also engaged 
in developing new methods of primary metal extraction and methods of metal 
processing. He is a Fellow of the Royal Society of Chemistry.
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Andrew Bloodworth 
POLICY DIRECTOR, BRITISH GEOLOGICAL SURVEY
As Policy Director, Andrew’s role is to lead and co-ordinate BGS interaction 
with policy- and decision-makers in the public sector. He is also Deputy Chief 
Scientist for the BGS Decarbonisation and Resource Management challenge 
area. His own interests include UK resource security, critical minerals and the 
impact of mining on developing countries. He has worked extensively in Africa 
and elsewhere in the developing world and was formerly Mining Advisor to the 
then UK Department for International Development (FCDO).
Andrew is a Chartered Geologist and a Council Member and Trustee of the 
Geological Society of London. He is also a member of the UK Minerals Forum, 
the Confederation of British Industry Minerals Group and the Mineral Resources 
Expert Group of EuroGeosurveys.
Rob Chaddock
STRATEGIC DEVELOPMENT MANAGER, EUROPEAN METAL RECYCLING LTD.
Rob has a 30 year career in the waste and recycling industry, with half of that 
spent at EMR, a global leader in the supply of sustainable secondary raw 
materials.
Much of that time has been focussed on positioning the business and industry to 
deal with future opportunities and challenges, created by legislation, technology 
and market development.
Rob is currently working on a range of projects including preparing to recycle the 
vehicles of the future, returning the new materials they will contain to the value 
chain, building new recycling capacity and capabilities in the UK and maximising 
the recycling rates of metals, plastics and other materials from complex post 
consumer goods.
Vernon Gibson
Vernon Gibson is an adviser to industry, academia and government on science 
and technology. A chemist by background, he holds Visiting Professorships 
at the Universities of Manchester, Oxford and Imperial College London and is 
Executive Director of the BP International Centre for Advanced Materials centred 
in Manchester. He was Chief Scientific Adviser to the Ministry of Defence 2012-
2016 and Chief Chemist at BP 2008-2012. He is currently an adviser to the 
Integrated Review Taskforce within the Prime Minister’s Office.
Neil Glover
HEAD OF MATERIALS RESEARCH, ROLLS ROYCE
Neil is Head of Materials Research at Rolls-Royce, based in Derby, and is a 
Fellow and President of the Institute of Materials, Minerals and Mining.
Neil has over 20 years of experience of materials engineering for aerospace 
and other high integrity applications.  His current role is focused on materials 
technology to support new product opportunities in Rolls-Royce including 
electric and hybrid flight.  Previous roles have spanned multiple business sectors 
and materials engineering across the product life-cycle.  
For many years Neil was responsible for Rolls-Royce’s aerospace materials 
research portfolio, including the company’s extensive external network for 
materials research. 
He is a regular speaker at national and international events and has been a 
member of numerous national advisory groups. He is a strong advocate of STEM 
education and a regular speaker at schools events.
Robin Grimes 
PROFESSOR OF MATERIALS PHYSICS, IMPERIAL COLLEGE
Robin Grimes is the Steele Chair of Energy Materials at Imperial College. In 2017 
he became Chief Scientific Adviser (nuclear) to the Ministry of Defence. Between 
2013 and 2018 he was Chief Scientific Adviser to the Foreign & Commonwealth. 
In his research, he uses computer simulation techniques to predict the behaviour 
of materials for energy applications including nuclear fission and fusion, fuel cells, 
batteries and solar cells. Robin is a Fellow of the Royal Society and the Royal 
Academy of Engineering.
Robert Gross
DIRECTOR OF THE UK ENERGY RESEARCH CENTRE (UKERC)
 He is Professor of Energy Policy and Technology at Imperial College London, 
where he was the Director for the Centre for Energy Policy and Technology 
(ICEPT) and the Director of Policy at the Energy Futures Lab. He has extensive 
teaching and post-graduate training experience.
Robert is a Fellow and Council member of the Energy Institute. He is also Council 
member and former Chair of the British Institute of Energy Economists (BIEE). 
Robert is currently a member of the Academic Advisory Panel for Ofgem (2018 
to date). He has been a specialist advisor to 3 Parliamentary Select Committees, 
has extensive engagement with UK policymaking, and has published extensively 
on energy policy, economics and technological innovation.
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Gavin Harper  
RESEARCH FELLOW, BIRMINGHAM CENTRE FOR STRATEGIC ELEMENTS AND CRITICAL MATERIALS
Gavin is a Faraday Institution Research Fellow, working on the ReLiB project, 
recycling Lithium Ion Batteries. Prior to this, he was Energy Development 
Manager at the University of Birmingham, developing the Birmingham Energy 
Institute under the Directorship of Professor Martin Freer. In this role he worked 
with Professor Allan Walton and Paul Anderson to develop the Birmingham 
Centre for Strategic Elements & Critical Materials.
He is a Fellow of the Royal Society of Arts, Manufactures and Commerce and the 
Higher Education Academy and a Member of the Institution of Engineering and 
Technology and Chartered Management Institute. He is a Chartered Manager. 
He is a Researcher Co-Investigator on the new UKRI Interdisciplinary Circular 
Economy Centre for Technology Metals.
Robert Lee 
EMERITUS PROFESSOR OF LAW, THE UNIVERSITY OF BIRMINGHAM
Professor Robert Lee is former Head of Birmingham Law School and Director 
of the Centre for Professional Legal Education and Research (CEPLER). Before 
taking up this post, Bob was Co-Director of the ESRC Research Centre on 
Business Responsibility, Accountability, Sustainability and Society at Cardiff 
University. Bob has written books on the regulation of biomedicine and food 
regulation He is an editorial board member of the Journal of Law and Society and 
of Environmental Liability.
Bob is an honorary life member of the UK Environmental Law Association and 
has acted as special adviser both the UK and the European Parliament and the 
National Assembly for Wales as well as to UN bodies such as UNEP and UNDP. 
He is a Fellow of the Royal College of Medicine and of the Academy of Social 
Sciences and holds a higher doctorate (LL.D.) for his work on regulation.
Rupert Lewis 
CHIEF SCIENCE POLICY OFFICER, THE ROYAL SOCIETY
Rupert’s role is to lead the Society’s policy work across a range of topics 
including data, climate and energy, natural resources and the biosphere, 
emerging technology and innovation, and science policy. Before joining the Royal 
Society Rupert led the Government Office for Science (GO-Science) which 
supports the Government’s Chief Scientific Adviser, providing science advice to 
the Prime Minister and to the Cabinet, carrying out strategic Foresight projects, 
and the science of emergency response. His previous roles include head of 
Automotive policy in the Department of Business, Energy, and Industrial Strategy, 
where he also led work on business risks and contingency planning and was 
deputy Chief Scientific Adviser. In Defra he headed Climate Adaptation policy, 
leading the UK’s first cross-economy climate risk assessment. He also set up 
the Prime Minister’s ‘Business Council for Britain’. Rupert has a BSc in Marine 
Biology, a PhD in genetics, and worked on aquaculture development and start-
ups in SE Asia, South Africa, and Europe prior to joining Government in 2002.
Dave OudeNijeweme 
HEAD OF TECHNOLOGY TRENDS, ADVANCED PROPULSION CENTRE UK
Dave has spent over 18 years in automotive companies and consultancies, with 
a focus on research and development of clean and efficient vehicles.
This included a stint at JLR getting new engines & technologies to market, 
time at MAHLE powertrain working in low CO2 technology demonstrator 
projects including a downsized engine, a range extender electric 
vehicle and a solar-driven Stirling engine as well as running a number of 
client projects. More recently Dave worked at E4tech, which is a strategic 
consultancy in sustainable energy.
At the APC Dave is responsible for providing strategic insights into future 
automotive technologies (road mapping) and how the UK should position itself 
to benefit most. His remit includes automotive propulsion as well as Connected 
and Autonomous Vehicle (CAV) technologies. Currently he is helping to build 
the supply chain for electrified vehicles.
Emma Schofield
PLATINUM GROUP METAL (PGM) RESEARCH FELLOW, JOHNSON 
MATTHEY (JM), UK
Emma joined JM in 2004, keen to use inorganic chemistry to make the world a 
cleaner and healthier place in a company dedicated to creating the sustainable 
technologies of the future. As Recycling and Separation Technologies 
Research Manager, Emma focussed on understanding and improving the 
environmental impact of the industrial processes by which PGMs and lithium 
ion battery metals are recycled.  She became a JM Research Fellow in January 
this year, with the remit to promote the understanding and application of PGMs 
in sustainable technologies globally.
Frances Wall 
PROFESSOR OF APPLIED MINERALOGY, CAMBORNE SCHOOL OF 
MINES (CMS), UNIVERSITY OF EXETER
Frances Wall specialises in technology raw materials, especially rare earth 
elements, with interests in geology, processing, responsible sourcing and 
circular economy. A former Head of CSM, Frances is PI for the new UKRI 
Interdisciplinary Circular Economy Centre in Technology Metals and has 
recently been leading two international consortium research projects on critical 
metals (www.sosrare.org, www.carbonatites.eu). She also leads a large Deep 
Digital Cornwall project to encourage business RD&I, is part of the MIREU 
(mining and metallurgy regions of Europe Horizons 2020 project) project 
and a member of the Geological Society Decarbonisation Group. Frances 
was named one of the 100 Global Inspirational Women in Mining 2016 and 
awarded the William Smith medal of the Geological Society of London for 
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Andy Abbott – Professor of Physical Chemistry, University of Leicester
Eoin Bailey – UK Innovations Manager, Celsa Steel UK
Hugo Brodie – Vice President, Sustainability, London Metal Exchange
David Brown – Research Specialist, SG Technologies Ltd.
Carlo Burkhardt – Scientific Director, Institute for Precious and Technology Metals, Pforzheim University
Rob Chaddock – Strategic Development Manager, European Metal Recycling
Susanne Coles – Business Growth Manager, Knowledge Transfer Network
Wavell Coulson – Buyer, Rolls Royce plc.
Tony Davis – Managing Director, Sycamore Environmental Ltd.
William Dawes – Chief Executive, Mkango Resources Ltd.
James Goddin Manager – Strategic Relationships, Granta Design
Gareth Hatch – Managing Director, Strategic Materials Advisors
Tony Hartwell – Director, Sustainable Materials Engineering Ltd.
Ian Higgins – Managing Director, Less Common Metals Ltd.
Robert Lee – Director, Centre for Professional Legal Education and Research, Birmingham Law School, University of Birmingham
Dylan McFarlane – Senior Programme Officer, Pact, Mines to Market
David Peck – Associate Professor, Faculty Architecture and Built Environment, Delft University of Technology
Carol-Lynne Pettit – Senior Manager – Sustainability, Cobalt Institute
Darryn Quayle – Mining Engineer and Business Specialist, UK Government Department of International Trade
Rupen Raithatha – Market Research Director, Johnson Matthey
Jon Regnart – Automotive Trend Strategist, Advanced Propulsion Centre
Vikki Roberts – Global Supply Chain Manager, Johnson Matthey
Neil Rowson – Laboratory Manager, Bunting – Redditch
Luis Tercero Espinoza – Head of Business Unit Systemic Risks, Competence Centre Sustainability and Infrastructure Systems, 
Fraunhofer Institute for Systems and Innovation Research ISI
Arwyn Thomas – Head of Drive Train Design, Siemens Gamesa Renewable Energy
Simon Trevenna – Implementation and Outcomes Manager, Department for Business, Energy and International Strategy
Rustam Stolkin – Director, UK National Centre for Nuclear Robotics, University of Birmingham






GLOSSARY OF TERMS, ABBREVIATIONS AND ACRONYMS
Artisanal Mining Informal mining employing rudimentary methods.
ATF Authorised Treatment Facility
BCSECM Birmingham Centre for Strategic Elements & Critical Materials, University of Birmingham
BEIS Department for Business, Energy & Industrial Strategy
Beneficiation A process that improves the economic value of an ore resulting in a higher-grade product and a waste stream 
(tailings).
Carbon Budget Carbon budgets tie an anticipated level of future warming to a total amount of CO2 emissions.
CAV Connected and Autonomous Vehicle
CEPLER Centre for Professional Legal Education and Research, University of Birmingham
Clean Technologies Technologies that can aid in decarbonisation with improved environmental performance.
Conflict Minerals Currently include tantalum, tin, tungsten and gold and are often referred to as 3TG.
CREAM The EPRSC Critical Elements and Materials Network.
CRMs Critical Raw Materials (See Critical Materials)
Critical Materials Critical materials are materials of high economic importance whose supply is associated with a high risk.
Critical Raw Materials See Critical Materials
CSM Camborne School of Mines, University of Exeter
DEFRA Department for Environment, Food & Rural Affairs
DRC Democratic Republic of Congo
DIT Department for International Trade
Downstream Processes in the supply chain to create finished goods.
Earth Abundant Raw materials which are existing in plentiful supply and are commonplace in the Earth’s crust.
ECHA European Chemicals Agency
Economic Importance One of the main assessment parameters (in addition to supply risk) of the revised EC methodology to assess 
the criticality of a raw material indicating the importance of a raw material to the EU economy.
Energy Vector An energy vector allows for the transfer in space and time of a quantity of energy. Increasingly carbon 
intensive hydrocarbon fuels are being replaced with low carbon energy vectors such as electricity and 
hydrogen.
EPSRC Engineering and Physical Science Research Council
ERECON European Rare Earths Competency Network
ETFs Exchange Traded Funds
EV Electric Vehicles
FCDO Foreign, Commonwealth & Development Office
GCSA Government Chief Scientific Adviser
GHS Globally Harmonised System
HEV Hybrid Electric Vehicles
Heavy Rare Earth 
Elements (HRE)
Yttrium, europium, gadolinium, terbium, dysprosium, holmium, erbium, thulium, ytterbium, and lutetium are the 
"heavy rare earths." Yttrium is lighter than the light rare earth elements but is included in the heavy rare earths 
because of its chemical and physical associations with heavy rare earth  deposits.
Hydrogen Economy The hydrogen economy is an envisioned future in which hydrogen is used as an energy vector in many 
applications.
Hot Pressing A high-pressure, low-strain-rate powder metallurgical process employing temperatures high enough to induce 
sintering and creep processes when processing powders.
Hydrometallurgy A technique within the field of extractive metallurgy for obtaining of metals from their ores using aqueous 
solutions.
Light Rare Earth 
Elements (LRE)
Lanthanum, cerium, praseodymium, neodymium, promethium, and samarium
LME London Metals Exchange
Mineral Resources Mineral resources are a concentration of material of intrinsic economic interest in or on the earth's crust.
MHCLG Ministry of Housing, Communities and Local Government
MMG Magnetic Materials Group, University of Birmingham
MoD Ministry of Defence
NERC Natural Environment Research Council
NOx nitrogen oxides
OECD Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development
Primary Materials Materials that are mined or extracted from the Earth, as opposed to materials that are extracted from 
previously used material through recycling. (See also Secondary Material).
Platinum Group Metals 
(PGMs)
The platinum group metals are six transition elements that are chemically very similar (palladium, rhodium, 
iridium, osmium and ruthenium).  They are known for their purity, high melting points and unique catalytic 
properties.
POST Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology
Pyrometallurgy The use of high temperatures to extract and purify metals.
Rare earth Elements 
(REE)
The rare earth elements are defined as the group of 17 elements that include the 15 lanthanoids and 
scandium and yttrium.  The rare earth elements are found in applications that exploit their magnetic, catalytic 
and optical properties.
REACH Registration, Evaluation, Authorisation and Restriction of Chemicals, A European Regulation
REE See Rare Earth Elements, See also HRE, LRE
Refining The process of taking a raw material and transforming it into a usable product. Often there are many refining 
and intermediate steps before a raw material reaches applications.
Reserves The economically mineable part of an Indicated Mineral Resource demonstrated by a Preliminary Feasibility 
Study.
Resources (Mineral) Resources, in the context of minerals are a concentration of material of intrinsic economic interest in or on the 
earth's crust.
SAGE Scientific Advisory Group in Emergencies
Secondary Materials Materials that have been produced through the recycling of previously used materials, rather than materials 
which are extracted from the earth. 
Sintering Where powdered materials are coalesced into a solid or porous mass through heating and sometimes 
compression, without taking that material into a liquid phase.
Smelter An installation or factory for smelting a metal from its ore.
Superalloys Alloys based on Group VIIB elements, capable of withstanding high temperatures, high stresses and often 
highly oxidising atmospheres.  The three major classes of superalloy are nickel-, iron- and cobalt based alloys.
Supply Risk One of the main assessment parameters (in addition to economic importance) of the revised EC methodology 
to assess the criticality of a raw material.  The supply risk parameter is based on the concentration of primary 
supply from countries and their governance incorporating other factors such as trade, import dependency 
and supply mix to the EU.
SVHCs Substances of Very High Concern
Technology-Critical  
Metal (TCM)
Metals used in high technology products that are also considered Critical Materials.  
(See also: Critical Materials)
Technology Metals Metals used in high technology products.
TRLs Technology Readiness Levels
UKRI UK Research & Innovation
WEEE Waste Electrical & Electronic Equipment
WRAP Waste & Resource Efficiency Programme - registered charity established to work with businesses, individuals 
and communities to achieve a circular economy by helping them reduce waste, develop sustainable products 
and use resources in an efficient way.
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Fig. 1, Page 16 European Commission Study on the EU’s List of Critical Raw Materials (2020), Economic Importance and Supply Risk Results of   
   2020 Criticality Assessment. Emphasis changed to focus on Technology Critical Metals
Fig. 2, Page 17 Classic criticality assessment developed by the US National Research Council in 2008
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Fig. 8, Page 32 World mine production of rare earths 2019. Reproduced from USGS
Fig. 9, Page 33 Chinese President Xi visits a rare earth processing plant
    On 20th May, 2019 the Chinese President Xi Jinping, the general secretary of the Communist Party of China Central Committee   
   and chairman of the Central Military Commission visiting JL MAG Rare-Earth Co. Ltd
Fig. 10, Page 42 Representation of the circular economy
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Fig. 23, Page 51 Examples of rare-earth element deposits and qualitative analysis of their mining and processing characteristics. Characteristics   
   shaded yellow are generally advantageous to responsible sourcing, grey are less so and unshaded cells are less favourable. From   
   Wall, F., Rollat, Pell, R.S.(2017)
Fig. 24, Page 51 Image of tailings pond at Bayan Obo
Fig. 25, Page 52 Sintering of Nd-Fe-B magnets
Fig. 26, Page 53 Prices for neodymium and dysprosium metals through time
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Fig. 28, Page 56 Long term battery technology trends, London. IHS Markit, 2021
Fig. 29, Page 57 Approximate size of lithium-ion battery applications in Wh
Fig. 30, Page 58 One type of Lithium-ion battery, the pouch cell, used in automotive applications.
Fig. 31, Page 58 Demand growth for lithium-ion batteries
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Fig. 34, Page 59 Future global sales of main lithium-ion battery market segments
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Fig. 36, Page 60 Demand for battery materials. Source: IHS, The Advanced Propulsion Centre UK Ltd
Fig. 37, Page 61 Rules of origin for batteries and electrified vehicles provide a 6-year phase-in period. Source: BEIS
Fig. 38, Page 62 Battery value chain, courtesy of APC
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Fig. 41, Page 64 Cobalt market balance
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Fig. 58, Page 71 Salar de Uyuni, Potosi, Bolivia, South America. The world largest salt and lithium reserve at 3650 meters above sea level. Potosi,   
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Fig. 71, Page 79 Mwinilunga, Zambia - December 6th, 2012: Three young African miners work in an underground mine and dig for resources
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